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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this disseration is to examine the distribution of illegal hunting and
fishing violations across Texas counties in respect to the economic structure. Illegal hunting
plays a part in the extraction of resources that are overly withdrawn, and criminologists have
ignored this form of deviancy that has large ramifications for the environment. To view this
criminal phenomenon, the study uses the Treadmill of Production theory to determine economic
structural factors and whether those factors explain the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing.
Using regression analyses and SatScan, the findings suggested that while there are significant
factors related to the distribution of illegal hunting, these factors do not explain the distribution
completely when a spatial component is included. Thus, while the economic structure does
explain the distribution when comparing illegal hunting and fishing across counties, it does not
explain individual county’s illegal hunting and fishing activity within them. Texas state and
county governments should not form a uniform policy across Texas, but have policy situated for
each county in order to address this issue.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examined whether variables from two theoretical fields (e.g., green
criminology and environmental sociology) employed to explain environmental destruction and
disorganization, and situational-opportunity and social structural variables that have been used to
predict the geographic distribution of crime, are relevant for understanding the geographic
distribution of hunting and fishing violations across counties in Texas. To explore this
possibility, political economic green criminological (PEG-C) explanations of environmental
crimes will serve as the primary theoretical background for this research. The key theoretical
variables that will be explored are drawn from treadmill of production theory in regards to
environmental disorganization. Control variables representing another green criminological
subfield, conservation criminology, and those representing relevant social structural research on
crime will also be included. Additionally, separate tests of the geographic explanations of crime
will be examined. The significant variables from initial tests of each approach will be included in
a “combined” model to determine which factors appear to be significant predictors of hunting
and fishing violations (IH&F). Predictor variables were employed to draw hot and cold spot
maps of hunting and fishing violations in Texas counties.
Criminologists have not widely examined IH&F. Illegal hunting and fishing can
potentially produce numerous ecological impacts for wildlife and ecosystems (Sollund, 2017;
Petrossian, 2015; Petrossian and Clarke, 2014). For example, hunting keystone wildlife species like
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tigers, elephants, and wolves contributes to the decline of some species, and may also have
adverse ecological system impacts (Beschta and Ripple, 2016; Breuer, Maisels, and Fishlock,
2016; Painter et al., 2015; Ripple et al., 2015; Marshall et al., 2014; O’Brien, Kinnaird, and
Wibisono, 2006). In other words, illegal hunting and fishing can have wide ranging ecological
effects criminologist often overlook. In addition, IH&F are violations of law which therefore
make those acts fall into the categories that behaviors criminologists have traditionally
examined. At the same time, while IH&F are criminal activities, criminologist have ignored
understanding the causes of these crimes and their distribution. With a growing awareness of
environmental issues, there is importance that criminologist join in expanding environmental
protection and contribute efforts to impact environmental policies and criminal acts against those
policies. In recent years, this situation has begun to change and some criminologists have taken
up the study of IH&F. The following section reviews some of what is known about illegal
hunting and fishing.

What is Known about Illegal Hunting and Fishing
Illegal hunting is an important criminal behavior to explore due to the cultural importance
of hunting activity in the United States of America (USA). Animals have long been hunted
(Eliason, 2020; Jacoby, 2003), and a hunting and fishing culture is well established in the United
States of America (Williams, 2015; Herman, 2014; Fine, 2000). In the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, threats to the vitality of wildlife populations such as mass hunting for both big game
(e.g., bears, cougars, and wolves) and birds stimulated concern for wildlife preservation,
particularly among economically advantaged outdoorsmen (Beschta and Ripple, 2016; Ripple,
Beschta, and Painter, 2015; Jacoby, 2003). The desire to reserve the traditions of hunting and
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fishing and access to wild game provided a foundation for the support of public land (Eliason,
2020; Walberg, Cornicelli, and Fulton, 2018; Newman, 2017; Herman, 2014). Public land gives
everyone the right to access fauna for their own personal benefits (Eliason, 2020), but the
privatization of land has restricted access to fauna for the public (Eliason, 2020; Jacoby, 2003).
Hunt Talk Radio is a podcast hosted by Randy Newman who interviews scholars around hunting,
public lands, and conservation. On this podcast, Dr. Greg Blascovish, founder of Keep It Public,
and Dr. Randall Williams, employee of the Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership,
argued that the USA was founded on the idea that anyone can be a gentleman which coincided
with being a sportsman (Newman, 2017); in contrast to the UK where the idea of hunting was
restricted to the elite (Herman, 2014). Keeping the land public protects the environment or
common collective (i.e. the public) from privatization and business exploitation. Research has
also found that private land has encouraged the decline in hunting participation for the common
man, and increased hunting for a subgroup of wealthier individuals (Walberg et al., 2018;
Eliason, 2017; Williams, 2015), causing conflict resulting in illegal hunting activity (Eliason,
2020; Jacoby, 2003; Forsyth, Gramling, and Wooddell, 1998). The wilderness and fauna in the
USA are seen as a right for the public, not just for the elite, but there is little research on how the
public acts within a political economy that encourages privatization and business.
This conflict between business and the public has been expressed throughout the history
of conservation within the USA with known relationships to IH&F (Sawyer, 2013; Jacoby,
2003); however, IH&F, their extent and distribution, have not been well studied within
criminology. Moreover, little is known about the extent and distribution of wildlife crime in
general particularly in the USA. Much of the available wildlife crime data and research come
from other countries, and similarly tends to show rising rates of IH&F over time, though these
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trends vary by species (Brisman and South, 2018). Yet, only a handful of studies have examined
trends and patterns of wildlife crimes in the USA (Kurland, Pires, and Marteache, 2018; Fischer,
Naiman, Lowassa, Randall, and Rentsch, 2014; Crow, Shelley, and Stretesky, 2013; Haines et
al., 2012).
The purpose of this dissertation is to address the distribution of IH&F activity by
analyzing official records from law enforcement in Texas. Here, the focus is on IH&F across
counties in Texas assessed whether county characteristics affected the distribution of IH&F. For
Texas, IH&F is a violation of hunting and fishing regulations overseen by the Texas Parks and
Wildlife codes (https://tpwd.texas.gov/regulations/outdoor-annual/). While these violations are
defined as crimes by the law, criminologist have paid little attention to these crimes, and have
not explored their distribution, or factors that may affect the distribution of those crimes
geographically. There is a rich tradition of geographic or spatial analysis within the field of
criminology which has been applied to a variety of subjects, and in particular the urban
geography of crime. In recent years, however, this approach has been increasingly applied to
rural crime (Kaylen and Pridemore 2013), but has not been applied to hunting and fishing
violations.
Prior criminological research around wildlife crimes suggests that characteristics of
places or situations can affect the volume of IH&F found in a location (Moreto and Pires, 2018).
These studies have been derived from PEG-C and conservation criminology, which suggest that
social and economic structural variables might potentially affect the geographic distribution of
IH&F. The primary theoretical argument for this association can be drawn from PEG-C and
environmental sociology, through the use of treadmill of production (ToP) theory. Control
variables useful for assessing the geography of wildlife crime can, however, also be gleaned
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from the conservation criminology literature, which primarily address situational context and
opportunity structures for crime. Alternatively, a small subgroup of research on IH&F, departing
from both fields, suggest that certain social factors may also play a role in explaining.

The Scope and Focus of the Dissertation
IH&F is defined differently across the USA, by both state and federal authorities. The
current study focused attention on one state in an effort to determine whether the structural
characteristics of counties play a role in understanding the distribution of IH&F violations across
counties in Texas. Texas, with its 254 counties, provided a unique opportunity to examine the
distribution of IH&F given the large number of counties. The IH&F data were collected from
the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department which included hunting and fishing violations across
the counties in Texas for the year 2015. Macro-level, county specific explanatory variables
representing arguments from green criminology and conservation criminology research were
drawn from several sources described later in this dissertation. The year 2015 was selected for
two primary reasons. The first involved data availability and efforts to match data across
datasets. Second, the data were limited to 2015 given expenses associated with obtaining hunting
and fishing violations from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, which charges a fee to
obtain each year of data. Further details and relevance about the data can be found in the
methods section. Given that the data only address the year 2015, the dissertation is considered
with the structural associations with the distribution of IH&F.
The focus on Texas also reflected this strong interest and history in conservation and
hunting (Sawyer, 2013). Research has found struggles between private landowners and the
economic cost of hunting on private property, and how the rights of the public to hunt conflict
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with the rights of private property landowner (Bean, 1997; Thomas et al., 1994). Landowners
were also split on whether or not their land should be used for conservation and animal
repopulation such as the black bear (Rice et al., 2007). Williams et al. (2011) found that land
stakeholders saw black bears as a means to increase the appeal of residency and tourism;
however, stakeholders or landowners did not want government interference with the black bear
population.
Research on IH&F, or wildlife crimes in general, does not exhibit a uniform theoretical or
methodological approach. The majority of researcher addresses IH&F crimes, however,
theoretically employs what can be described as structural analysis. Current PEG-C research
addresses animals by referring to the economic context in which action are treated and regulated,
which can has also included research on the historical origins of attitudes towards animals and
their treatment in the law (Beirne 2009; Sinclair, Fryer, and Phillips, 2019; Martilli, 2009). Not
all wildlife research, however, takes a PEG-C approach. Similar to traditional criminological
studies, researchers also take a micro-level approach focused on offender characteristics and also
on micro-sociological (e.g. strain or subcultural) explanations to explain IH&F (Forsyth and
Forsyth, 2018; Agnew, 2012; Eliason, 2012; Enticott, 2011; Eliason, 2004: Muth and Bowe,
1998). While PEG-C has been applied to the analyses of a wide variety of green crimes (Lynch
et al, 2017), it has not been applied to IH&F, leaving open the explanation of how the economic
structure influences the distribution of wildlife harm.
An alternative to PEG-C is conservation criminology, which examines how the structure
of opportunity and enforcement in a particular context influences the decision of an offender to
engage in environmental crimes, including wildlife crime. Conservation criminologists refer to a
wide variety of situational or contextual factors that they suggest affect opportunity for
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environmental crimes (Moreto and Pires, 2018; Gibbs, Gore, Hamm, Rivers, and Zwickle, 2017).
These contextual factors focus on available markets, geographical opportunities, product
demand, and risk factors (Moreto and Pires, 2018: Moreto, 2018). It would be intuitive to control
for these alternative explanations to obtain a clearer effect of how or whether political economic
measures affect the distribution of IH&F.
Drawing on observations made in prior research, this dissertation examines structural
factors that may help explain the distribution of wildlife enforcement in Texas, using PEG-C as
the main theoretical explanation. In doing so, this dissertation addressed the following: (1) the
content of extant of wildlife crime research that has examined IH&F in the USA; (2) how
political economic studies have explained harms against wildlife and IH&F; (3) whether
variables from the treadmill of production processes widely referred to in the PEG-C literature
are useful for explaining and understanding the distribution of IH&F in Texas; and, (4)
discussed whether finding of the study have implications for theory and policy and future
research.

Dissertation Outline
The remainder of this dissertation continues in the following manner:
Chapter 2 discussed the literature relevant from the both criminological categories along
with a subgroup of small series of studies. Frist, green criminological research on wildlife harm
and biodiversity loss was reviewed. Next, conservation criminology research was reviewed as a
competing explanation, and analyzed for relevant control variables. Lastly, a small subgroup of
USA-based illegal hunting research that has not drawn on the two approaches above was
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reviewed to determine which factors should be considered controls for analysis. The chapter
concluded by summarizing the theoretically important concepts from green criminology and
control variables.
Chapter 3 examined treadmill of production (ToP) theory to provide further context to
analyze concepts related to the economic factors found within the literature review. The
discussion examined how each concept would explain illegal hunting. Some subfields of
criminology, such as radical and structural criminology, have explored the importance of
economic structural factors to explain crime. These approaches have also been explored in the
sociological and economic literature (Wallerstein, 1974; Bunker, 1985; O’Connor, 1973).
Economic structure literature looked at not just the composition business but the composition of
business growth and processes. For green criminology, the literature argues that along with
business growth, the ecological consequences of this composition provided a structural
framework in which society operates. The chapter concluded with a summary of the theoretical
understanding of the economic structure.
Chapter 4 discussed the data, operationalization of variables, and an analytic plan to
assess the variables. The chapter first examines research questions and hypotheses of the study.
Next, the relevancy and details of IH&F data are discussed. After that, the operationalization of
variables of interest and control variables are presented Lastly, the chapter covers an analytical
plan to assess the data using regression analyses and spatial analyses to test the hypotheses of the
study. The chapter concluded with how this methodology builds on the current knowledge of
IH&F and how the results are presented in the next chapters.
The remaining chapters examined the findings of the study with interpretations and
implications. Accordingly, chapter 5 reported the linear analyses results. Descriptive statistics
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and bivariate results are also reported in the chapter. Chapter 6 reported the spatial analyses
results, controlling for significant variables found in the linear analyses. Maps of clustering are
also provided. Lastly, Chapter 7 concluded the dissertation by discussing the results, theoretical
implications, policy implications, and limitations.
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CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW ON ILLEGAL HUNTING AND FISHING

The focus of this chapter is to review the current literature around the political economic
green criminology (PEG-C), to describe how that approach applies to understanding wildlife
harms, and to identify factors for exploring a structural explanation of illegal hunting and fishing
(IH&F) in Texas. Additionally, research on alternative explanations is explored to identify
control variables for the current study. The existing literature on hunting and fishing in Texas is
primarily located in the wildlife management literature, and does not discuss criminological
factors that may help explain the distribution of IH&F. It also should be noted that the
criminological literature contains a limited number of relevant studies to IH&F. For example,
much of the conservation criminological research that explains wildlife crimes fails to examine
IH&F in developed nations, and has largely drawn attention to providing a theoretical
understanding of poaching behaviors in less developed nations. Furthermore, the limited IH&F
literature that does exists, does not provide substantial material applicable at the structural level.
Thus, the literature review focuses on areas that examine wildlife crimes and harms to determine
factors that could be used to extend the research on IH&F in the United States of America
(USA). The following sections cover, in order, PEG-C, conservation criminology, and the social
literature around IH&F in the USA. The chapter concludes with a summary of factors the current
dissertation uses for analysis.
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Political Economic Green Criminology Research
Green criminology draws from multiple fields to compile evidence to support a
theoretical framework for criminological applications that explains various outcomes such as
environmental injustices, the structure of environmental law, or green crimes that involve large
scale harmful activities including biodiversity loss, pollution and other forms of illegal and legal
ecological destruction that have extensive ecological impacts (e.g., mining and timber-clear
cutting). The ultimate goal of green criminology is to challenge the traditional social construct of
crime by recognizing who had the power to influence the construction and application of relevant
laws (Sollund, 2017). One way in which green criminology addresses these power relationships
is through the theoretical lens of the political economy, which forms the basis of political
economic green criminology (PEG-C).
Several varieties of green criminology have emerged such as nonspeciesist criminology
(Beirne 1999), green-cultural criminology (Brisman and South, 2013), dark green criminology
(McClanahan 2019), and visual green criminology (Natali 2016). Of these variations that have
examined animal harms, the political economic green criminology (PEG-C) focuses on how the
economic structure produces outcome that harm fauna. PEG-C research borrows from related
research in environmental sociology, emphasizing the exploration of biodiversity loss that can be
explained as a consequence of the organization and structure of capitalism. As several studies
note (Lynch and Pires, 2019; Lynch, Stretesky, Long, and Barrett, 2019; Lynch, Barrett,
Stretesky, and Long, 2017; Eliason, 1999), non-PEG-C research has tended to overlook
empirical studies of explanations for green crimes, especially macro-structural analyses. Thus,
the review below explores and draws primarily from the PEG-C literature.
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PEG-C criminology has been most often associated in recent years with treadmill of
production theory (ToP), introduced into criminology by Long et al. (2012), Lynch et al. (2013)
and Stretesky, Long and Lynch (2013a, 2013b). In the ToP view, the production of commodities
for consumption causes ecological destruction and disorganization through a continually need to
extract natural resources for expanded production and consumption associated with the
expansion of capitalism (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky, 2019). In other words, this economic
structure is argued to encourage an expanding process of producing and consuming goods and
services that require a continuous acceleration of natural resources extraction, that facilitates the
depletion of the ecosystem (Lynch, Long and Stretesky, 2019; Lynch et al., 2017). While the
perspective examines the consequence of human actions on an economic level (Brisman and
South, 2018), PEG-C research also focuses on business and government agencies due to the
applied theoretical framework. Within the USA, farms, business factories, and industrial
factories are the main offenders of EPA regulations (Jarrell, Ozymy, and Sanders. 2017). There
have been studies examining environmental crime in the production of coal (Lynch and Barrett,
2015; Long, Stretesky, Lynch, and Fenwick, 2012; Stretesky and Lynch, 2011) and refining
industries (Ozymy and Jarrell, 2011; Jarrell, 2007) which led to destroyed and polluted lands,
ultimately limiting habitats for wildlife (Lynch et al., 2019).
The research around this political economic orientation emphasizes the larger structure of
operations in production, trade, and class relationships (Pires and Moreto, 2018). PEG-C has
used a variety of methods to demonstrate this issue through the use of descriptive statistics,
inferential statistics, mix-methods of quantitative and qualitative analyses, and spatial analyses
(Lynch, Long, Stretesky, and Barrett, 2017); however, spatial analyses are more concentrated
within conservation criminology (see below). PEG-C criminological research mainly focuses on
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the effects of manufacturing growth on the environment through ecological destruction, and how
the legal system has failed to enforce regulation compliance to protect the environment (Lynch et
al., 2017).
Borrowing from environmental sociology, Lynch et al. (2017) argue that the political
economy is structured to promote or accept the over usage of natural resources. Within a free
market, good and services are not protected by government agencies and are subjected to market
demands. For the market to sustain itself, more production, while lowering labor cost, is needed
to generate more wealth and value for the market (O’Connor, 1973). Continual extraction of
natural resources is needed to maintain production. Thus, the PEG-C school of green
criminology is centered around the structure of the economy. While green criminology addresses
crimes against wildlife, it has not translated green criminological theories into explanations for
IH&F.
Qualitative green criminological literature offer some discussion of how a political
economic perspective could be used for green criminological research (Eliason, 2020; Peterson,
Von Essen, Hansen, and Peterson, 2017; Sollund, 2016). The literature observes that access to
wildlife is desired by different classes, and this can cause a conflict between the ruling class and
the public. Eliason (2020) argued the ruling class can maintain control over wildlife through land
ownership. In some views, natural resources (e.g. wildlife and land) are considered a public trust
or a resource held in common by the public, not by individuals, leading to conflicts over the
rights to own land and the right to use undeveloped land for purposes such as hunting and fishing
(Eliason, 2020). As society expands, undeveloped land is threatened, limiting the resources that
were once held in common by the public. As a result, one can argue that individuals hunt
illegally (i.e., are defined as hunting illegally) as a result of how access to land and wildlife is
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distributed legally. At the individual level, Eliason (2020) also argued that some hunt illegally to
exercise what they view as their right to natural resources. Alternatively, Peterson et al. (2017)
argued that government and colonialism establish rules to protect wildlife and criminalize people
who are not environmentally conscience. There are arguments that the political economy
motivates competition within the market to illegally hunt (Eliason, 1999), however, PEG-C is
more concerned with power relationships and the impact of economic structures, rather than
explanations of the motivations of individual hunters.
Sollund (2017), taking a qualitative approach to explore the PEG-C perspective,
examined the value of wildlife itself in relation to government protection in Norway. She
focused on the differences in value of animals within government. After analyzing different
types of legislation related to protecting animals, she concluded that domestic animals seem to
have a higher value to society than wildlife, and thus receive more extensive legal protection
(Sollund, 2017). This also seemed to be the case when examining a court case of illegal wolf
killings (Sollund 2017). The Supreme Court rejected a lower court’s interpretation that the legal
killing of wolves keeps the population on the brink of extinction and in violation of a pervious
establish law to protect wildlife. While the offenders still were sentenced to prison, the point was
the court’s perception on the value of wildlife was influenced by the hunting and farming lobby
to encourage protection for agriculture. While, Sollund’s research focuses on the micro-aspects
of the political economy, the majority of PEG-C research focuses on macro-patterns of the
economic structure.
Due to trends in globalization and nationalization of economic relationships, most green
criminological studies examine the depletion of biodiversity at the cross-national level (Lynch et
al., 2017). Relevant research has explored different measures of economic structure to determine
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how those structure leads to animal biodiversity loss. Of all the levels of the economic structure,
research has found that cross-national or global relationships best explain animal biodiversity
loss (Hoffman 2004). McKinney, Fulkerson, and Kick (2009) focused on measures of country’s
world system position (WSP) as a predictor of biodiversity loss. Countries were either core or
periphery to the global economy; some were coded as semiperiphery or in between countries.
Controlling for other explanations, WSP (i.e., being a peripheral nation) had the largest effect
among competing variables, indicating that the dynamics of the global economy plays a larger
part in determining the percent threatened bird populations across nations (McKinney et al.,
2009). McKinney et al. (2010) expanded on the previous study by incorporating measures of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), arguing that these groups can mitigate factors against
biodiversity loss. Using structural equation modeling, the study found NGOs to be ineffective,
reinforcing the finding that the WSP or country’s relevance to the global economy is still the
dominate explanation for biodiversity loss.
Shandra et al. (2009, 2010) took a different approach to explore how cross-national
relationships relate to biodiversity loss. Focusing on the commodity exports and import of
nations, these studies controlled for government spending, economic activity, economic
development, environmental NGOs, and urban-rural population growth. Shandra et al. (2009)
found that only a few variables were significant. Primary export flows, NGOs, and GDP;
however, export measures had the strongest effect, indicating that countries that export more raw
materials experience higher losses of threatened mammals. This result is consistent with those
from McKinney’s studies, since peripheral nations in the world system are exploited for their
resources. Shandra et al. (2010) expanded on the previous study by including measures of
country foreign debt, capturing the economic dependency of countries. Debt measures were
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positively related to bird and mammal loss, and in addition, the effects of exports increased
(Shandra et al., 2010).
These pieces of research suggest that biodiversity loss is dependent on the economic
power relationship across nations in the world system. That is, locations with lower debt and
with a higher WSP in the global economy are environmentally benefiting from trades with lower
class countries or trade partners. Stretesky, McKie, Lynch, Long, and Barrett (2018) expanded
on these studies by including measures that represent the effect of the treadmill of production.
They specific analyzed whether GDP, ecological footprints, and level of export activity of
nations affected the trade in Saker falcons, Stretesky et al. (2018) found that ecological footprints
had no relation to the frequency of falcon exports. More importantly, the level of general export
activity had the strongest effect on falcon export, followed by a nation’s GDP. Thus, it is
possible these measures can explain one form of animal biodiversity loss related to global trade
patterns’ effects on a national level.

The Take Away from Green Criminology Research
The application of PEG-C is limited to explanations of how economic structures affect
outcomes such as biodiversity loss and international wildlife trade. This approach has not,
however, been applied to efforts to explain illegal hunting and fishing violations. More recently,
some studies have drawn on concepts relevant to PEG-C analysis to explain the relationship
between the geography of pollution, inequality and crime (Muller, Sampson, and Winter, 2018;
Sampson and Winter, 2018; Winter and Sampson, 2017; Barrett, 2017; Sampson and Winter,
2016). In these studies, the economic structure is interpreted as affecting the criminal behavior of
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people primarily in urban areas. This style of argument and analysis has not, however, been
applied to understanding or analyzing the distribution of hunting and fishing violations.
Some factors can be taken from the PEG-C research that may help explain the geographic
distribution of IH&F. First, the economic development of underdeveloped nations led to
biodiversity loss (Shandra et al., 2010; McKinney et al., 2010; Shandra et al., 2009; McKinney et
al., 2010). Factors such as the volume of agricultural land would grow to compensate the demand
for food export relationships (Shandra et al., 2010). This suggests that the physical change of the
land to support international economic growth would lead to biodiversity loss. Following
Sollund (2017), this growth could lower the value of wildlife to protect crops and land. Second,
the withdrawal of land from wilderness ecosystems could lead to wildlife loss. Lynch et al.
(2019) argued that the research around resource mining destroys land in order to extract raw
materials for the economy. This behavior, according to Jacoby’s (2003) historical documents of
early IH&F in the USA, restricts hunters from land that was supposed to be set aside for the
public. For these reasons, the behaviors and consequences of the economy influences the
location and displacement of behaviors.

Conservation Criminology
Conservation criminology seeks to integrate principles of opportunity theory (i.e., how do
opportunities contribute to crime), mapping, and situational crime explanations to tailor policies
and enforcement to address specific causes of the business of illegal wildlife trade (Brisman and
South, 2018; Pires and Moreto, 2018). This area of criminology heavily focuses on the rationale
for wildlife trading, bushmeat hunting, and illegal commercial fishing in relation to the
situational context of opportunities for these crimes (Moreto and Pires, 2018). This school
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employing methods of analysis that examine the situational context using spatial analyses and
linear analyses (Moreto and Pires, 2018), with a growing interest in crime scripts (Viollaz,
Graham, and Lantsman, 2018), to explain crimes against wildlife. The methodological approach
in this perspective has brought a spatial and temporal understanding to understanding the risk
assessment of wildlife offenders. Typically, conservation criminology examines how the
behaviors of certain groups leads to decreases in animal biodiversity and density, and to illegal
wildlife trading behaviors. This school of criminology, however, does not necessarily provide an
appropriate perspective for the current dissertation. Three central limitations related to actors,
areas of study, and situational factors typically employed within conservation criminology
demonstrate why this perspective is inappropriate on its own for a study drawing attention to a
structural explanation of wildlife crimes in the USA.
Conservation criminology is focused on four main actors: (1) bushmeat hunters
(Greengrass, 2016; Moreto and Lemieux, 2015); (2) commercial fishing violators (Petrossian,
2015; Petrossian and Clarke, 2014); (3) transnational illegal trade organizations (Pires and
Moreto, 2018; Kurland and Pires, 2017; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009); (4) and law enforcement
agencies (Pires and Moreto, 2018; Weekers, Zahnow, and Mazerolle, 2019; Adams, Mustin,
Possingham, and Fuller, 2016; Gibbs, Gore, McGarrell, and Rivers, 2010). Gibbs et al. (2010)
argued that the implications of conservation criminology is for conservation enforcement to be
organized or structured around the risk assessment of offenders, and as a result, this perspective
does not necessarily explain the entire situational structure in which these offenders operate.
Thus, conservation studies ultimately examine the effectiveness of enforcement in regards to a
specific wildlife crime situation (e.g., the trade in parrots in Mexico, Pires and Clarke 2012).
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The primary focus of conservation criminology is to identify the situational factors that
can be used to explain the commission of wildlife crime. Conservation criminology studies
largely examine situational context, arguing that an offender’s rationale to commit a crime is
based on an array of situational factors (Pires and Moreto, 2018). Given that these explanatory
factors are situational, they are likely to vary significantly depending on the particular wildlife
crime being examined, where those crimes occur, and other factors related to how the situational
context of a crime is defined (for discussion see, Lynch, Stretesky and Long, 2018).
Pires and Moreto (2011) described the main premises of conservation criminology as
involving a person-situation nexus. Exploring that nexus involves employing a case-by-case
methodology that focuses on contextual factors within one area of wildlife crime (e.g., what
factors produce parrot poaching?), and then combining the results from numerous, independent
studies to yield a larger understanding of the situational context behind a given kind of crime.
Thus, conservation crime studies use a variety of factors based on the current structure of the
location and crime type being examined. This can mean that the structural factors identified as a
“cause” of any given crime change from study to study and from one location to the next. As has
been noted in the literature, in this approach, the “causes” of a crime may be related to specific
situational factors that are not generalizable (Lynch, Stretesky and Long, 2018). These causes
are structural to the extent that they identify the structure of a context, but are not structural in
the same, more general sense, as variables associated with PEG-C theory.
Though there are multiple iterations of the theoretical model used to conceptualize
decision-making, the majority of these models target concepts expressed within the CRAVED
model (Moreto and Pires, 2018). This model is used to understand “hot products” or why certain
fauna are illegally handled (CRAVED) over others. CRAVED is comprised of six concepts
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which capture the essence of the situation around the opportunity to illegally handle an animal.
The concepts are: concealable, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable. Each
concept in the CRAVED model reflects the structure of the situation, especially how wildlife
products are targetable for crime in relationship to the structure of enforcement.
It has been suggested that while these factors explain why certain wildlife species are
illegally acquired and traded, the factors do not target the driving force of the structure that
allows for opportunity (Lynch, Stretesky, and Long, 2018). Lynch et al. (2018) argued that
situational explanations do not ultimately prevent wildlife crime; the approach only provides
information for building more efficient enforcement and compliance strategies, and is based on
an assumption that doing so will deter environmental offenders (on the limits of environmental
crime deterrence see, Lynch et al., 2016). With the focus on the structure of the situation, the
literature around CRAVED or decision making does not have a universal means to measure
factors pertaining to the theoretical model. This is because the information is contextual, and
changes based on the situation in question. This is the point of conservation criminology;
conservation criminology argues that no situation is the same and has unique social and
economic relationships between people that have to be considered when understanding wildlife
crime. Research reflects on the chain of behaviors of criminal actors and how enforcement can
address those behaviors; thus, the purpose of conservation criminology is not to explain the
structure of wildlife crime in general, but rather to understand how rational actors behave in
different situational contexts.
As a result, there is a wide variety of research on various forms of wildlife crime within
the field of conservation criminology. Adams et al. (2016), for instance, examined migratory bird
populations in relation to the cost of wildlife enforcement and patrol efforts. They found that
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offenses did not differ between low cost-low patrol areas and high-cost-high patrol areas,
suggesting that enforcement should focus less on patrols and more on other forms of protection.
In contrast, Moreto and Lemieux (2015) focused on illegal wildlife trades within a local town’s
market-place, and found that the ability to move an animal through the stages of trade without
detection made it more suitable to be traded (i.e., the animal was easily concealed). Given the
six CRAVED factors, and the inconsistent results across studies that examine different kinds of
poached animals, and the various contexts in which animals are poached, there are no consistent
outcomes related to CRAVED models that can be neatly summarized. Moreover, the majority of
these studies occur outside the US, and consequently involve situational factors that are not
relevant to the US, making an effort to attempt to understand any potential similarities across
these studies tangential to the focus of the current study on wildlife crime in the US. There is,
however, a handful of conservation criminology studies that have relevance to the US.
The research in conservation criminology that specifically focuses on the USA addresses
the context of the wildlife trade business (Kurland and Pires, 2017; Petrossian, Pires, and van
Uhm, 2016), with two exceptions -- Haines et al. (2012) which focuses on specifically illegal
hunting in Iowa, and Crow, Shelley, and Stretesky (2013), which focuses on the geographical
differences of IH&F in the state of Florida. As of now, there is no study within conservation
criminology that has tied IH&F within the USA to the wildlife trade business. In fact, Kurland
and Pires (2017) argued that the United States is more likely to import wildlife than to export
wildlife. Though most factors within conservation criminology would not relate to IH&F for the
USA, especially measuring on a county level, some findings do warrant some attention. Factors
that may be relevant to the IH&F in the USA is the spatial and temporal context of hunting.
Kurland and Pires (2017) spatially and temporally observed 40,113 incidents of illegal wildlife
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trade seizures across USA ports. The study found that holidays where enforcement was lower
had more seizures of illegal wildlife, indicating that the amount of enforcement may influence
the decision on when to ship illegal wildlife products (Kurland and Pires, 2017). Extending that
finding, one could argue that different times of the year might relate to the quantity of hunting
and fishing violations on particular days of the year. Given that the current study has annually
aggregated data for a one-year period, this possibility cannot be assessed.
Haines et al. (2012) used a geo-spatiotemporal approach to explain the physical patterns
of offenders killing White-tailed deer in Fayette County, Iowa. Using 67 reported events over a
ten-year period (2000-2009), the study examined the space of the events in respect to the
landscape (valleys, roads, etc.). Cases typically occurred at night, and on Thursdays during the
late fall- to early winter months. The majority of cases occurred along the forest line, valleys, or
road side with variable topography to provide as cover from detection (Haines et al., 2012). This
study, however, has several limitations similar to qualitative studies, including a small sample
size. The small sample size itself is not the only factor that limits the generalizability of the
study, especially since all events occur on private land that has limited access to majority of the
hunting community (Eliason, 2019; Haines et al., 2012). Additionally, the study only examines
physical landscape. No information is applicable when studying how other structures (e.g.
economic structure) impacts the distribution of IH&F.
Crow et al. (2013) is one study that expands IH&F outside of qualitative approaches and
applies a quantitative analysis. The analysis focuses on descriptive statistics and logistic
regressions to find which Florida offenders commit hunting and fishing offenses, and where
those offenses occurred. Results revealed that about half (49.5%) of cases were coded as
improper permitting; around 81% of offenders were white; and 92% of offenders were male.
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Logistic regression showed that when compared to whites, blacks were more likely to receive
violations related to illegal possession of fish and improper permitting. Apart from whites,
Hispanics were more likely to be cited for illegal fishing methods in additions to the same
violations for blacks. The issue with this study is the geographical categorization of cases. Crow
et al. (2013) sectioned the state of Florida into five large sections, but these sections can be
further broken down into counties with different environments which may hide more differences
between offenses, offenders, and locations. Moreover, county-level analysis would allow other
factors to be assessed, and allow the inclusion of, for example, county level geographic features
(e.g., number of rivers and streams, acres of farm lands or hunting preserves) and economic
characteristics from the census to be assessed.
These studies indicate that wildlife crimes do not happen uniformly across time or space,
suggesting that spatial and temporal analyses are needed to understand the context of IH&F.
Spatial analysis has been used for multiple forms of wildlife crimes (Marteache and Pires, 2020;
Kurland, Pires, and Marteache, 2018; Petrossian, Pires, and van Uhm, 2016; Petrossian, 2015),
with each study suggesting that wildlife crime happens in specific locations at specific times – a
finding that replicates result from traditional criminological studies of street crime (i.e., that
crime has time and space correlates). The time and space correlates related to street crime,
however, are necessarily relevant to the explanation of IH&F crimes. To know, for example,
that more crimes occur in location A compare to locations B, C or D does not tell us how A
differs from other areas in terms of factors that may contribute to criminogenic activity.
Additionally, the cross-cultural findings from conservation criminology suggests that the
availability of markets and product should relate to illegal markets in the USA. Petrossian, Pires,
and van Uhm (2016), for instance, established that illegal wildlife products in the USA have a
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marketable purpose in relation to their availability (e.g. leather products, jewelry, hunting
trophies, etc.), but there has not been a study examining the markets themselves when it comes to
illegal wildlife activity within the USA. A few studies can be drawn upon to understand how
these factors might impact IH&F. Petrossian and Clarke (2014) examined the location of illegal
fish products and ports across numerous countries and found that all CRAVED factors
significantly correlated with illegal fish products, but abundance, a newly added variable, had the
highest correlation (r = .39). Whether “market place” variable would have a relationship to
IH&F in the US is an unknown. Petrossian (2015) found that the centration of illegal fishing
internationally occurred in areas where there was an available “port of convenience” or a port
commonly used for illegal fishing trade, again indicating a market-place (e.g., economic) effect.
Other studies have shown that the amount of product and markets available affect the amount
and degree of illegal hunting focused on larger mammals and birds (Moreto and Lemieux, 2015;
Pires and Clarke, 2012; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009; Schneider, 2008; Wright et al., 2001). These
studies indicate that the availability of wildlife and access to markets could be common factors
when analyzing the spatial concentration of IH&F within the USA.
These factors targeting markets, spatial, and temporal concepts seem to be the more
common factors found within the literature when analyzing wildlife crime; however, they do not
seem to be the focus of the situation – hence, the focus on contextual factors. Still, the common
discussion of these factors across studies warrants some attention when discussing IH&F within
the USA. It should also be mentioned that these factors are also considered within green
criminology. This overlap, coupled with a lack of understanding, suggest that green criminology
may be another avenue to understand IH&F within the USA; however, green criminology is not
above reproach.
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The Take Away from Conservation Criminology Research
For reasons noted above, conservation criminology, which comprises a major area of
wildlife crime research, offers only a few studies relevant to the assessment of whether economic
and social structural factors contribute to the explanation of IH&F across counties in Texas.
Conservation criminology seeks to explain the decisions of offenders’ link to situational context
(Lynch, Stretesky, and Long, 2018; Moreto and Pires, 2018; Gibbs, Fore, McGarrell, and Rivers,
2010), and the research has been applied to a number of contextual situations. Most of the
existing studies examine actors and outcomes outside the US, mainly focusing on African, Asian,
or Latin countries (Weekers, Zahnow, and Mazerolle, 2019; Moreto, 2018: Moreto and Pires,
2018: Viollaz, Graham, and Lantsman, 2018; Petrossian, 2015; Lemieux and Clarke, 2009). The
field has rarely been applied to the study of wildlife crimes such as IH&F within the USA
(Kurland and Pires, 2017; Petrossian, Pires, and van Uhm, 2016; Haines et al., 2012). The focus
on these countries is due to the types of wildlife accessible in those nations that are valued across
nations, or in regard to internal hunting and trading for bushmeat. For instance, Pires and Moreto
(2011) reviewed cases that covered macaws in Peru, snow leopards in Mongolia, India, and Peru,
and fish populations in Benin, Senegal, and Australia. Petrossian et al. (2016) and Petrossian
(2015) examined the geographical patterns of illegal commercial fishing in international and
national waters. Moreto and Lemieux (2015) sought to expand situational crime models to
explain illegal wildlife markets in Africa. Because these studies have varied situational contexts
and focus on contexts outside of the US (for an exception see, Haines et al., 2012), they provide
limited insight into the problem of IH&F within the USA (Kurland and Pires, 2017). Apart from
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these few studies, the school of conservation criminology has a focus that addresses poaching for
larger, more economically valued animals which would typically be seen outside of the USA
(Brisman and South, 2018).
It should be noted, however, that this school of research provides reason to
geographically map and understand the spatial and temporal location of events, which is
consistent with the current dissertation, which looks to explain how variations in the geography
of the economic structure across Texas counties may impact the geographic distribution of
IH&F. The conclusion concerning the utility of conservation criminology for the current study of
IH&F in Texas should not be taken as rejection of this area of wildlife crime research. That is to
say, this research approach can still be examined to determine how situational factors held out by
conservation criminology as an explanation of wildlife crime could potentially be modified and
be applied to future research of wildlife crime in the USA. The school of thought provides
multiple tools to examine case studies within the USA, but first, there needs to be a better
theoretical understanding that examines how the economic structure affects the distribution of
IH&F, since the economic structure is part of the situational context that affects participation in
and the distribution of crime. In other words, one could argue that the economic structure of
different locations determines the situational context that researchers interested in IH&F should
investigate further. Currently, however, conservation criminology has overlooked the importance
of the superseding structure of the situations, which I argue, following the logic of Marx (1859),
Foster (1999), and O’Connor (1971), is the economic structure. In general terms, the focus of
conservation criminology on situational context effecting the opportunity of crime would seem to
suggest that including those kinds of factors would appear relevant, given under certain
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economic structural organizations. Therefore, it is intuitive to include factors that address the
opportunity for IH&F behaviors within any study of IH&F behaviors.

Cultural and Social Literature on Illegal Hunting and Fishing
Another explanation of IH&F comes from a small group of research focused on cultural
and social relationships around the hunting culture in the USA. These studies mainly examine
the perspective of poachers or game wardens to examine mainly IH&F in the USA. Eliason
(1999) argued that to study these motivations, the best criminological theories were differential
association and techniques of neutralization (Eliason and Dodder, 2000; Curcione, 1992). Later,
Eliason (2012a) used routine activities theory to study illegal hunting. In another series of
studies attempting to explain motivations for wildlife crime, Forsyth and colleagues used a
subculture-conflict approach (Forsyth and Forsyth, 2018; Forsyth, Gramling, and Wooddell,
1998; Forsyth and Marckese, 1993). It should be noted that such studies use data about
individuals, and attempt to discover individual correlates of hunting and fishing crimes.
Curcione (1992) interviewed 16 California anglers about a form of illegal fishing called
party-boat poaching. The content of the interviewed showed commonalities associated with the
theory of differential association. First, the act of party-boat poaching must be conducted in the
company of others, and due to this, findings showed that these anglers shared the same values
around the activity (Curcione, 1992). Second, the act of party-boat poaching was passed down
from fathers or brothers (Curcione, 1992). Lastly, these individuals did not have criminal
backgrounds apart from fishing violations. Curcione (1992) concluded that these offenders
reflect what are called “folk crimes,” defying authorities that impose laws that negatively affect
local lifestyles.
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Forsyth and Marckese (1993) explored the sociological connection between pleasure and
deviance culture with illegal hunting, using Walter Miller’s (1965; 1958) focal concern theory.
Interviewing 36 rural offenders, Forsyth and Marckese (1993) examined the focal points,
toughness, excitement, smartness, toughness, autonomy, and fate. All points were found except
for fate; however, not all points were found within each individual surveyed. The most common
point was trouble, followed by excitement. Both points related to the idea that offenders found it
fun to evade enforcement (Forsyth and Marckese, 1993). In all, the study found support that
socially isolated groups segregated from normal society have a subculture value. However, one
must keep in mind the very small and nonrandom samples employed to reach this conclusion.
Forsyth, Gramling, and Wooddell (1998) explored the cultural conflict of illegal hunters
and enforcement in Louisiana through a conflict perceptive. Most illegal hunters were white
males, young and old. Illegal hunters either hunted for food, money, tradition, and exhilaration,
and enforcement varied by the perceived motivation of the offender. Forsyth, Grambling and
Wooddell (1998) found that game wardens were more lenient if an individual illegally hunted for
food or survival or tradition, most likely to avoid the conflict of hunting culture. Anytime a game
warden confirmed alternative motives such as money or exhilaration, wardens would be stricter.
This dichotomy for the wardens, however, disappeared if the animal victim was endangered,
leading to stricter enforcement universally.
Eliason and Dodder (2000) hypothesized that illegal hunting has its own culture of
rationalities. To study this assumption, they examined data from forty-two individuals across
1990 to 1996 who completed surveys using a Likert-type scale targeting multiple techniques of
neutralization. Eliason and Dodder (2000) found that offenders use multiple forms of
neutralization to justify illegal hunting. Around 59 percent would deny responsibility or intent to
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kill a deer illegally. About 97 percent of offenders denied injury, while 94 percent, denied the
victim, or asserted that the crime was victimless. Of the offenders, 92 percent claimed
entitlement to the hunt. Many offenders, 62 percent, denied the necessity of the law.
Continuing the research on techniques of neutralization, Eliason (2004) found several
factors played into the motivation of illegal hunting. Typically, excuses such as ignorance,
forgetfulness, and carelessness were expressed by respondents. Illegal hunters relayed either they
did not know the restrictions existed, or forgot about the restrictions. Some broke the law to
experience the recreational activity of hunting, which mitigated the seriousness or the restrictions
(Eliason, 2004). Game wardens who were surveyed believed that people hunt illegal out of
entitlement for meat, contradicting the responses from the poachers (Eliason, 2004). Game
wardens would also apply techniques of neutralization to understand illegal hunting. The
wardens would not pursue charges or arrest against poor rural individuals. According to Eliason
(2004), wardens had sympathy for lower class citizens to illegally hunt and supply their families
with food.
Trophy hunting is also argued to be harmful to the population of fauna (Nurse, 2013;
Eliason, 2008a). To understand the motivations to trophy hunt, Eliason (2008a) sent out 1,000
surveys to Montana state hunters, with a return of 255 surveys for resident hunters and 281 for
non-residents. Findings suggests that non-residents are more likely to pursue trophy hunting, but
the appeal of trophy hunting is relevantly low. Eliason (2008a) concluded that this appeal to
hunting was promoted by the general tendency toward competition engendered by the capitalistic
system.
Eliason (2008b) interviewed 24 conservation officers and 29 interviews with wildlife
offenders concerning the motivations of people who specifically illegally hunted. Findings
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suggested a few types of illegal hunting (Eliason, 2008b). The first, the back door hunter,
illegally hunts on their own land away from law enforcement. The second, experienced hunter,
are individuals who have the experience to outwit law enforcement. The third, the opportunist
hunter, are people who only illegal kill in favorable opportunities. The fourth, the quiet hunter,
are the individuals who do not talk about their illegal hunting success. And lastly, the trophy
hunter are individuals who use illegal technology to kill the best specimen they could find.
Eliason (2008) argued that law enforcement needs to understand why people chose one type of
illegal hunting over the other to start address the behavior.
Using routine activities theory, many factors found in the historical literature were
reinforced for more current times. Eliason (2012a) focused on illegal trophy hunting and the
opportunities around the hunt. There are many reason Eliason (2004) offered for why people
illegal trophy hunt. Explanations from wardens range from the limitation of laws targeting meat
hunting, the crime is victimless, to obtaining an elite hunter status. Private lands have dual roles
in illegal hunting. Since wildlife enforcement does not have jurisdiction on private land, which
leaves animals without a capable guardian, making the animals suitable targets (Eliason, 2012a).

The Take Away from Social Literature on Illegal Hunting and Fishing
Research on IH&F within the USA provides multiple motivations explaining individual
level factors that might be related to IH&F; however, the research fails to provide an explanation
for the distribution of IH&F, especially at a structural level. The information found by the
researchers above provides some contextual background for individuals who illegally hunt.
Additionally, most of the literature describes the interactions between wardens and illegal
hunters; in other words, the research examines how individuals perceive enforcement or
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rationalize justification to break hunting laws. Similar to Lynch et al. (2019) critique of
conservation criminology, these studies ignore the structural factors that comprise the social
environment that influences these decisions. Eliason (2008) argued that the increase in individual
competition in hunting which caused in the decrease in fauna populations, but hunting is a
behavior supported and regulated by how the economy and government organizes itself (e.g.
policies, agencies, law, and business) around the value of nature as a public trust (Jacoby, 2003).
The social literature fails to acknowledge the growing resource mining industry destroying and
polluting land, limiting animal populations (Shandra et al., 2010; Shandra et al., 2009; Jacoby,
2003). The context found in this body of research is dictated by the narrative of the motivations
of individuals, ignoring the organization of society around the value of wildlife.
There are several general limitations found in this literature. First, the generalizability and
application of the findings are hindered by the small sample size in most studies. Eliason (2004,
2000) had a survey sample size ranging from 113 to 115 people who illegally hunted. Some of
the studies brought in game wardens to add additional information (Eliason, 2012). Those
sample sizes ranged from 22 to 146 game wardens. Wardens gave insight to the dangers and
enforcement perspectives of offenders, but the information is only assisting in understanding the
conflict between officers and offenders (Eliason, 2012; Forsyth and Forsyth, 2009; Forsyth et al.,
1998). The issue of small samples exasperates other issues like relatability; however, the studies
have yet to come contradicting responses from interviews and surveys.
The second issue with the studies is the discovery of location. One study found the
importance of spatial factors (Eliason, 2012); however, none of the studies used this information
to spatially illustrate the relevance with the different types of land and how space effected
enforcement and IH&F. Location seems important since Eliason (2012a) found factors of routine
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activity theories when interviewing game wardens. For instance, Eliason (2020; 2012)
emphasized the need to acknowledge private lands due to the lack of enforcement. Similarly,
Forsyth and Forsyth (2009) discussed the hardships of game wardens, especially how dangerous
natural environments threaten the life of game wardens. Unfortunately, these studies did not
provide any means to analyze geographically. Geographically mapping out jurisdictions provide
visual understanding with enforcing large pieces of land and how other factors can impact the
concentration of IH&F. This discovery of location would warrant further scholarly investigation,
but no discussion was given. Instead, conservation criminology took up this discussion but
applied a different perspective.
Lastly, and the most important, there is a lack of quantitative analysis within this
literature. Only two studies examining IH&F in the USA used quantitative analyses, which are
conservation criminological research (Crow et al., 2013; Haines et al., 2012). With the lack of
quantitative studies, there is insufficient information to fill in the gap of understanding on the
trends and distribution of IH&F using social factors. This brings to question about the
generalizability of understanding the behavior across the USA. In contrast to qualitative research,
no theoretical framework has been quantitively applied to determine how IH&F behaves within
the USA. More quantitative studies are needed to offset this gap in social research, and
additional investigation is needed to determine if social factors influence IH&F in the USA, and
by extension, Texas.
Though social research does not have sufficient evidence to support a social framework,
it would be intuitive to include the social commonalities between the research and measure this
commonality at a structural level. Specifically, the social research argues the illegal hunters are
more likely to be poor (Forsyth and Forsyth, 2018; Eliason, 2012; Eliason, 2004; Forsyth,
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Grambling and Wooddell, 1998; Forsyth and Marckese; 1993; Curcious, 1992). This would
suggest a class conflict within the ownership of nature. Second, local residents are perceived to
be related to illegal hunters (Forsyth and Forsyth, 2018; Eliason, 2012; Eliason, 2004; Forsyth et
al., 1998). This would suggest IH&F is not a behavior generalizable across areas where there is
little resident tenure. Jacoby (2003) documented a historical trend of class conflict between
lower class locals and businesses over the right to use the land over the Adirondacks park,
supporting social factors play into the explanation of IH&F. Thus, measures of social factors are
structural level that relate to class and local residency should be controlled.

Summary of Literature
This current dissertation seeks to explore the structural factors related to the geographical
distribution of illegal hunting across Texas counties. Following PEG-C research, factors that
would affect IH&F would be how economic factors affect the destruction, modification, and
withdrawing of the natural ecosystems. An alternative explanation with more empirical
application to wildlife crimes, conservation criminology, suggest that factors of opportunity
could influence the distribution of IH&F. Therefore, in order to ensure the effects of PEG-C
factors are independent from alternative explanations, control variables representing
geographical features that would provide opportunity for IH&F are used. Additionally, social
literature argues that social factors like socioeconomic status and residential tenure provide
explanation to illegal hunting. Even though the research did not explore how these factors
influence the spatial distribution of IH&F, it would be intuitive to control for these factors for a
clearer effect of the PEG-C factors. To understand the how the PEG-C factors would relate to
IH&F, the next chapter explored the treadmill of production theory. The theory covers factors
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targeting the behaviors and consequences of economic growth within a capitalistic structure.
After, a methodology is discussed to determine a quantitative approach to study the effect of
these factors.

References
Adirondack park Agency. (2014). Annual Report, 2014. Ray Brook, NY: Adirondack Park
Agency.
Bean, J. S. (1997). The Growing Importance and Value Implications of Recreational Hunting
Leases to Agricultural Land Investors. Journal of Real Estate Research, 14(3), 399-414.
Bessey, K. M. (1985). Wildlife Law Revised: Violator Profiles and Their Implications for
Management. Human Dimensions in Wildlife Newsletter, 4(3): 10-16.
Bowman, J. L., Leopold, B. D., Francisco J. Vilella, F. J. and Duane A. Gill. (2004). A Spatially
Explicit Model, Derived from Demographic Variables, to Predict Attitudes toward Black
Bear Restoration. The Journal of Wildlife Management, 68(2), 223.
Brisman, A. and South, N. (2018). Green Criminology and Environmental Crimes and Harms.
Sociology Compass, 1, 1-12.
Broad, S., and Burgess, G. (2016). Synthetic biology, product substitution and the battle against
illegal wildlife trade. Traffic Bulletin, 1, 22.
Brown, T. L., D. J. Decker, and D. L. Hustin. 1979. Public attitudes toward black bear in the
Catskills. Final report. Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, USA.
Chernow, Ron. (1998). Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller Sr. New York: Random House.

37

Crow, M. S., Shelley, T. O., and Stretesky, P. B. (2013). Camouflage-Collar Crime: An
Examination of Wildlife Crime and Characteristics of Offenders in Florida. Deviant
Behavior, 34(8), 635–652.
Eliason, S. L. (1999). The Illegal Taking of Wildlife: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of
Poaching. Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 2, 27-39.
Eliason, S. L. (2003). Illegal Hunting and Angling: The Neutralization of Wildlife Law
Violations. Society and Animals, 3, 225-243.
Eliason, S. L. (2004). Accounts of Wildlife Law Violators: Motivations and Rationalizations.
Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 2, 119-131.
Eliason, S. L. (2012a). Trophy Poaching: A Routine Activities Perspective. Deviant Behavior,
33(1), 72–87.
Eliason, S. L. (2012b). From the King’s deer to a capitalist commodity: A social historical
analysis of the poaching law. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal
Justice, 2, 133-148.
Eliason, S. L. (2020). Poaching, Social Conflict, and the Public Trust: Some Critical
Observations on Wildlife Crime. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 31(2), 110–126.
Eliason, S. L., and Dodder, R. A. (2000). Neutralization Among Deer Poachers. Journal of
Social Psychology, 140(4), 536–538.
Elmendorf, C. S. (2003). Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward Conservation
Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective. University of
Illinois Law Review, 2003(2), 423–506.

38

Dhanjal-Adams, K. L., Mustin, K., Possingham, H. P., and Fuller, R. A. (2016). Optimizing
disturbance management for wildlife protection: the enforcement allocation problem.
Journal of Applied Ecology, 53, 1215-1224.
Fine. L. M. (2000). Rights of Men, Rites of Passage: Hunting and Masculinity at Reo Motors of
Lansing, Michigan, 1945-1975. Journal of Social History, 33(4), 805-823.
Floyd, M. F. and Lee, I. (2002). Who Buys Fishing and Hunting Licenses in Texas? Results from
a Statewide Household Survey. Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 2, 91-106.
Forsyth, C. J. and Marckese, T. A. (1993). Thrills and skills: A sociological analysis of poaching,
Deviant Behavior, 14(2), 157-172.
Forsyth Y. A., and Forsyth, C. J. (2018). Ordinary Folk Transformed: Poachers’ Accounts of
Cultural Contests and History. In W. Moreto (Ed), Wildlife Crime: From Theory to
Practice (135-149). Temple.
Forsyth, C. J., Gramling, R., and Wooddell, G. (1998). The game of poaching: folk crimes in
southwest Louisiana. Society and Natural Resources, 11(1), 25–38.
Gibbs, C., Gore, M. L., McGarrell, E. F.,and Rivers III, L. (2010). Introducing Conservation
Criminology: Towards Interdisciplinary Scholarship on Environmental Crimes and Risks.
The British Journal of Criminology, 50(1), 124.
Greengrass, E. (2016). Commercial hunting to supply urban markets threatens mammalian
biodiversity in Sapo National Park, Liberia. Oryx, 50(3), 397–404.
Groombridge, N. (1998). Masculinities and Crimes Against the Environment. Theoretical
Criminology, 2(2), 249–267.

39

Haines, A. M., Elledge, D., Wilsing, L. K., Grabe, M., Barske, M. D., Burke, N., and Webb, S.
L. (2012). Spatially explicit analysis of poaching activity as a conservation management
tool. Wildlife Society Bulletin, 36(4), 685–692.
Hoffmann, J. P. (2004). Social and environmental influences on endangered species: a crossnational study. Sociological Perspectives, 47(1), 79-107.
Jacoby, K. (2003). Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History
of American Conservation. University of California Press.
Jarrell, M. L. (2007). Environmental Crime and the Media: News Coverage of Petroleum
Refining Industry Violations. LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC.
Jarrell, M., Ozymy, J., and Sandel, W. L. (2017). Where the wild things are: animal victimization
in federal environmental crime cases. Contemporary Justice Review, 3, 319-335.
Kurland, J., and Pires, S. F. (2017). Assessing U.S. Wildlife Trafficking Patterns: How
Criminology and Conservation Science Can Guide Strategies to Reduce the Illegal
Wildlife Trade. Deviant Behavior, 4, 375-391.
Kurland, J., Pires, S. F., and Marteache, N. (2018). The spatial pattern of redwood burl poaching
and implications for prevention. Forest Policy and Economics, 94, 46–54.
Lane, P. (1998) Ecofeminism Meets Criminology. Theoretical Criminology, 2(2), 235–248.
Langholz, J. A. and Lassoie, J. P. (2001a). Perils and Promise of Privately Owned Protected
Areas: This article reviews the current state of knowledge regarding privately owned
parks worldwide, emphasizing their current status, various types, and principal strengths
and weaknesses. BioScience, 51(12), 1079-1085.

40

Langholz, J. A. and Lassoie, J. P. (2001b). Combining Conservation and Development on Private
Lands: Lessons from Costa Rica. Environment Development and Sustainability, 4, 309322.
Lemieux, A. M. and Clarke, R. V. (2009). The International Ban on Ivory Sales and Its Effects
on Elephant Poaching in Africa. The British Journal of Criminology, 49(4), 451-471.
Lobao, L., Zhou, M., Partridge, M., and Betz, M. (2016). Poverty, Place, and Coal Employment
across Appalachia and the United States in a New Economic Era. Rural Sociology, 81(3),
343–386.
Long, M. A., Stretesky, P. B. Lynch, M. J., and Fenwick, E. (2012). Crime in the coal industry:
implications for green criminology and treadmill of production. Organization &
Environment, 25(3), 328–346.
Lynch, M. J. (1990). The Greening of Criminology: A Perspective on the 1990s. Critical
Criminology, 2(3), 3-12.
Lynch, M. J. and Barrett, K. L. (2015). Death Matters: Victimization by Particle Matter from
Coal Fired Power Plants in the US, a Green Criminological View. Critical Criminology,
3, 219-234.
Lynch, M. J., Stretesky, P. B., and Long, M. A. (2018). Situational Crime Prevention and the
Ecological Regulation of Green Crime: A Review and Discussion. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 679, 178–196.
Lynch, M. J., Long, M. A., and Stretesky, P. B. (2019). Green Criminology and Green Theories
of Justice: An Introduction to a Political Economic View of Eco-Justice. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.

41

Lynch, M. J., Long, M. A., Barrett, K. L., and Stretesky, P. B. (2013). Is it a Crime to Produce
Ecological Disorganization? Why Green Criminology and Political Economy Matter in
the Analysis of Global Ecological Harms. British Journal of Criminology, 53(6), 9971016.
Lynch, M. J., Barrett, K. L., Stretesky, P. B., and Long, M. A. (2016). The Weak Probability of
Punishment for Environmental Offenses and Deterrence of Environmental Offenders: A
Discussion based on US EPA Criminal Cases, 1983-2013. Deviant Behavior, 37(10),
1095-1109.
Lynch, M. J., Long, M. A., Stretesky, P. B., and Barrett, K. L. (2017). Is It a Crime to Produce
Ecological Disorganization? British Journal of Criminology, 53, 997-1016.
Marteache, N. and Pires, S. F. (2020). Choice Structuring Properties of Natural Resource Theft:
An Examination of Redwood Burl Poaching. Deviant Behavior, 41(3), 311–328.
McKinney, L. A., Fulkerson, G. M., and Kick, E. L. (2009). Investigating the Correlates of
Biodiversity Loss: A Cross-National Quantitative Analysis of Threatened Bird Species.
Human Ecology Review, 16(1), 103.
McKinney L. A., Kick, E. L., and Fulkerson, G. M. (2010). World system, anthropogenic, and
ecological threats to bird and mammal species: a structural equation analysis of
biodiversity loss. Organization & Environment, 23(1), 3–31.
Moreto, W. D. and Lemieux A. M. (2015). From CRAVED to CAPTURED: Introducing a
Product-Based Framework to Examine Illegal Wildlife Markets. European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research, 3, 303-320.
Moreto, W. D. and Pires, S. F. (2018). Wildlife Crime: An Environmental Criminology and
Crime Science Perspective. Caroline Academic Press.

42

Morgan, J. (1845, August). Notice. Houston Telegraph and Texas Register, 10(34), 1-4.
O’Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. St. Martin’s Press.
Ozymy, J. and Jarrell, M. L. (2011). Upset over Air Pollution: Analyzing Upset Event Emissions
at Petroleum Refineries. Review of Policy Research, 4, 365-382.
Peterson, M. N., Von Essen, E., Hansen, H. P., and Peterson, T. R. (2017). Illegal fishing and
hunting as resistance to neoliberal colonialism. Crime Law and Social Change, 4, 401.
Petrossian, G. A. (2015). Preventing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing: A
situational approach. Biological Conservation, 189, 39–48.
Petrossian, G. A. and Clarke, R. V. (2014). Explaining and Controlling Illegal Commercial
Fishing: An Application of the CRAVED Theft Model. The British Journal of
Criminology, 54(1), 73-90.
Petrossian, G. A., Pires, S. F., and van Uhm, D. P. (2016). An overview of seized illegal wildlife
entering the United States. Global Crime, 2, 181-201.
Pires, S. and Clarke, R. V. (2012). Are Parrots CRAVED? An Analysis of Parrot Poaching in
Mexico. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 49(1), 122–146.
Pires, S. F., and Moreto, W. D. (2011). Preventing Wildlife Crimes: Solutions That Can
Overcome the “Tragedy of the Commons.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and
Research, 2, 101-123.
Powell, J. W. (1962). Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the United States. Reprint,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Original work published in 1878)
Posewitz, J. (1999). Inherit the Hunt: A Journey into the Heart of American Hunting. Helena,
MT: Falcon

43

Rice, M. B., Ballard, W. B., Fish E. B., Wester, D. B., and Holdermann, D. (2007). Predicting
Private Landowner Support toward Recolonizing Black Bears in the Trans-Pecos Region
of Texas. Human Dimensions of Wildlife, 12(6), 405-415.
Rockefeller v. Lamora (1904, 89 NYS 1, 96 App. Div. 91).
Sawyer, R. K. (2013). Texas market hunting: stories of waterfowl, game laws, and outlaws.
Texas A&M University Press.
Schneider, J. L. (2008). Reducing the Illicit Trade In Endangered Wildlife: The Market
Reduction Approach, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 24(3), 274-295.
Schuett, M. A., Lu, J., Ditton, R. B., and Tseng, Y. P. (2010). Sociodemographics, Motivations,
and Behavior: The Case of Texas Anglers 1989–2004, Human Dimensions of Wildlife,
15(4), 247-261.
Shandra, J. M., Leckband, C., McKinney, L. A., and London, B. (2009). Ecologically Unequal
Exchange, World Polity, and Biodiversity Loss: A Cross-National Analysis of
Threatened Mammals, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 3(4), 285-310.
Shandra, J. M., McKinney, L. A., Leckband, C., and London, B. (2010). Debt, Structural
Adjustment, and Biodiversity Loss: A Cross-National Analysis of Threatened Mammals
and Birds, Human Ecology Review, 17(1), 18-33.
Sollund, R. (2017). Perceptions and law enforcement of illegal and legal wolf killing in Norway:
organized crime or folk crime? Palgrave Communications, 3(1), 1-9.
South, N. (1998). A Green Field for Criminology? A Proposal for a Perspective. Theoretical
Criminology, 2(2), 211–233.
State of New York Forest, Fish and Game Commission. (1910). Annual Reports of the Forest,
Fish and Game Commission 1907-1908-1909. Albany, NY: James B. Lyon.

44

Stretesky, P. B., and Lynch, M. J. (2011). Coal Strip Mining, Mountaintop Removal, and the
Distribution of Environmental Violations across the United States, 2002–2008.
Landscape Research, 2, 209-230.
Stretesky, P. B., Long, M. A., and Lynch, M. L. (2013a). The Treadmill of Crime: Political
Economy and Green Criminology. New York, NY: Routledge.
Stretesky, P. B., Long, M. A., and Lynch, M. J. (2013b). Does Environmental Enforcement Slow
the Treadmill of Production? The Relationship Between Large Monetary Penalties,
Ecological Disorganization and Toxic Releases Within Offending Corporations. Journal
of Crime and Justice, 36(2), 233-247.
Stretesky, P. B., McKie, R. E., Lynch, M. J., Long, M. A., and Barrett, K. L. (2018). Where have
all the falcons gone? Saker falcon (falco cherrug) exports in a global economy, Global
Ecology and Conservation, 13, 1-14.
Thomas, J. K., Adams, C. E., and Thigpen III, J. F. (1994). The Management of Hunting Leases
by Rural Landowners. Southern Rural Sociology, 10(1), 55-73.
Viollaz, J., Graham, J., and Lantsman, L. (2018). Using script analysis to understand the
financial crimes involved in wildlife trafficking. Crime, Law & Social Change, 69(5),
595–614.
Miller, W. B. (1958). Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency. Journal
of Social Issues, 14(3), 5–19.
Miller, W. B. (1965). Focal Concerns of Lower Class Culture. In L.A. Ferman, J. L. Kornbluh,
and A. Haber (Eds.), Poverty in America. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

45

Weekers, D. P., Zahnow, R., and Mazerolle, L. (2019). Conservation Criminology: Modelling
Offender Target Selection for Illegal Fishing in Marine Protected Areas. British Journal
of Criminology, 6, 1455-1477.
Wright, T. F., Toft, C. A., Enkerlin-Koeflich, E., Gonzalez-Elizondo, J., Albornoz, M.,
Rodriguez Ferraro, A., Brice, A. T., … Wiley, J.W. (2001). Nest poaching in neotropical
parrots. Conservation Biology, 15(3), 710-720.

46

CHAPTER 3:
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND ILLEGAL HUTNING AND FISHING

In the previous chapter, an analysis of illegal hunting’s history revealed that economic
context and structures impacted how social relationships and lifestyles affect trends in illegal
hunting. Building upon that observation, this chapter discusses how structural factors identified
in the Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory could be employed to explain the distribution of
illegal hunting. ToP theory argues there are two ecological consequences of capitalism –
ecological additions and ecological withdrawals – which combine to cause ecological
disorganization. While both processes are important to describing the operation of the ToP, the
process of ecological withdrawals is argued to play a role in affecting the distribution of illegal
hunting by altering the distribution of, and access to wildlife. Adding to the observations from
ToP theory, it is also argued that other ecological modifications such as the building of roadways
which contribute to the stability of the ToP can segment ecosystems, and affect the distribution
of illegal hunting.
To establish the above, this chapter begins with a review of treadmill of production
theory. That discussion includes a review of the ecological consequences of capitalism. Those
discussions, I introduce the concept of ecological modifications, and argue that these
modifications should be included as control variables that could affect the distribution of hunting
violations across Texas counties. The chapter concludes with a summary of the theoretical
models that will be examined in the empirical portion of this study.
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The Treadmill of Production Theory
Political economic green criminology (PEG-C) argues that economic forces impact the
types and amount of environmental crime found in society. Increasingly, PEG-C has done so
through the lens of the Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory. While not all green criminological
research is grounded in a political economic approach, here, I draw more heavily on the PEG-C
approach. In general, the purpose of green criminology is to address how the economic
organization of society (i.e. the organization of production) consumes and pollutes the natural
environment and causes ecological disorganization or the dysfunctionality of nature (Lynch and
Stretesky, 2011). The concept of ecological disorganization did not originate within green
criminology but stems from theoretical critiques of capitalism in the economics, political science,
and sociological literatures (O’Connor, 1988; Foster, 1999). Green criminology argues that the
harms produced by the structural organization of capitalism produces ecological costs that can be
considered crimes from the perspective of nature as a living entity (Lynch et al., 2013).
The concept of the treadmill of production (ToP) was introduced by Schnaiberg (1980) to
describe the production’s impact on the ecosystem, as well as social and political responses to
the production (Schnaiberg, Pellow, and Weinberg, 2000). According to Schnaiberg, the ToP
started after 1945 when factories needed greater material input as well as expanded fossil fuel
and chemical energy technologies to increase production and profit-making. The environmental
impact of the ToP originates from the dynamic relationship between laborers, the state, and
capital owners. Schnaiberg et al. (2000) observed five axes of this dynamic relationship.
Economic Expansion was the idea that as the economy grew, all parties receive an increase in a
form of capital. Increased consumption is the axis that as goods are produced, there needs to be
an increase in consumption. Thus, consumers need financial assistance to continue to consume
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(i.e. credit). The third axis, solving social and ecological problems by speeding up the treadmill,
focuses on the ability of the market and technological development to “solve” problems such as
poverty and environmental degradation. Large firms, the fourth axis, were believed to be the
driving mechanism of economic expansion in treadmill capitalism; these firms provide the
greatest demand for jobs, and encouraged smaller firms to supply the larger firms. Lastly, the
fifth axis focused on an implicit contract with the alliances among capital, labor, and
governments, to ensure the stability of the ToP. The alliance influences society to maintain
laborers and entrepreneurs; but, following the classic theory of capitalism development by Marx,
the growth of technology was seen as detrimental to the needs of the working class, since
technology functions to make production efficient, leading to the elimination of labor costs and
employment (Schnaiberg et al., 2000). At the same time, however, Schnaiberg argues that
working class members participate in this technological restructuring in an effort to save as many
jobs as possible.
In sum, Schnaiberg (1980) argued that the structure of the capitalist ToP operates to
fulfill the primary function of capitalism – profit making – but does so endlessly, as if it were on
a treadmill. This treadmill continually expands production. In order to continually expand
production, the treadmill must increase the extraction of raw materials used in the production
process. In addition, it must emit an increasingly larger volume of pollution. Accordingly,
Schnaiberg et al. (2000) argued there is an ecological dimension to the ToP that negatively
impacts the stability of the ecosystem, and increasingly disorganizes the ecosystem over time.
According to O’Connor (1988) and Foster (1999), this relationship between capitalism and the
environment is one of the central contradictions of capitalism: as capitalism grows, it continually
destroys nature, and must do so. That contradiction reveals a central limitation of capitalism – as
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it destroys nature, it consumes the natural resources it requires for production, and, at some
point, nature is no longer able to support capitalism or its expansion (Foster 1999). Drawing on
these observations and those from scientific studies, green criminologists have employed these
observations to note that this process promotes such extensive ecological damage and ecological
disorganization that the ecosystem is faced with the possibility of collapse (Lynch and Stretesky,
2014). It is in this sense that capitalism is said to not only harm, but to commit crimes against
nature (Lynch et al., 2013), with environmental sociologists specifically referring to this process
as “the robbery of nature” (Foster and Clark, 2018, 2020).
According to Lynch et al. (2017a), green criminology discusses the contradiction
between the ToP and the environment in terms of environmental disorganization or destruction
outcomes. The ToP generates adverse ecological outcomes that hinder the ability of the
environment to maintain itself, and by extension, lower the availability of natural resources for
the ToP (Lynch et al., 2013). These outcomes have been supported by multiple studies in
environmental sociology and natural sciences. Schnaiberg et al. (2000), and recently scholars
like Jorgenson (2006: 2009); Shandra and colleagues (2010; 2009); McKinney and colleagues
(2010; 2009), and Lynch and colleagues (2013), globalization has brought this uneven
distribution in the ToP across nation borders, expanding the ToP beyond a nation’s ability to
control the ToP. Now, companies move production to nations with cheaper labor and use other
nation’s recourses as input into the system (Schnaiberg et al., 2000). however, only a few studies
have explored theoretically and empirically how the ToP relates to the distribution of green
crimes (Lynch, Long and Stretesky, 2019). Due to the limited scope of this literature, numerous
topics have escaped examination. To date, for example, the PEG-C approach has not been
applied to the study of illegal hunting and fishing.
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While the ToP approach draws attention to how capitalism generates ecological
disorganization through ecological withdrawals and additions, I argue that the ecological
withdrawal dimension is the most relevant to consider when attempting to understanding the
distribution of illegal hunting. The opportunity for illegal hunting, for example, is not likely to
be impacted by pollution since a great deal of pollution is located in urban areas where hunting
opportunities are diminished. However, illegal hunting is likely to be affected by ecological
withdrawals since they restrict and change the nature of the ecosystem and landscapes in which
wildlife are found. For example, during the early conservation years of the Adirondack Park, the
lumber industry was growing, buying land and logging down forestry and displacing wildlife. In
response, the state of New York enacted conservation regulations to preserve the remaining
public land of the park, but the regulations were imposed on the public, rather than the lumber
industry. As a result, hunters ignored conservation efforts and the lumber industry by continuing
to hunting and poach lumber illegally to counteract the shrinking land to hunt and gather
materials (Jacoby, 2003). This can also be seen within the agricultural industry, lowering the
biodiversity of a nation’s fauna (Shandra et al., 2010; McKinney, 2010).
Additionally, while the ToP approach provides an overarching description of a given
form of capitalism, the ToP itself can be understood in more nuanced ways, and consisting of
various dimensions. For example, while a major component of the ToP is the manufacturing
sector, manufacturing itself is comprised of subareas. For instance, the manufacture of food also
involves agricultural production, and this process of manufacturing/producing food can be
described as being part of the ToP (Konefal and Mascarenhas, 2005). Drawing from ToP theory,
one can suggest that large scale agricultural operations promote the withdrawal of ecological
resources and facilitates the destruction of habitat for certain wildlife species. At the same time,
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large agribusinesses may also provide habitat for certain species (i.e., quail, pheasant) hunters
desire. Thus, the distribution of the agricultural portion of the ToP may impact opportunities for
illegal hunting by altering natural terrain, affecting the presence of certain species of wildlife,
and affecting lands hunter can access to carry out hunting activities.

Conflicting Industries in the Treadmill of Production
According to Jacoby (2003), there are two industries in conflict with one another access
to, and the preservation of nature – the hunting industry and the mining industry (e.g. mining,
fracking, etc.). Posited here, there is a hunting or outdoor industry (HI) that can be considered to
be part of the economic treadmill. The HI portion of the United States’ (USA) ToP may come
into conflict with other, and much larger, sectors of the ToP, such as the mining sector (MI).
Prior studies, for instance, demonstrate that during the early years of conservation efforts, there
was an increase in illegal hunting and conservation violations due the growth of the MI and HI
(Jacoby, 2003). During these times, there was a growing HI that encouraged more and more
individuals to invest in hunting. At the same time, the wildlife needed to satisfy the growing
number of hunters was decreasing due to habitat lost from the growing lumber industry and
urban sprawl, which the government endeavored to balance through increased forest
conservation efforts (Eliason, 2012; Jacoby, 2003). During those times, as mining (i.e. lumber
extraction), and hunting industries grew, social conflicts followed, and increased the likelihood
of acts of illegal hunting (Jacobs 2003).
As the mining industry expanded, resources available to other industries become more
limited. The MI is responsible for land destruction, limiting the volume of undeveloped land and
resources individuals – and wildlife – can use or access. Similarly, expansion of the agricultural
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sector of the ToP can also have adverse ecological impacts on wildlife, and affect the opportunity
for hunting and hunting violations. For instance, Shandra et al. (2010) observed a relationship
between increased agricultural land use and bird and mammal biodiversity loss. This association
may indicate that land losses – a specific forms of ecological disorganization -- may affect illegal
hunting by changing the availability of the number of species, or the quantity of any given
species.
In regards to the HI, the HI does not cause the same kinds of ecological harms as other
segments of the ToP. In general terms, the HIs, themselves, do neither withdraw resources (with
the exception of game animals), add pollutants, or produce large changes to ecosystems, like
other industries green criminological research has explored. Hunting industries relay on available
land for customers to use their products for hunting and fishing. This is an important observation
to bear in mind when discussing the context behind the economic behaviors of the ToP and the
distribution of illegal hunting.
Overall, the growth of certain sections of the ToP leads to ecological consequences that
affect the state of the ecosystem, and the distribution of wildlife species. In this way, the
ecological disorganization effects of the ToP may be shaping the distribution of illegal hunting.
More specifically, the mining industry restricts the capital of nature from hunting industry
consumers or individuals through ecological disorganization and privatization of land for the
mining industry. The following sections further expands the discussion of these adverse
ecological consequences that flow from the expansion of the ToP and how they relate to the
distribution of illegal hunting.
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Ecological Disorganization Outcomes
The ToP disorganizes the environment and harms the replenishment of natural habitats
and resources. Thus, ecological disorganization outcomes (EDO) are an umbrella term used to
describe how the economy damages the environment through ecological withdrawals and
additions. These behaviors “disorganize” the current state of nature. Over the years, Lynch and
other green criminologist (e.g. Nigel South, Avi Brisman, Michael Long, Melissa Jarrell, Paul B.
Stretesky, and Kimberly L. Barrett) have observed how corporate behavior massively alters the
environment (e.g., blowing up mountain tops, polluting waters with chemicals; Lynch, Long, and
Stretesky, 2019). One of the most famous examples of adverse environmental impact was the BP
oil spill in 2010. Situations like the BP oil spill have questioned the legitimacy of business
behavior with respect to environmental consciousness. EDO seeks to highlight how even the
mundane use of the environment as a resource, or as a sink for pollutants causes deterioration of
the overall health of the environment. Additionally, research around economic structure and
biodiversity loss have pointed towards a third outcome – ecological modifications – as a cause of
ecological disorganization due to physically changes which support the expansion of the ToP
while damaging the ecosystem.
To date, studies have not separately analyzed these outcomes, let alone the disaggregated
effect of industries found in the ToP. This is because the ToP involves a complex set of
relationships that it is unable to be captured within one or even several simple measurements.
Typically, ToP related research focuses on the main premise of economic expansion to show
how the economy is producing and using natural resources. Empirical research related to this
argument has been shown to explain outcomes such as global animal biodiversity (McKinney,
Kick, and Fulkerson, 2010; Shandra et al., 2010; Shandra et al., 2009; McKinney, Fulkerson, and
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Kick 2009). The current dissertation, then, seeks to determine whether certain EDOs would
relate to the spatial distribution of illegal hunting.
There are currently two EDO supported by green criminological research. First, there are
ecological withdrawals which describe the economic behavior of extracting resource. Second,
there are ecological additions which describe negative additions to the environment such as
pollution. As the ToP expands, more behaviors are exhibited that facilitate disorganization of the
environment. However, there are also other ecological changes that can alter ecosystems which I
shall call ecological modifications. These include the construction of roadways, for example,
which can cause the fragmentation of ecosystems (on ecosystem fragmentation see, Geneletti
200). The adverse ecological consequences of ecological modifications have not been examined
in the green criminological literature. I will suggest that it is necessary to consider ecological
modification as another way in which the ToP can adversely impact ecosystems, and
consequently, to affect the distribution of outcomes such as illegal hunting.

Ecological withdrawals
As the ToP expands, the resource mining industry must extract more and more materials
to keep the production process in motion (Schnaiberg et al., 2000). It should be noted that the
damage associate with the ecological extractions from mining can be extensive, and may exceed
the ability of nature to replace or replenish extracted materials. An obvious example is the
extraction of fossil fuels, which take millions of years to form, but are currently extracted at very
high rates (e.g., in 2019, more than 95 million barrels of oil were extracted daily). Ecological
withdrawals are not simply the use of natural resources, but include the excessive rate at which
resources are extracted. The process of ecological withdrawals can also be related to the concept
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of metabolic rift (Foster 1999). According to Lynch et al. (2019), “the process of metabolic rift
leads to the unequal distribution of matter and energy represented in the capitalist economy by
good/commodities…” (p. 153). The metabolic rift can also be related to planetary boundaries
that describe the limits of natural recourses. These boundaries describe the ecological
sustainability of the planet (Lynch et al., 2019; Rockstrom et al., 2009). When a planetary
boundary is reached, environmental sustainability is threatened (Rockstrom et al., 2009).
There are multiple ecological withdrawals required to operate the ToP. Research has
identified one form of withdrawal that lowers the diversity and density of wildlife --deforestation
– which also promotes habitat destruction/loss (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky, 2015). Examining
virtually every inhabited nation in the world, Hoffmann (2004) found that as percent of forest
cover decreased, the number of threatened species increased. Schipper et al. (2008) found
around 40% of land mammal species assessed were adversely affected by habitat loss and
degradation. The destruction of habitat, in short, causes both the population of species and the
number of species to decline. Within the context of hunting, it can be argued that as the ToP
expanded and consumed more and more of nature, species richness declined, limited the
opportunity to hunt successfully, and perhaps creates pressure to hunt illegally. It might also
enhance the ability of enforcement agents to discover more hunting violations as the volume of
nature that needs to be police shrinks, and access to the “deep” wilderness becomes easier.
At the same time that the ToP was consuming nature, hunting industry (HI) was
promoting hunting in order to expand its profit-making capacity. The HI was very successful in
this regard, and the number of registered hunters has grown substantially. In Texas alone, for
instance, there are more than 1.25 million registered hunters. Overall, in the US, the number of
registered hunters has grown from 34.19 million in 2004 to 36.82 million by 2017, or by about
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8% (Lock, 2017). To protect the remaining wildlife from extinction while also protecting the
ToP, state conservation laws are passed to limit the amount of people who can hunt (e.g., through
the use of license limits or bag limits). Laws may prohibit actions such as hunting at night, or
hunting without a paid permit.
It should be expected that withdrawals from resource mining would impact where illegal
hunting occurs. Unfortunately, when it comes to the impact of the economic structure, little
attention has been paid to how those structure affect the local or county level, and studies of
economic production have mainly focused on the effects the ToP at the national and global levels
(Hoffman 2004)). On a smaller scale or local level, information on these withdrawals is limited;
however, following the logic of the ToP, examining the growth of employment in, the volume of
output from, and the establishments of mining operations can serve as direct indictors of mining
activity and growth (Lynch et al., 2017; O’Connor, 1988). Paralleling Jacoby’s (2003)
observation within history, wherever the resource mining industry grows, the public’s access to
land is restricted either by private purchase of land, or government conservation efforts designed
to limit wildlife resource extraction. In certain instance, illegal hunting can occur due to a
conflict between local hunting cultures/values and land ownership patterns. For example, in areas
where there are no public lands to hunt due to a large concentration of resource mining, illegal
hunting occurs, because there is a fundamental value that the wilderness is a public trust, not to
be owned by business (Jacobs 2003).

Ecological Additions
On the opposite end of the production process is ecological additions. These additions are
pollutants or waste that are not part of the natural ecosystem. According to Lynch and Stretesky
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(2014), these additions are discharged into the environment as the result of production, and as a
consequence of resource extraction processes. These pollutants can change ecosystems as well as
the behavior of animals, and may even affect the heath of local wildlife species. One of the most
well-known examples of an ecological addition is the BP Oil Spill. This spill impacted over
1,300 miles of shoreline in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, which generated extensive pollution
from a resource withdrawal method (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2017).
NOAA scientists saw environmental damage to breeding and nesting grounds for four
endangered species of turtles (Kemp’s ridley, loggerhead, green turtle, and hawksbill). Scientists
confirmed a trend of reproductive failure and organ damage that caused the longest and largest
marine mammal mortality event (NOAA, 2017). NOAA found a 50 percent reduction in the
population of bottlenose dolphins after the event.
Ecological withdrawals have a direct effect on habitat destruction, while the destruction
associated with ecological additions is less obvious. While the health of the wilderness is
affected and contributes to the overall biodiversity loss, this does not limit the land where people
are able to hunt, but may affect the availability of species, as demonstrated in the famous book
by Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, which showed how pesticide pollution was killing bird
populations. That work was so influential it ushered in the environmental era of the 1960s.

Ecological Modifications
I argue there is a third EDO that has not been discussed in the ToP literature, but has been
addressed in other research that explores the ecological contradictions of capitalism. O’Connor
(1988) argued that capitalism shapes “urban space”, a term to describe the social organization
such as family roles, education, labor, and more. The urban space helps centralizes production
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and distribution of capital exchange, but there is also another aspect to urban space -- its physical
space or composition. In order for this urban space to development, modifications to the natural
environment must occur to sustain such a setting. Deriving from the theoretical framework of
Marxist geography, space and a physical infrastructure plays a large role for the urban space to
sustain of the ToP. On this point, Peet (1979: 166-167) has argued that
A mode of production generates a typical set of relations with the physical environment,
and a territorial structure, which reflect the relations of production (especially the
purposes of the owners of the means of production) and the level of development of the
productive forces. Social formations structured by the same mode of production thus
have generally similar geographies. But a given mode of production expresses itself
differently under varying physical conditions or in areas of varying cultural transmission
from decayed modes of production, producing variations between and within the social
formations it generates. Also, a social formation develops historically in spatial
interaction with other social formations, those produced by the same mode of production,
those produced by previous modes, and those produced by alternative modes. Geographic
relations thus play extremely important mediating roles between modes of production and
the social formations which appear on the earth's surface.
This view draws attention to how the development of capitalism affects the types of and
the distribution of different kinds of space. In this long history, the development of urban centers
was necessary to the development and growth of capitalism (Peet 1979). Moreover, Peet (1969)
argued that the development of urban space required the development of centralized agricultural.
To align these spaces, transportation technology grew which assisted in creating more
agricultural zones outside cities, and which moved food (metabolic materials) from rural to urban
areas. As the economy grew, land and technology were transformed to produce more product to
compensate for the demand of the economy, a transformed more rural and natural areas into farm
lands, affecting wildlife habitat and access to wildlife. Today, this relation has become
internationalized as well. On a global scale, Shandra et al. (2010; 2009) found this relationship
between undeveloped nations experiencing economic growth and growing agricultural land due
to the increase demand for exports to more developed nations.
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This process can also be applied to the demand of labor for industries. Parks and Burgess
(1921) discussed how cities were centered around a business zone and workers are centralized
around that zone. According this concentric zone theory, as transportation improved and groups
gain wealth, they moved further away from the business zone (Sampson, 2012). From a ToP
perspective, the cost of labor (the support of people) is lower when labor lives in proximity to
businesses, but as industries grew, more labor was needed and more room for the excess labor
was need. Transportation was needed to improve to compensate the travel of cost of labor to the
business zone. Soon after, the cost of labor to live away from the business zone was more cost
effect than before. Dennis and Urry (2009) found that road development was created to assist in
the innovations in transportation. In turn, Shatz (2011) saw that road developed assisted in
economic factors such as productivity and worker transportation. Therefore, as the ToP lead to
“urban space”, the ToP also modifies the natural environment to build an infrastructure to
support this urban space for the productivity of the ToP. Therefore, just like agricultural land, as
the economy grows, urban areas grow outward from the business zone. Additionally, along with
modifying the physical space of the natural environment, this growth also results in increase
consumption of nature around the area. Queen et al. (1934) argued that urban development
settled on land full of resources like water access to supply the urban setting. Therefore, as the
economy grows, urban areas will transform the land to allow easier access to these natural
recourses and lower the cost of labor. Moreover Peete (1979) argues that the physical urban
space growth space assists in ecological contradiction and destruction of the natural
environment.
In this manner, ecological modifications change the ecosystem. Ecological modifications
are the products or the result of the ToP growing, laying a foundation of an ecosystem to further
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support the ToP. Ecological modifications are considered buildings, roads, farms, and other
forms of human development that change the “nature of nature”. From discussions above,
ecological modifications change the physical landscape of the environment itself. Unfortunately,
this concept has not been fully explored within green criminology. This is mainly due to the
focus of the remaining environmental lands; however, when focusing on the health of animal
wildlife, there needs to be a focus on these modifications since animal wildlife migrate from
place to place. For example, a grazing ground becomes a supermarket and a parking lot. The
newest suburban neighborhood was a habitat for small mammals and hunting grounds for
predatory birds. McKinney (2002) found that as the physical urban development expanded, there
was a downward trends of species richness, and a growth in species that benefit from human
development (e.g. mice, rats, pigeons, etc.).
Some modifications are referenced within conservation criminology studies of factors
that affect outcomes such as illegal fishing or hunting. Fine (2000) suggested that the expansion
of roads allowed more urban dwellers to travel to parks to hunt. Haines et al. (2012) found that
road development created increased opportunity to hunt within a forest ecosystem. Illegal
hunters hunted near the road, because animals would graze in the open grass by the tree lines
(Haines et al., 2012). For conservation criminology, these modifications affect rational decision
making-factors related to engagement in illegal behaviors. In contrast, green criminologists
would address environmental modifications as structural factors related the expansion and
ecosystem invasion of the ToP. For instance, roads assist human transportation of natural
resources for the purpose of expanding economic development (Shatz, 2011; Peet, 1969). Thus,
these modifications help understand where human development invades the wilderness, leading
to increased ecological withdrawal, ecological additions, and more ecological modifications.
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How does ecological modification relate to hunting? Hunting is a form of ecological
withdrawals, though not from an industry but from individuals. Yet, at the structural level,
ecological modifications change ecosystems, essentially “causing” hunting to be limited in
certain locations, to be more prevalent in others, and also affecting how wildlife species are
distributed. In essence, ecological modifications limit the distribution of wildlife, increasing the
value of wildlife. As a response, to restructure the capital of wildlife and lower the cost of
wildlife, illegal hunting occurs around these areas. Without controlling for ecological
modifications, studies on the ToP have potentially ignored an important spatial dimension of
how the ToP affects ecosystems.
While ecological modification can be employed to control for some spatial relationships,
they also offer a perspective on private lands, and issue that is not addressed by an ecological
withdrawal or addition approach associated with ToP arguments. Privatized lands restrict access
to wilderness land potentially for both the ToP and the general public. For instance, when the
state was unable to monitor the wilderness effectively due to limited economic means, people
bought land to preserve it, and turned those lands into private hunting clubs and businesses
(Jacoby, 2003). It should also be recognized that privatized land can be used for multiple
reasons, not just conservation or hunting business. Privatized land can be used for ranches,
farms, mining industries, or for resale for future development. The argument here is that when
you examine ecological modifications, you need to control for the remaining privatized land to
determine an accurate measure of effect of the current degree of ecological modifications.
To sum up, ecological modifications effect illegal hunting in two ways. First, the
modifications can interrupt animal migration and habitats, and alter the concentration and
availability of animals that could be hunted. Second, ecological modifications affect the volume
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of and access to land usable for hunting. By controlling for ecological modifications, the effects
of withdrawals become clearer, because you are controlling for the space in which withdrawals
cannot occur. It must be kept in mind that privatized land is an alternative explanation to the
spatial explanation of the ToP. Privatized land can limit the access of land to the ToP and
hunting. Without controlling for this factor, the effect of the ecological modifications can be
overestimated or underestimated.

Summary of Economic Structure and Illegal Hunting and Fishing
Ecological withdrawals from the mining industry, but not necessarily ecological
additions, are key economic factors that can be employed to describe how illegal hunting is
distributed (Figure 3.2). As the treadmill expands, ecological disorganization also spreads,
becoming more invasive and harmful over time. Therefore, a ToP model explaining illegal
hunting would propose that illegal hunting is a result of outcome effects associated with the
distribution of the mining and hunting industries. Both ecological withdrawals and modifications
limit the availability of hunting, thus limiting the fauna resources hunters may extract, and the
lands they may access. These effects also impact hunters from different social classes in unique
ways. For example, some social classes are more likely to rely on hunting to provide food, and
some people are more likely to engage in sports hunting depending on their social class
(Johnson, 1999; McGee, 2010) or their ethnicity (e.g., Native Americans, see Sepez, 2002).
Put simply, economic factors focus more on how the growth of certain sectors of the
economy the extraction of natural resources. The mining industry extracts resources for the
masses and to facilitate the growth of the ToP, while the hunting industry wants individuals to
extract resources instead of the industry. Ultimately, when one industry expands within an area,
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the ability of the other industry struggles to maintain relevancy. According to Jacoby (2003),
mining industries have more control over land, limiting the enlarging consumer base of the
hunting industry to use the land. Thus, the distribution of illegal hunting is determined by how
dominate the MI or HI is over the other.
The next chapter examines the data used in the analysis, variable operationalization, and
methodological steps employed to assess the distribution of illegal hunting in Texas. A few
things must be taken into consideration within the quantitative analysis. That chapter also
explores variables that may provide alternative explanations to ToP theory. These additionally
control variables include those from conservation criminology, from social disorganization
theory, and other cultural factors described in prior research (Jacoby 2003; (Eliason, 2020;
Eliason, 2004; Forsyth et al., 1997; Forsyth and Marckese, 1993). By controlling for these
variables, the relationship between the economy and illegal hunting becomes clearer.
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CHAPTER 4:
METHODS AND DATA

The prior review of the research suggested that there is a relationship between economic
organization represented by the Treadmill of Production (ToP), and illegal hunting and fishing
(IH&F). While this association has been demonstrated in qualitative assessments, there has yet to
be a quantitative assessment on the effect of the economy on IH&F. Unfortunately, due to
limited data covering one year, the current dissertation employs a cross-sectional study using
Texas data from 2015 to examine the concertation of the ToP and how the concertation of the
ToP affects the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing in Texas. While this is a limitation to
testing the ToP theory, it allows a basic assessment of the geographic associations between
IH&F and ToP variables. The chapter focuses on the methodology employed to study these
relationships. To begin, the relationships to be tested and hypotheses statements are explored.
Then, the data, units of analysis, and sample are discussed. Next, the conceptualization and
operationalization of the dependent, independent, and control variables is provided. Finally,
methodological steps for analysis of the hypothesized associations are discussed.

Research Questions and Hypotheses
This study has specific but exploratory aims. First, the study explores the distribution of
economic structures, opportunity variables, and social factors hypothesized to affect the
distribution of IH&F across Texas counties. Second, it explores the relationship between the ToP
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and the distribution of IH&F across Texas counties. Third, this study asked whether significant,
if any, discovered between ToP indicators and IH&F change after when control variables
representing opportunities for crime are controlled. Spatial analyses of these associations are also
conducted to identify whether high risk counties are grouped for IH&F in Texas.

Treadmill of Production Variables
PEG-C research discusses how the ToP impacts ecological withdrawals or the
consumption of nature (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky, 2019). Three variables representing the
ToP, according to literature, were used to capture the concertation of the ToP in the current
study. First, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita was used for the concentration of the
overall economic activity across counties that represented the ToP (Shandra et al., 2010).
Second, an additional aspect of the ToP was assessed by measuring manufacturing concentration
across counties (Lynch et al., 2019). Lastly, resource mining industries concentration was used to
assess one dimension of ecological withdrawals and ecological consumption activity across
counties (Jacoby, 2003). The exact definitions of these variables are found below.
The study addresses a straight forward research questions: Are variables that measure
aspects of the treadmill of production related to the geographic distribution of illegal hunting and
fishing violations in Texas? Regression models are employed to determine whether ToP
indicators and IH&F violations across Texas counties appear to be statistically related. The more
specific hypotheses tested are found below. Based upon assumption contained within ToP
theory, these hypotheses posit the following.

H1: County measures of the GDP per capita are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.
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H2: County measures of manufacturing industries are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.
H3: County measures of resource mining industries are associated with illegal hunting
and fishing at the county level.

Schnaiberg (1980) argued that as the overall economy grew, the consumption of nature
increases. As argued in Lynch et al. (2019) and Shandra et al. (2010), both the GDP per capita
and manufacturing industries reflect dimensions of the ToP. Previous studies have not
specifically linked the ToP to illegal hunting activities. However, following the logic of ToP
theory, one would expect that even illegal resource consumption might increase with the
concentration of the ToP. In the current study, therefore, I expect areas with a higher
concentration of the GDP per capita (H1) and manufacturing industries (H2) to be associated
with higher concentrations of illegal hunting and fishing activity. The ToP effect for MI on
illegal hunting, however, would not necessarily be consistent with the effect for other indicators
of the ToP. For example, following Jacoby’s (2003) account of the lumber industry, the
development of the MI reduced the land available for wildlife by destroying wildlife habitat, and
also and by restricting access to land for public uses such as hunting. Therefore, it is expected
that as MIs grow and consume larger segments of animal habitat, there would be fewer available
animals, and less opportunity for wildlife crime, leading to a negative association between MI
concentration and illegal hunting.

Hunting Industry Variables
As mentioned in the previous chapter, other the ToP may come into conflict with other
segments of society. Conservation efforts to preserve land against the ecological destruction
associated with expansion of the MI, for instance, emerged in location where efforts were made
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to protect the hunting industry and the rights of individuals to access nature and to hunt (Jacoby,
2003). Thus, as both the MI and HI grew, an increasing number of conservation regulation were
passed into law that endeavored to preventing the loss of flora and fauna. Some of those new
laws criminalized illegal hunting and fishing. This historical relationship would suggest a
potential relationship between the development of the hunting industry and the distribution of
illegal hunting and fishing.
Two variables were employed to measure the concentration of the HI across counties in
Texas. The first variable is the number of hunting establishments. Number of hunting
establishment is used to describe the presence of the industry. The second variable is the number
of licenses and permits within a county. These variables are employed to address two additional
research questions. First, does the HI, consisting of the count of hunting establishments and
licenses, impact the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing? And second, if apparent, does HI
impact the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing when controlling for the effect of ToP
variables? The specific hypotheses measuring these relationships are as follows.

H4: County measures of hunting establishments are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.
H5: County measures of licenses and permits are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.

Both hypotheses posit a positive relationship between HI indicators and illegal hunting
and fishing violations. In part, this empirical relationship may be driven by the unobserved
impact of enhanced enforcement, which might be elevated in counties with more hunting
business and licenses.
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Ecological Modifications Variables
Research has shown how the physical development of human society has led to an
increase in land destruction and modification (Lynch, Long and Stretesky, 2019; Lynch et al.,
2017). This argument is supported in the environmental sociology, ToP and Marxist Geography
literatures (Peet, 1979, 1969). As noted, however, one of the missing pieces in those literatures
involves identifying empirical measures of each view.
In the current study, three measures were taken to capture the concentration of ecological
modifications associated with the ToP: the amount of area of road in a county (i.e. road
development), the amount of area of land dedicated to growing crops (i.e. agricultural
development), and the concentration of house construction in an area (i.e. structural
development). While the effect of the ToP is typically described in relationship to its broad
ecological effects that occur through ecological withdrawals and additions, I argue that the social
and economic systems support the ToP in other ways as well. This includes the construction of
an appropriate infrastructure that supports the ToP (Curran, 2017). Related to these
observations, the finally hypotheses address whether measures of ecological modification are
associated with the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing activity.

H6: County measures of road development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting and fishing at the county level.
H7: County measures of agricultural development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting at the county level.
H8: County measures of structural development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting and fishing at the county level.

For hypothesis 6, road development, measured by lane miles, is expected to be positively
associate with IH&F, because roadways help provide access for the ToP to consume more nature
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by making transporting easier (Shatz, 2011; Dennis and Urry, 2009). Similarly, Fine (2000)
argued that the development of roads made it easier for urban dwellers to travel to areas where
you are able to hunt. Also, studies indicate that lane mileages is a significant predictor of travel,
particularly in rural areas (Lia, Kaiser, Zekkos, and Allison, 2006). Therefore, counties with
higher concentration of roads should see higher concentration of IH&F activity. For hypothesis 7
and 8, a negative association with IH&F is expected due to the species richness that is lost in
areas with agricultural development (Shandra et al., 2009) and structural development
(McKinney, 2002). With a smaller number of species, there should be less availability of fauna
for people to illegal hunt and fish.

Spatial High-Risk Clustering of Illegal Hunting and Fishing Violations
Individual pieces of research have suggested that IH&F may be spatially grouped (Crow
et al., 2013; Haines et al., 2012; Eliason, 2012; Jacoby, 2003). That is, there should be a
clustering pattern of IH&F violations across Texas counties. Since the dissertation is exploratory
and no prior research has discussed these factors spatially in relation to IH&F, there is no
predisposition on the spatial effects of these variables. Additionally, spatial effects for all
variables may not be warranted if certain variables have no statistical relationship with IH&F.
No hypotheses can be drawn at this current time. Therefore, to start the discussion for future
research, a post linear spatial analyses is conducted to test if counties with a high risk of IH&F
violations cluster controlling for variables found to be significant in the linear analyses.
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Units of Analyses
The current study examines the above hypotheses at the county level. In Texas, IH&F
data are collected at the county level. A number of criminological studies have employed county
level analysis (Deller and Deller, 2010; Bouffard and Muftić, 2006; Wells and Weisheit, 2004;
Osgood and Chambers, 2000). One advantage of using counties as the unit of analysis is that
many measures of social and economic relationships are available at the county level.

Dependent Variable Data and Measures
This study employs official measures of known violations of hunting and fishing
regulations. As prior studies suggest, official statistics represent a blend of the behavior of
individuals, and the behaviors of law enforcement agencies and agents (McCleary 1982).
Addressing this observation, Gove, Hughes, and Geerken (1985) found that while official crime
statistics do not capture all crimes, and addressing the dark figure of crime has included the use
of self-report or victimization surveys, the purpose of official crime statistics are accurate for
what they measure. This does not mean that official data are the best means to measure crime
rates, but that those data accurately describe the crime rate. Since the dissertation is focused
solely on Texas, and IH&F is investigated by the same agency in all locations, it is reasonable to
assume the official data represents some dimension of the “real” crime rate combined with
TPWD enforcement policies and initiatives. IH&F data from the TPWD is meant to capture the
violations set forth by law, and provides a one useful indicator of the crime rate for these
violations.
The data for this study was requested from the Texas Fish and Wildlife Department
(TFWD). The latest available data upon request was 2015. Therefore, the data requested was the
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entire list of 22,141 IH&F incidences with offenders over the age of 18 within the year 2015.
Following, all other variables reflected the year 2015. Data for the current dissertation were
extracted from multiple sources. Most data were extracted from federal and state government
census data with the closest corresponding year. No census data extracted were after 2015. Since
data source is not constant across variables, the source of data is discussed within the respective
variable sections. The remainder of this section discusses the 2015 IH&F data.
The data will be treated as counts by county. While county-base population adjusted
IH&F rates could be used, IH&F is a rare occurrence. For example, the Uniform Crime Report
for Texas reported a total of 890,966 incidences of violent and property criminal activity for
2015, or about 40 times more UCR crimes compared to IH&F crimes. The total UCR crime rate
was roughly 3,244 incidences per 100,000 people. For IH&F, the rate was roughly 81 incidences
per 100,000 people, or 40 times less likely. Additionally, when considering the statistical
distribution of an event across large and small populations, rates tend to be misleading.
Wiersema, Loftin, and McDowall (2000) and Nolan (2004) found that homicide rates were best
used to compare areas with large populations, but when smaller populations are included, the
rates no longer represented the population. Wiersema et al. (2000) found that the distribution
favored urban areas while count data provided a more even distribution across areas. Therefore,
the overall counts of IH&F are used as a measure for the dependent variable.
Within Texas, IH&F cover a wide variety of activities. Typically, these illicit activities
are defined under the Texas Parks and Wildlife code, and include code violations numbered 1000
to 5799. These violations cover a variety of animal victims such as mammals, birds, exotic land
and water animals, birds, salt and fresh water fish, shell fish, and alligator. See Table 1 for more
information on specific species and groupings. Additionally, these violations address a multitude
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of activity involved around hunting and fishing activity. Activities such as illegal use (i.e.
without a permit or illegal equipment) of a bow, firearm, animal call, vehicle, light, trap, net,
and bait. Trespassing on restricted, private, or road along with hunting and fishing before and
after hours. Lastly, these violations also cover illegal possession of animals, live, hunted, or
dead.

Table 1. Groupings of Animal Victims from Hunting and Fishing Violations
TERRESTRIAL
Javelina
Mule Deer
Pronghorn
White-tailed Deer
Squirrel
Alligator
Exotic Species*
Endangered Species*
Threatened Species*
Non-game Species*

BIRD
Duck
Eastern Turkey
Falcon
Geese
Mourning Dove
Quail
Rio Grande Turkey
Sandhill Crane
Chachalaca
Pheasant
White-winged Dove
Other Migratory Birds*

AQUATIC
Mussels
Oysters
Shrimp
Crab
Fresh-water Fish†
Salt-water Fish†
Aquatic Exotic Species*
*These miscellaneous categories were grouped based on violation code and examining similar victim species
around those codes. Most violations are grouped by similar species. For instance, violation codes numbered 2000
to 2507 and 5000 to 5799 cover only terrestrial species.
†The number of species under these categories is too vast to list. These categories are covered by violation codes
numbered 1000 to 1899.

The eight hypotheses described earlier were tested using four different four dependent
variables, using victim data, which are measures of illegal hunting and fishing: (1) the total
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number of illegal hunting and fishing violations (N = 22,141), (2) the number of illegal hunting
violations against terrestrial species (n = 5603), (3) the number of illegal hunting violations
against birds (n = 4,435), and (4) the number of illegal fishing violations against aquatic species
(n = 12,103). Testing the hypotheses on four measures of the dependent variable allows
assessment of the relevance of the explanations for IH&F for different IH&F measures. It is
possible that some variables are useful for predicting hunting violations against birds, but not for
explaining fishing violations, or hunting violations against terrestrial species. Ascertaining
whether the hypotheses fit different measures of IH&F tells us something about the
generalizability of the explanation for illegal hunting, and its applicability in different
circumstances.

Measures of Treadmill of Production Variables
Variables relating to measuring dimensions of the ToP were the GDP per capita, the
concentration of manufacturing industries, and the concentration of resource mining industries.
The GDP per capita was measured as a ratio of a county’s GDP over the county’s
population. GDP was measured as the current dollar GDP for the 2015, extracted from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. A county’s population count was extracted from the 2015 five
year estimate American Community Survey. Using these two measures, a ratio was calculated
with the GDP as the numerator and population count as the denominator. As indicated in
hypothesis 1, GDP per capita is expected to have a positive correlation with IH&F violations.
To measure the concentration of manufacturing and resource mining industries, the
location quotient from the Bureau of Labor Statistics is used for each industry. Location
quotients (LQ) “compare the concentration of an industry within a specific area to the
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concentration of the industry nationwide” (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). The calculation is
conducted for employment, establishments, and other measures of industries. According to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, this quotient allows for the distribution of an industry in one area to
be compared to the nation’s industry distribution. Moreover, the LQ are argued to be a measure
of exports or indicates locations where resources are extracted for the rest of the nation, which is
a measure of economic activity consistent with ToP research While the Bureau of Labor
Statistics applies the ratio to multiple measures of industry such as earnings and wages, the
current study uses the number of establishments for manufacturing and resource mining industry.
(Shandra et al., 2010; McKinney et al., 2009).
The LQ is a ratio that is calculated as follows: 1

𝐿𝑄 =

(𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦, 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦)
(𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦/𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝, 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦

The formula shows that the numerator is the proportion of a county measure of private
owned industries, to the county measure of all owned industries, including government owned
industries. The denominator is the proportion of a national measure of private owned industries,
to the national measure of all owned industries, including government owned industries. Thus,
the ratio is comparing the percent of establishments of an industry within a county to the percent
of establishments of that industry across the nation. Using this quotient gives an understanding
on the status of an industry in 2015 within a certain county.

1

For more information visit www.bls.gov/cew/about-data/location-quotients-explained.htm.
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Measures of Hunting Industry Variables
The elements that comprise the treadmill of production have not been entirely specified.
To be sure, the ToP includes manufacturing, and also the extractive industries. In the view taken
here, hunting can be interpreted as being part of the extractive sector of the ToP since hunting
directly extracts raw materials – albeit in the form of living beings – from nature.
The study uses two variables to measure the hunting industry: hunting establishments and
licenses and permits. Since hunting establishments have not been explored quantitively, multiple
measures of the hunting establishments were taken. Using the NAISC code 114 for private
hunting and trapping industries, data was extracted from the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics
that included location quotient of hunting industry establishments, and the total number of
establishments in each county in Texas. Neither of these measures has been included in prior
research attempting to predict the geographic distribution of IH&F violations. To find the best
fitting measure, analyses rotated each measure to determine the best predictor. Licenses and
permits were measured as the total of licenses and permits sold, requested from the Texas Parks
and Wildlife Department.

Ecological Modifications Variables
Three variables are proposed to capture the distribution of ecological modifications, that
might impact the opportunity for IH&F: road development, agricultural development, and
structural development. These variables are argued to impact fauna and the availability to hunt;
however, the statistical relationship of these factors on IH&F are unknown.
To measure the structural development, a structural density quotient of the 5-year
estimates of unweighted sampling of housing units from the 2015 census bureau per square mile

81

of land was calculated. A value of 0 indicate that there are no enough housing units or people
per square mile within a county. To measure agricultural development, a percent of farm land in
acres to the number of acers in a county was calculated. Data on acres of farm land and total
acres in a county were extracted from the 2012 Census of Agriculture of National Agriculture
Statistics Service of the United States Agriculture Department. Data on farmland are only
available once every 5 years, and 2012 is the closet measure to the year examined here. To
measure road development, data on lane miles of road were extracted from the County
Information Program in Texas. Unlike centerline miles which look at the length of roads, lane
miles are a measure of the total length of a roadway, and includes an adjustment for lane counts
for a given highway or road. Traditionally, this measurement takes the length of the road
multiplied by the number of lanes.

Measures of Control Social Variables
Extant literature suggests two social factors influence IH&F. Prior studies have found
that people who commit IH&F acts are not from out of town (i.e., they are locals), and tend to be
low income or poor (Forsyth and Forsyth, 2018; Eliason and Dodder, 2000; Forsyth, Gramling,
and Wooddell, 1998). Prior criminological and sociological research has examined these
variables at a structural level using counties as units of analysis, but typically measures these
indicators as socioeconomic status and as residential turnover rates (Lobao, Zhou, Partridge, and
Betz, 2016; Bouffard and Muftic, 2006; Wells and Weisheit, 2004; Osgood and Chambers,
2000). In the current study, three indicators of socioeconomic status were extracted from the
American Community Survey: the percent of people living below poverty level; the
unemployment rate; and medium housing value (Lobao et al., 2016; Bouffard and Muftic, 2006).
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Similarly, using the American Community Survey, residential turnover was measured as the
precent of renters and the percent of residence who moved between 2010 and 2014 (Lee, 2008;
Wells and Weisheit, 1994).

Measures of Control Opportunity Variables
While the economic and social structural variables are of theoretical interest, there are
other potential explanations for the distribution of IH&F that needs to be controlled for in the
analysis. These variables can be extracted from research in conservation criminology that
address the opportunities for wildlife crime. Haines et al. (2012) and Crow at al. (2013), for
example, both found that certain characteristics of the local geography provide opportunities to
illegal hunt.

Consistent with prior studies, the current research addressed the potential

geographic opportunity for IH&F by measuring county level public hunting lands, private
hunting lands, bodies of water, and a species richness indicator. Public hunting lands were
measured as a percent ratio between the acres of public hunting lands and the total acres of a
county. Private hunting land was also measured as a percent ratio between the acres of known
private hunting land and the total acres of a county. Data on the acres measures of public and
private hunting land were extracting from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department geographical
database. Bodies of water were measures as a count measure which included lakes, rivers,
streams, and reservoirs by county, and were extracted from the National Water Information
System of the US Geological Survey. Species richness was measured as the number of species
listed as rare, threaten, and endangered within a county, extracted from the Texas Park and
Wildlife Department. Theoretically, each measure of opportunity should be related to an
increase in the likelihood of IH&F violations across Texas counties.
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Methodological Steps
This section breaks down the analysis process employed to assess the hypotheses. First,
basic statistics are used to determine how these variables vary. Second, the skewness and
kurtosis statistics of independent variables are explored to determine if the natural log of a
variable should be taken into consideration. The natural log is taken for any variable where the
skewness statistic is lower than -1 or higher than 1 (Bulmer, 1979) and the kurtosis statistics is
higher or less than 3 (Westfall, 2014). Third, a correlation matrix is used to determine which
variables are highly correlated with one another, followed by an OLS regression to examine VIF
factors and goodness of fit. Forth, using SPSS generalized linear modeling, Poisson regressions
are used to test hypotheses 1 through 8.
A Poisson regression was used as the primary method of analysis. The assumption of the
Poisson regression is that the dependent variable is a interval count measure with a Poisson
distribution starting at a value of 0. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, the count data indeed follows a
Poisson distribution. It is also assumed that the number of zero cases is limited. Consistent in the
current study, the number of counties with zero IH&F violations was three. The model also
assumes three conditions: (1) all events are independent from one another, (2) the average rate of
the event is independent from other events, and (3) events cannot happen at the same exact time.
As well, the regression assumes is that the mean and variance are similar. The assumption of the
mean and variance can be statistically asses. To test this assumption, a deviance statistic,
calculated by SPSS, is used. If the deviance statistics is near or exactly 1, there is overdispersion
and violates this assumption. As a result, a negative binomial model is used to statistically handle
the overdispersion.2

2

Though there were concerns about the dependent variable being zero-inflated, the number of counties without any
form of illegal hunting or fishing was 4. Therefore, no zero-inflated regressions were used; however, when breaking
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Osgood (2000) and other scholars noted (Nolan, 2004; Wiersema, Loftin, and McDowall,
2000), when counts of the dependent variable are small and there is a comparatively small
population, a one-unit change in counts can have large effect on rates and significantly impacts
the estimates of the outcome. For example, in the current data, 70 percent of counties have
counts below the mean (n = 176 counties). Among those counties, 130 have IH&F counts below
a value of 50. This distribution implies that the data contains a large number of locations were
the counts of IH&F are small enough that a one-unit change in IH&F could generate large
changes in the rate of offending. Considering the above, Osgood (2000) suggests an alternative
Poisson rate model, which address problem related to small counts in small populations. Thus,
two Poisson regressions were used, one with count measures and one with adjusted rate
measures. Most of the analysis focuses on the count results. The adjust rate measures are used for
comparative purposes and to assess whether different analytic approaches significantly alter the
findings.
Several regression models are used to slowly introduce and assess the effects of
independent variables. This procedure was followed to assess effects for related sets of
independent variables associated with one of the theoretical or research perspective as prescribe
earlier (e.g. ToP variables; conservation/opportunity variables), while limiting the number of
variables in a model. This was also done to minimize problems encountered with collinearity
among estimators. Following estimation of the separate models, final models are estimated
employing the significant variables from the prior models.

down illegal hunting and fishing into categories, there were more counties with zero observations. Additionally,
SPSS does not have an option for a zero-inflated regression. Future versions of the study will explore other
statistical programs to provide zero-inflated regression options.
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Lastly, SatScan is used to spatially analyze the data and provide geographical locations
where IH&F is concentrated to test hypotheses 9. The program QGIS is used to map out these
location outputs by SatScan. At this point of the analysis, geographical and law enforcement
districts are used within the maps to show the degrees of clusters within these districts. More
information on SatScan is discussed in chapter 6.

Summary of Methodology
Using data from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the current study uses spatial
and regression analyses to determine the distribution of IH&F across space. GDP, manufacturing
industries, resource mining industries are used as variables to represent ToP theory assumptions.
Hunting establishments and hunting and fishing licenses and permits are used as variables
representing the expected impact of the hunting industry on IH&F. Measures of residential
turnover, socioeconomic status, acres of public hunting land, acres of known private hunting
land, and number of bodies of water (e.g. rivers, bays, lakes, etc.) are used as control variables.
Nine hypotheses are presented in a step-by-step fashion to determine the influences behind the
distribution of IH&F across Texas counties. This analysis is large due to the exploratory nature
of the study. As a result, the analysis is broken down over the next two chapters. The fifth
chapter covers hypotheses 1-8, discussing the basic statistics and regression outputs. The sixth
chapter presents the statistics, figures, and tables on spatial analyses of significant variables
found in the fifth chapter to address hypothesis 9.
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CHAPTER 5:
REGRESSION ANALYSES RESULTS

This chapter reports the results from the analyses of factors hypothesized to affect the
distribution of illegal hunting violations. Mentioned in the previous chapter, observations and
results are used to address hypotheses 1 through 8. In this chapter, the skewness and kurtosis are
analyzed, and based on those results, variables lacking normal distributions were logged. Lastly,
Poisson regressions are used to determine if variables associate while controlling for other
explanations. The following chapter explores these relationships in spatial analyses.

Analyzing the Distribution of Variables
Using SPSS, descriptive statistics are reported along with skewness, kurtosis, and
Shapiro-Wilk statistics (Table 2). The skewness, kurtosis, and Shapiro-Wilks statistics were used
to determine the normality of the distribution of variables. These statistics help determine
whether or not variables need to be logged for regression purposes. Highly skewed variables
violate many assumptions of data analyses. The probability of producing inaccurate estimates
may be increased when modeling variables with non-linear relationships. It is widely noted in the
statistics literature that logging variables helps reduce errors in the estimates without overfitting
the modeling. The transformation of variables helps make the distribution closer to a normal bell
curve. In addition, highly skewed and varying distributions can yield statistical outcomes that are
not easily interpretable.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables

1. Total Violations
Violations against Land
2.
Animals
3. Violations against Birds
Violations against Aquatic
4.
Animals
5. GDP Per Capita
6. LQ of Manufacturing Industries
7. LQ of Mining Industry
8. LQ of Hunting Industry
9. # of Hunting Establishments
10. # of Licenses and Permits Sold
11. Road Development
12. Agricultural Development
13. Structural Density
14. % of Public Hunting Land
15. % of Private Hunting Land
16. # of Bodies of Water
17. # of Species Listed as R/T/E
18. % Unemployed
19. % Below Poverty
20. Average Housing Value
21. % of Rented Housing Units
22. % of New Residents

N
Minimum
Statistic Statistic
0.00
254
0.00
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254
254

0.00
0.00

Maximum
Statistic
584.00
149.00

Mean
Statistic
87.17
22.06

Std.
Deviation
Statistic
107.41
23.77

Variance
Statistic
11,537.82
565.12

262.00
531.00

17.46
47.65

25.46
83.74

648.08
7,012.54

40,965.00 360,491,167.00 6,175,027.56 28,964,662.91
0
3.04
0.92
0.50
0.00
45.40
9.10
7.41
0.00
175.81
5.49
19.12
0.00
44.00
0.80
3.20
0.00
386,482.00
18,367.76
47,876.76
18.85
11,861.73
1,168.88
959.18
2.54
99.63
76.48
22.95
0.11
1,105.05
43.51
124.08
0.00
22.37
0.96
2.63
0.00
1.10
0.03
0.11
0.00
50.00
3.32
5.25
24.00
224.00
55.12
26.09
0.00
19.80
6.74
3.00
1.40
40.30
17.16
6.12
32,300.00
281,200.00
97,947.24
39,031.66
9.80
69.90
28.41
8.08
8.20
51.10
26.97
6.08

LQ = Location Quotient
R/T/E = Rare, Threatened, or Endangered
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838,951,697,771,033
0.25
54.91
365.64
10.21
2,292,183,959.08
920,025.24
526.89
15,396.54
6.90
0.01
27.53
680.51
9.02
37.48
1,523,470,644.55
65.27
36.99

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables (Cont.)
Skewness
Statistic
1. Total Violations
2.29
2. Violations against Land Animals
2.12
3. Violations against Birds
4.44
Violations against Aquatic
4.
3.10
Animals
5. GDP Per Capita
9.54
6. LQ of Manufacturing Industries
0.59
7. LQ of Mining Industry
1.26
8. LQ of Hunting Industry
5.96
9. # of Hunting Establishments
10.76
10. # of Licenses and Permits Sold
5.43
11. Road Development
6.06
12. Agricultural Development
-1.48
13. Structural Density
5.94
14. % of Public Hunting Land
5.30
15. % of Private Hunting Land
6.13
16. # of Bodies of Water
5.13
17. # of Species Listed as R/T/E
2.22
18. % Unemployed
0.86
19. % Below Poverty
0.87
20. Average Housing Value
1.45
21. % of Rented Housing Units
1.37
22. % of New Residents
0.49

Kurtosis
Statistic
5.90
6.26
34.08

Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic Sig.
0.73
6.16
0.80
1.58
0.63
4.08

11.19

0.60

6.93

103.368
1.259
2.02
41.27
136.80
33.82
62.13
1.47
40.79
32.86
45.47
35.39
8.17
1.64
2.30
2.87
4.56
0.77

0.18
0.98
0.90
0.31
0.22
0.37
0.63
0.82
0.34
0.39
0.30
0.53
0.82
0.96
0.95
0.89
0.92
0.98

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01

*Sharpiro-Wilks degrees of freedom is 254
LQ = Location Quotient
R/T/E = Rare, Threatened, or Endangered
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A variable is skewed if the skewness statistics is less than -1 or greater than 1. Any
kurtosis statistic below the value of 3 is suggested to have a platykurtic distribution shape, and
any value above the value of 3 is suggested to have a leptokurtic distribution. Shapiro-Wilks is
used to determine whether the distribution is significantly different from a normal distribution.
The Shapiro-Wilks statistics for all independent variable were significant, and the
kurtosis and skewness statistics show that each measure of the dependent variable were heavily
right skewed with a high peak. Of the independent variables, the percent unemployed, percent
living below poverty, and percent of new residents were the only variables that did not need to be
corrected. The natural log was taken from the remaining independent variables for regression
analysis. Observations and discussions on the normality of variables are found below.

Illegal Hunting and Fishing Measures
All measures of hunting violations have a large range of outcomes. That is, the number of
violations found across counties have a large range overall. Total variance for each measure is as
follows: total violations (σ2 = 11537. 817); hunting violations (σ2 = 1429.041); and fishing
violations (σ2 = 7012.537). Fishing violations specifically have the larger variation out of the
two subtypes of violation. This is expected since bodies of water are more concentrated in certain
areas of Texas compared to others (e.g., around the Southeast end of Texas). As illustrated in
Table 2, the Shapiro-Wilks statistics is not significant, suggesting the distribution of the
measures of illegal hunting and fishing not violating the assumption of normality, but skewness
and kurtosis statistics illustrate a right skewness. Therefore, a Poisson regression remains a more
appropriate approach than an ordinary least square regression.
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Economic Structural Measures
According to Table 2, Shapiro-Wilks statistics for each economic variable are significant,
suggesting that the distribution of all economic measures across counties are highly skewed.
Measures of the treadmill of production (ToP), the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita
and location quotient (LQ) of manufacturing establishment, were not normally distributed. GDP
per capita was rightly skewed with a high peak. The LQ of manufacturing establishments is not
skewed, but is more platykurtic in shape. The difference in distribution suggest that economic
growth does not reflect manufacturing establishments; however, this could suggest that certain
areas benefit more from manufacturing than other area. The LQ of resource mining
establishments had skewness following the pattern of a platykurtic shape, though not extreme (K
= 2.020). With a statistic above 1, mining industry observation display a right skew. The hunting
industry (HI) variables are distributed similar to the Mining Industry (MI), but the distributions
are more pronounced in shape. The skewness statistics range from 5.43 to 10.76, with the
kurtosis statistics ranging from 33.81 to 136.801. This suggests a right skewed distribution with
an incredibly high peek. The Shapiro-Wilks statistics are significant, indicating this distribution
shape is non-normal (i.e., not Bell-shaped). A high peek right-skewed distribution means that
when the value of the measures deviates from the mean, the values tend to be smaller and likely
to be an extreme deviation. These basic statistics argue a stark contrast of areas with high
measures of the HI and areas with low measures of the HI.
The distributions of ecological modification measures appear to have similar distributions
to the LQ of the mining industry. The amount of housing units (W = .260, p. < .001), the density
of housing units (W = .340, p. < .001), lane miles of road (W = .626, p. < .001), and acres of
farm land (W = .562, p. < .001) have Shapiro-Wilks statistics which indicate that all measures of

98

ecological modification are not normality distribution. All variables have a skewness statistic
above 1, ranging from 5.941 to 7.928, and are heavily right skewed. Additionally, the Kurtosis
statistics are higher than 3, ranging from 24.129 to 75.800, indicating a leptokurtic shape. The
combination of these two statistics suggests that observations are either closely associated with
the mean or extremes, with little if at all between. With a right skew, the extreme or rare cases
are more likely to reflect metropolis areas the while majority of counties are rural, centering
around the mean.

Control Variables
The first set of control variables, geographical opportunity variables appear to be rightly
skewed with a skewness value ranging from 2.22 to 6.13. Additionally, the variables have a
leptokurtic shaped distribution with a kurtosis value ranging from 8.17 to 45.47. The distribution
of these statistics would suggest that there is a heavy concentration of geographical opportunity
variables for a few areas. Similar to economic measures, this may reflect the contrast between a
few urban settings surrounded by many rule areas. Social variables, however, have different
disruptions from the rest of the variables.
Measures of socioeconomic status seem to be the set of social structure variables closest
to a normal distribution. All SES variables have a significant Shapiro-Wilks statistic, ranging
from .894 to .980. Housing values were considered skewed with a skewness statistic over 1;
however, housing values (K = 2.865) had Kurtosis statistics close to a value of 3. In contrast,
poverty and unemployment were not skewed, but the distributions had Kurtosis less than 3
suggesting a platykurtic shape where extreme values are more likely to occur. It is interesting to
point out that all measures of poverty and unemployment had a fairly normal distribution across
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counties; but measures of wealth had a right skew, suggesting that the distribution of wealth does
not reflect the distribution of low socioeconomic status measures.
Examining the measures of residential turnover, percent of renters have a stark shape
compared to the percent of new residents. The percent of new residents have a skewness statistic
between 1 and -1. The kurtosis for new residents (K =.0.767), which suggest a platykurtic shape.
The percent of renters for occupied housing has a skewness above 1, and kurtosis above 3. With
a skewness statistic over 1 and a Kurtosis statistic over 3, the distribution shape suggests there is
a high concentration of counties around the mean but that any deviation away from the mean is
extreme, particularly towards the right of the mean. Taken all together, residential turnover does
not seem to have similar observations across counties. Additionally, this indicates that there are
certain levels of structure in which turnover is higher than others.

Bivariate Relationships
The next analysis tests the bivariate relationships between theoretical, control, and
dependent variables. The analysis is presented in Table 3. Results suggest multiple variables are
significantly associated with the total count of hunting and fishing violations, with results
breaking down violations by land, air, and aquatic victims. The analysis shows significant
positive relationships between the following theoretical variables and the total count of hunting
and fishing violations: (1) GDP per capita (r = .41, p < .01), (2) LQ of MUI (r = .21, p < .01), (3)
number of hunting establishments (r = .45, p < .01), (4) the number of hunting and fishing
licenses and permits sold (r = .61, p < .01), (5) road development (r = .40, p < .01), and (6)
structural density (r = .51. p < .01). Only two theoretical variables had a significant negative
relationship, the LQ of MI (r = -.45, p < .01) and agricultural development (r = -.22, p < .01).
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix of Variables
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

1

2

.48**

1

3

.64**

.18**

1

4

.95**

.28**

.47**

1

5

.41**

.06

.15*

.46**

1

6

.21**

.22**

.17**

.15*

.05

1

7

-.45**

-.33**

-.28**

-.39**

-.17**

-.52**

1

8

.05

.04

.08

0.02

-0.04

-.13*

.17**

1

9

.45**

.03

.30**

.47**

.22**

.00

-.10

.32**

1

10

.61**

.10

.32**

.66**

.69**

.08

-.33**

-.06

.26**

1

11

.40**

.20**

.19**

.40**

.60**

.22**

-.18**

-.13*

.15*

.50**

1

12

-.22**

-.06

-.06

-.25**

-.13*

-.30**

.23**

.07

-.04

-.18**

-0.11

1

13

.51**

.06

.26**

.56**

.89**

.10

-.32**

-.07

.21**

.74**

.44**

-.22**

1

14

.08

.10

-.06

.10

-.02

-.01

-.16*

-.02

-.01

.00

.01

.23**

-.02

1

15

.02

-.07

.06

.02

.02

.03

-.05

.03

.07

.05

.02

-.04

.02

.02

1

16

.44**

.19**

.21**

.44**

.71**

.14*

-.35**

-.02

.21**

.69**

.62**

-.12*

.67**

.03

.00

17

.40**

.23**

.33**

.36**

.17**

.04

-.42**

.06

.34**

.34**

.07

.24**

.26**

.41**

-.04

18

.15*

.13*

.15*

.11

.02

.16*

-.23**

.09

.09

.04

.00

.17**

.03

.06

.14*

19

.16*

.11

.24**

.10

.00

-.03

-.11

-.03

.17**

.00

-.01

.14*

-.03

.02

.14*

20

.27**

.09

.12*

.28**

.23**

.34**

-.41**

-.09

.03

.38**

.20**

-.22**

.37**

.02

-.04

21

.18**

-.03

.14*

.20**

.30**

-.04

-.17**

-.15*

.09

.34**

.11

.06

.34**

.11

0.10

-.32**

-.14*

.07

.44**

.26**

-.08

.44**

.09

.02

22 .31**
.04
.20**
.32**
.32**
.11
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Matrix of Variables (cont.)
16

17

18

19

20

21

22

1

16
17

.32**

18

.01

.18**

1

19

-.10

.18**

.48**

1

20

.40**

.30**

-.23**

-.43**

1

21

.22**

.17**

-.02

.21**

.13*

1

1

.16*
-.08
-.06
.39**
.60**
22 .37**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
1 = Total Violations
2 = Violations against Land Animals
3 = Violations against Birds
4 = Violations against Aquatic Animals
5 = GDP Per Capita
6 = LQ of Manufacturing Industries
7 = Location Quotient of Mining Industry
8 = Location Quotient of Hunting Industry
9 = # of Hunting Establishments
10 = # of Licenses and Permits Sold
11 = Road Development
12 = Agricultural Development
13 = Structural Density
14 = % of Public Hunting Land
15 = % of Private Hunting Land
16 = # of Bodies of Water
17 = # of Species Listed as R/T/E
18 = % Unemployed
19 = % Below Poverty
20 = Average Housing Value
21 = % of Rented Housing Units
22 = % of New Residents

1
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Only three theoretical variables were significantly associated with illegal hunting against
terrestrial species: (1) LQ of MI (r = .22, p < .01), (2) LQ of MI (r = -.33, p < .01), and road
development (r = .20, p < .01). As illustrated, the largest association with illegal hunting against
terrestrial species was the LQ of MI with a negative relationship. However, the amount of illegal
hunting against birds was associated with seven theoretical variables: (1) GDP per capita (r =
.15, p < .05), (2) LQ of MUI (r = .17, p < .01), (3) LQ of MI (r = -.28, p < .01), (4) number of
hunting establishments (r =.30, p < .01), (5) number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits
sold (r = .32, p < .01), (6) road development (r = .19, p < .01), and (7) structural density (r = .26,
p < .01). Unlike illegal hunting against terrestrial species, the largest association with illegal
hunting against birds was the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold with a
positive relationship.
With regards to illegal fishing, the amount of illegal fishing is similar to illegal hunting
of birds. Six theoretical variables were associated with the number of violations against aquatic
species: (1) GDP per capita (r = .46, p < .01), (2) LQ of MUI (r = .15, p < .01), (3) number of
hunting establishments (r = .47, p < .01), (4) the number of hunting and fishing licenses and
permits sold (r = .66, p < .01), (5) road development (r = .40, p < .01), and (6) structural density
(r = .56. p < .01). Only two theoretical variables had a significant negative relationship, the LQ
of MI (r = -.39, p < .01) and agricultural development (r = -.25, p < .01). The highest association
found was the positive relationship for the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits
sold.
These results indicate that unique theoretical variables affect different types of illegal
hunting violations. As noted, violations against bird and aquatic species have similar
relationships with theoretical variables. This relationship might also suggest that the geographic
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distribution of these violations would be similar as well: that is, where there is illegal hunting of
bird animals, there is also illegal fishing. The analysis also suggested that different variables
explained the distribution of illegal hunting of terrestrial species. The remaining sections explore
these similarities and differences between IH&F in more detail.

Hypotheses Testing
Multiple research questions and hypotheses were posed concerning the relationships
between IH&F and economic and other structural variables. To test these hypotheses, a Poisson
regression was argued to be appropriate. (see chapter 4 for full discussion). IH&F was
measured in four ways to address whether economic and structural variables are associated with
the distribution of IH&F. To address these questions/hypotheses, multiple analyses were
conducted using the total amount of IH&F violations, the number of illegal hunting violation
against terrestrial species, the number of illegal hunting against birds, and the amount of illegal
fishing as dependent variables. Before analysis were conducted, two steps were taken to address
multicollinearity between independent variables and overdispersion of the dependent variables.
First, multicollinearity was assessed. While multicollinearity does not affect the
underlying assumptions required for regression analyses, it would impact the slopes and standard
errors (Allison, 1999). To test for multicollinearity, the variance influence factors (VIF) was
examined across each theoretical and control variable using ordinary least squares regressions.
Variables are argued to have serious multicollinearity if VIF are above the value of 10 (Menard,
1995; Mason, Gunst, and Hess, 1989). The mean VIF among each variable was 2.74, but two
variables did approach the value of 10: GDP per capital (VIF = 8.52) and structural density (VIF
= 8.50). Though this may be a problem, the natural log of the variables was taken as discussed in
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the section above. After logging variables to correct for normality, the mean VIF decreased to
2.71. The VIFs also decreased for GDP per capita (VIF = 1.77) and structural density (VIF =
6.84). Collinearity diagnostics are reported in Appendix A.
Second, model fit diagnostics were assessed in order to determine if Poisson modeling or
negative binomial model should be employed. Intercept only Poisson models were estimated
using each measure of IH&F. Presented in Table 4, the log-likelihood suggests that the models
for illegal hunting against land and bird animals have a better fit; however, all measures of IH&F
seem to be over dispersed. SPSS provides two statistics to show overdispersion, deviance and
Pearson chi-square. These statistics are the value of the deviance and Pearson chi-square divided
by the degrees of freedom (df = 253). If the result of this calculation centers around one, the data
are considered to exhibit equidispersion. Values greater than 1 suggest data are overdispersed.
Values less than 1 would indicate underdispersion within the data. For the intercept only models,
the results suggest that negative binomial regressions are preferred.

Table 4. Goodness of Fit Test of Poisson Modeling Intercept Onlya
Pearson
Model
Total Violations
Illegal Hunting against Land Animals
Illegal Hunting against Birds
Illegal Fishing against Aquatic Animals

Deviance
101.275
21.505
24.421
94.563

Chi-Square
132.361
25.618
37.117
147.169

Log Likelihoodb
-13510.890
-3255.459
-3555.022
-12463.121

a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.
b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

With multicollinearity and overdispersion attended to, each analysis of illegal hunting
and fishing used multiple negative regression models to introduce estimates for theoretically
relevant variables, and then the removal of insignificant variable and re-estimation of equations
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to eliminate variables that were not contributing to the empirical explanation of IH&F3. This
procedure allows researchers to see how relationships change or emerge when new variables are
added to or removed from the analysis. To reduce a model, variables that were insignificant from
a full model were removed, and the remaining variables were regressed on the dependent
variable. Variables continued to be removed if variables lost significance after reducing the
3

Other regressions were used, as requested, to determine how the data behaved. The main reason for
running two different regressions was to address the absence of a population variable in the original analysis. In the
original analysis, population variables were excluded. Population and population per square mile had a large
correlation with the total number of houses and the number of houses per square mile. Correlations between the four
variables ranged from .93 to .99. Statistically, it would be improper to include population, and since the number of
houses per square mile was more reflexive of the theory, it was retained. Thus, initially, population was removed
from the analyses. Still, the critiques argued that population is a key variable in terms of spatial analyses and theory
at a macro level. Therefore, two different regressions were request, an ordinary least square (OLS) with population
rate measure of the dependent and an offset negative binomial with a weighted logged population variable. When
rerunning the models with these regressions, outputs for the variables drastically changed. Regression models were
running with all variables from the study.
Population was measured as the total amount of individuals within a county. To create a population rate of
illegal hunting and fishing, the formula (crime/population)*100,000 was used. This formula reflects the crime rate
per 100,000 people in a county.
Within the OLS regressions, no variables remained significant for the total of IH&F violation. However,
the percent of public hunting land in acres did become significant. The variables that remained significant for the
number of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species were the number of hunting and fishing licenses sold
and structural development. The new variables that became significant were road development and manufacturing
industries. The variable that remained significant for the number of illegal hunting violations against birds was
hunting establishments. No other variables were significant. The variable that remained significant for the number of
illegal fishing violations against aquatic species was the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold,
and only the GDP per capita became significant.
After using the offset negative binomial regression, outputs drastically changed. The variables that
remained significant for the total number of hunting and fishing violations species were the number of hunting and
fishing licenses and permits sold and structural development. Additionally, road development, agricultural
development, the percent of public hunting land in acres, and the percent of rented homes became significant. The
variables that remained significant for the number of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species were GDP
per capita, number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, agricultural development, structural
development, and the number of bodies of water. No new variables were significant. The variable that remained
significant for the number of illegal hunting violations against birds was manufacturing industries, the number of
hunting establishments, and structural development. One other variable became significant, road development.
Lastly, the variables that remained significant for the number of illegal fishing violations against aquatic species
were the number of hunting and fishing licenses sold, the percent of public hunting land, and the number of bodies
of water. Four new variables became significant, resource mining industries, road development, agricultural
development, and the percent of houses that are rented.
From these analyses, the methodologically approach used to study illegal hunting can provide different
outcomes. Therefore, when future research explores explanations for illegal hunting and fishing, the methodology
should be the biggest concern to properly communicate relationships. While the OLS found significance, there are
many assumption violations of the OLS analysis, because the nature of the data at county level, as discussed in the
Chapter 4, can be sensitive to rate measures. While some outputs were similar to the presented results, offset
negative binomial seems to be the better analyses. Though it includes population, the calculations of the formula to
calculate the regression line alleviates many violations of OLS assumptions (Osgood, 2000). Thus, future versions
of this study will pursue an offset negative binomial analysis instead.
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model.4 This procedure was followed because of the large number of potential variables used to
explain IH&F across the models. While variables were selected in each model due to prior
research or theoretical implications, variables that were statistically insignificant become, in
principle, theoretically meaningless once they are shown to be devoid of any practical empirical
predictive power. Most analyses had gone through a process of 10 models to find a reduced
model, with the except of Table 7. A summary of hypotheses testing is presented in Table 9 at
the end of the chapter.5

Treadmill of Production Variables
The first research question asked whether there “is there a relationship between measures
of the treadmill of production (ToP) and illegal hunting and fishing?” Bivariate relationships
found initial relationships between GDP per capita, manufacturing industries, and mining
industries with multiple measures of illegal hunting and fishing, with illegal hunting violations
against terrestrial species with the least number of associations. The following set of hypotheses
answers this question by exploring the condition in which (if any) significant relationship
between variables of the ToP and illegal hunting and fishing. The test of hypotheses proceeded in

4

In Table 6, the GDP per capita and resource mining industry were included in the reduced model, because
those variables were significant in a model controlling for other economic variables. Using the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC), model 7 had a value of 2027.05. Model 8 has an AIC of 2028.84. Since model 7, containing only
economic variables, had a better model fit, those variables significant in model 7 but not model 8 were also retained
for the reduced model, model 9.
5
One of the concerns here is with the interpretation of the logged models. This may be particularly true
for the Census variable, the Location Quotient, used to determine where industries are most concentrated using
cross-county import and export data. Additional models (not shown here) were estimated without logged
variables. After rerunning the models without logged variables, the significance of some variables was different,
but the coefficient became substantively insignificant. For instance, in the unlogged model, GDP per capita had a
significant relationship with illegal hunting violations against terrestrial animals, but the coefficient was less than
.0000001, in contrast to it logged version (see Table 6). Due to the issue with interpretation of output and
variables, future versions of this research based on this disseration will explore other measures that are more
intuitive and interpretable.
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Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression for the Total Hunting and Fishing Violations Across Counties (N = 254)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

% Unemployed

Model 6
0.06

Model 7

Model 8

*

(0.29)
% Below Poverty

0.07

1.55

-0.76

0.05

**

6.52
a

Log Likelihood

Pearson Chi-square

*

-0.36
(0.37)

**

0.01

1.54

**

1.62

**

(0.02)

5.09

-2.37

-13.97

5.27

*

-1330.1

-1311.3

-1309.0

-1313.9

-1318.0

-1338.0

-1297.2

-1286.4

-1293.4

-1295.1

291.11

207.88

201.54

213.20

208.34

230.06

182.22

162.54

168.18

170.36

250

251

251

250

249

248

245

236

249

250

2668.24

2628.68

2624.68

2635.81

2646.00

2688.00

2612.37

2608.77

2596.77

2598.25

Degrees of Freedom
AIC

**

-1.18

-0.33
(0.34)

(0.02)
(Intercept)

-1.18

(0.02)

(0.38)
% of New Residents

4.82

0.02

(0.25)
% of Rented Housing Units†

Model 10

(0.03)
**

(0.01)
Average Housing Value†

Model 9

-0.04

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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Table 5. Negative Binomial Regression for the Total Hunting and Fishing Violations Across Counties (Cont.)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

% Unemployed

Model 6
0.06

Model 7

Model 8

*

(0.29)
% Below Poverty

0.07

1.55

-0.76

0.05

**

6.52
a

Log Likelihood

Pearson Chi-square

*

-0.36
(0.37)

**

0.01

1.54

**

1.62

**

(0.02)

5.09

-2.37

-13.97

5.27

*

-1330.1

-1311.3

-1309.0

-1313.9

-1318.0

-1338.0

-1297.2

-1286.4

-1293.4

-1295.1

291.11

207.88

201.54

213.20

208.34

230.06

182.22

162.54

168.18

170.36

250

251

251

250

249

248

245

236

249

250

2668.24

2628.68

2624.68

2635.81

2646.00

2688.00

2612.37

2608.77

2596.77

2598.25

Degrees of Freedom
AIC

**

-1.18

-0.33
(0.34)

(0.02)
(Intercept)

-1.18

(0.02)

(0.38)
% of New Residents

4.82

0.02

(0.25)
% of Rented Housing Units†

Model 10

(0.03)
**

(0.01)
Average Housing Value†

Model 9

-0.04

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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Table 6. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Hunting Violations Against Terrestrial Species Across Texas Counties
(n = 254)
Model 1
GDP Per Capita†

-0.20

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

*

LQ of Mining Industries†

*

(0.09)

Model 8

-0.26

(0.11)

(0.09)

0.47

0.16

0.38

(0.33)

(0.36)

-0.35

**

-0.33

*

Model 9

-0.13

(0.31)

-0.12

-0.08

(0.16)

(0.18)

(0.16)

-0.07

0.09

-0.10

(0.12)

(0.12)

(0.14)

(0.11)
LQ of Hunting Industry†

Model 7
-0.20

(0.09)
LQ of Manufacturing Industries†

Model 6

**

Model 10
-0.28

**

(0.09)

0.25
(0.05)

# of Hunting Establishments†

# of Licenses and Permits Sold†

0.23
(0.03)

Road Development†

**

0.23

**

0.23

(0.29)
0.21
(0.12)

Agricultural Development†

Structural Development†

% of Public Hunting Land†
% of Private Hunting Land†

-0.47

0.17

(0.14)

(0.14)

0.07

0.35

(0.06)

(0.09)
*

-0.34

**

-0.30
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**

0.23

**

(0.04)

-0.37

**

(0.14)
*

-0.28

-0.43

**

(0.14)
**

(0.08)

-0.28

**

(0.07)

0.09

-0.17

(0.22)

*

(0.11)

-0.74

0.93

0.20
(0.05)

(0.16)

(0.13)

0.35

**

(0.13)
**

(0.12)

(0.73)
**

(0.10)
# of Species Listed as R/T/E†

0.22

-0.40

0.23

0.18
(0.09)

(0.12)
**

(0.68)
# of Bodies of Water†

**

(0.05)

0.35

**

(0.13)
**

0.57
(0.28)

0.35
(0.12)

*

0.41
(0.24)

**

0.40
(0.11)

**

Table 6. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Hunting Violations
Against Terrestrial Species Across Texas Counties (Cont.)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

% Unemployed

% Below Poverty

Average Housing Value†
% of Rented Housing Units†

% of New Residents

(Intercept)

6.46
a

Log Likelihood

Pearson Chi-square

1.15

**

1.14

**

3.45

**

-1.14

-1023.8

-1018.8

-1018.8

-1027.9

-1016.8

253.58

251.24

251.88

274.465

239.84

250

251

251

250

249

2055.65

2043.69

2043.57

2063.85

2043.59

Degrees of Freedom
AIC

**

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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Table 6. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Hunting Violations Against
Terrestrial Species Across Texas Counties (Cont.)
Model 6
% Unemployed

% Below Poverty

Model 7

Model 8

0.04

-0.02

(0.03)

(0.03)

0.04

**

% of Rented Housing Units†

% of New Residents

(Intercept)

0.77

Model 10

0.02

(0.01)
Average Housing Value†

Model 9

(0.02)
**

-0.17

(0.25)

(0.34)

-0.67

-0.37

(0.37)

(0.39)

0.01

0.01

(0.02)

(0.02)

-4.89

5.65

4.78

5.73

Log Likelihooda

1033.7

-1004.5

-994.4

-999.9

-1002.0

Pearson Chi-square

264.45

205.52

189.20

204.37

222.57

Degrees of Freedom
AIC

**

**

**

7.44

248

245

236

246

248

2078.69

2027.05

2028.84

2015.77

2016.06

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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**

Table 7. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Hunting Violations Against Birds Across Texas Counties
(n = 254)
Model 1
GDP Per Capita†
LQ of Manufacturing Industries†

LQ of Mining Industries†

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 7

Model 8

-0.19

0.01

(0.09)

(0.09)

(0.11)

0.40

0.58

(0.30)

(0.30)

(0.35)

0.20

0.23

(0.16)

(0.19)

-0.50

**

(0.10)
LQ of Hunting Industry†

Model 6

-0.15

0.17

*

1.03

*

Model 9

0.63

**

-0.29

**

(0.06)
# of Hunting Establishments†

0.50

**

0.61

(0.13)
# of Licenses and Permits Sold†

0.23
(0.02)

Road Development†
Agricultural Development†

**

0.21

(0.14)
**

0.02
(0.05)

0.01

0.02

-0.03

(0.12)

(0.13)

(0.14)

0.09

0.02

-0.07

0.42

(0.12)
**

0.33
(0.09)

0.41
(0.11)

-0.13

-0.16
(0.12)

0.96

0.45

(0.79)
# of Bodies of Water†

0.34

(0.80)
**

(0.09)
# of Species Listed as R/T/E†

1.08
(0.19)
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0.13
(0.12)

**

0.59

**

(0.13)

(0.13)
**

(0.10)
% of Private Hunting Land†

**

(0.15)

0.03

(0.05)
% of Public Hunting Land†

0.46

(0.05)

(0.03)

(0.12)
Structural Development†

**

0.25
(0.27)

**

0.33
(0.05)

**

Table 7. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Hunting Violations Against Birds Across Texas Counties (Cont.)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

% Unemployed

Model 7

0.05

0.06

(0.03)
**

.03

(0.01)
Average Housing Value†

1.14

(0.02)
**

-.46

(0.24)
% of Rented Housing Units†

% of New Residents

(0.36)

-0.35

-0.06

(0.39)

(0.37)

0.04

-0.01

(0.02)
(Intercept)

5.75
a

Log Likelihood

Pearson Chi-square

0.66

**

0.81

**

1.28

-1.88

**

(0.02)

-11.57

3.39

4.68

1.28

-957.13

-939.58

-937.26

-936.19

-950.30

-949.76

-920.61

-909.78

-923.93

435.08

379.73

359.58

336.08

312.32

328.992

275.48

234.87

295.45

250

251

251

250

249

248

245

236

250

1922.25

1885.17

1880.52

1880.38

1910.61

1911.51

1859.21

1855.55

1855.86

Degrees of Freedom
AIC

**

Model 9

-.01

(0.03)
% Below Poverty

Model 8

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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Table 8. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Across Texas Counties (n = 254)
Model 1
GDP Per Capita†

LQ of Manufacturing Industries†

Model 7

Model 8

0.12

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

0.06

0.17

(0.08)

(0.09)

(0.10)

0.56

0.13

0.58

(0.36)

(0.41)

0.00

0.36

(0.16)

(0.20)

(0.36)
LQ of Mining Industries†

-1.17

**

(0.10)
LQ of Hunting Industry†

Model 6

Model 9

Model 10

0.08
(0.05)

# of Hunting Establishments†

0.31

**

0.31

(0.11)
# of Licenses and Permits Sold†

0.48
-0.03

Road Development†

**

0.45

(0.12)
**

0.22

(0.03)
-0.32

**

(0.11)
Agricultural Development†

-0.42

**

0.74

(0.14)
**

(0.05)
-0.26

(0.12)

(0.14)

0.45

(0.06)

(0.10)

% of Public Hunting Land†

0.35

% of Private Hunting Land†

# of Bodies of Water†

**

**

**

0.52

0.28
(0.12)
-0.03

(0.73)

(0.74)
**

2.08
(0.20)

0.53

*

0.91
(0.28)

**

0.14

**

(0.05)

-0.26
(0.15)

**

0.37

**

(0.07)
*

0.21

**

0.41

0.95
(0.23)

**

0.27

**

(0.10)

**

(0.12)
**

0.38
(0.07)

*

(0.11)

(0.13)
**

0.13
(0.05)

(0.12)

0.16

0.78
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-0.38

*

(0.16)

(0.10)

(0.09)
# of Species Listed as R/T/E†

0.12

-0.19

(0.15)
**

0.03

(0.05)

-0.44

(0.15)
Structural Development†

*

0.35

**

(0.11)
**

1.12
(0.22)

**

Table 8. Negative Binomial Regression for Illegal Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Across Texas Counties (Cont.)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

% Unemployed

0.09

Model 7
**

0.10

2.30

0.05

-1.57

**

0.12

Log Likelihooda
Pearson Chi-square

5.20

**

-1.00
(0.43)

**

AIC

-0.69

**

10.55

*

5.49

**

-5.81

**

-23.07

*

-0.26
(0.26)

0.04
(0.02)
2.28

-2.72

-1.45

-3.78

-1129.9

-1094.0

-1090.8

-1083.3

-1111.4

-1129.5

-1064.0

-1041.5

-1050.5

-1053.7

832.69

657.06

505.78

611.75

521.72

547.77

479.76

459.17

539.51

498.57

Degrees of Freedom

**

(0.01)

0.06

(0.02)
(Intercept)

0.02

(0.37)

(0.43)
% of New Residents

*

(0.02)

(0.27)
% of Rented Housing Units†

Model 10

(0.03)
**

(0.01)
Average Housing Value†

Model 9

-0.05

(0.03)
% Below Poverty

Model 8

**

250

251

251

250

249

248

245

236

245

248

2267.80

2194.02

2187.78

2174.66

2231.74

2271.00

2146.07

2118.92

2119.04

2119.43

a. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.
*p < .05
**p < .01
†the natural log was taken
LQ = location quotient
AIC = Akaike's Information Criterion
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**

three steps across analyses of IH&F. First, a cross sectional analysis was conducted assessing the
association of all variables of the ToP regressed onto the total number of IH&F measures.
Second, a cross sectional analysis was conducted exploring the associations of all ToP variables
regressed onto IH&F measures while controlling for other economic variables. Third, a cross
sectional analysis was conducted exploring the associations of all ToP variables regressed onto
the total number of IH&F while controlling for other economic, opportunity, and social
variables. These steps are presented in Model 1, 7, and 8 across Tables 5.4 to Table 8. If the
variable remains significant in model 8, the variable would be included in reduced models for
future analysis of effect strength.

H1: County measures of the GDP per capita are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.

Over all tables and models, little support was found for hypothesis 1. Presented in Table
5, the GDP per capita had a negative relationship with the total number of illegal hunting, until
the full model where the direction changed. This pattern was also seen in Table 7 when
analyzing the relationships with illegal hunting violations against bird animals. The GDP per
capita was non-significant and negative, until the full model, where the variable become very
mildly (b = 0.01) positive. When assessing the illegal fishing violations against aquatic species
(Table 8), the GDP per capita was not significant but positive, and significant and negative for
illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species (Table 6). Surprisingly, GDP per capita lost
significance in the full model; however, model 7 had a slightly lower AIC indicating a better
model fit than model 8. GDP per capita was retained for the reduced form models, 9 and 10. In
the reduced models (models 9 and 10), the strength of the GDP per capita increased. Basing on
the model 10 in Table 6, a one unit change in the log of the concentration of the GDP per capita
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is significantly and negatively associated with a .28 change in the log of the number of illegal
hunting violations against terrestrial species. In all, I find no support for hypothesis 1 throughout
all analyzes – the results were either insignificant or in the unexpected direction.

H2: County measures of manufacturing industries are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.

Little support was found for hypothesis 2 across equations predicting the different
dependent variables. For total illegal hunting and fishing violations, manufacturing industries
had no significant relationships, though the effect was in the predicted direction (Table 5). No
significant results were apparently in the separate estimations for illegal hunting of terrestrial
species or aquatic species (Tables 5.5 and 5.7). Manufacturing industry was significant in
models 7, 8 and 9 in Table 7 predicting the number of illegal hunting violations against birds.
Thus, there is support for hypotheses 2, but only when predicting illegal hunting activities
focusing around birds. A unit change in the log of the concentration of manufacturing industries
positively associated with a .63 unit change in the log of the number of illegal hunting violations
against bird animals.

H3: County measures of resource mining industries are associated with illegal hunting
and fishing at the county level.

For resource mining industries, mixed support was found for hypothesis 3. Across all the
analyses, mining industries was significant in the initial model (i.e., model 1 in Tables 5.4., 5.5.,
5.6. and 5.7), but became insignificant once other structural variables and control variables were
entered into the analysis. Mining was not significant in any of the reduced form models
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regardless of the nature of the dependent variable (i.e., total, land, bird or aquatic animal illegal
hunting violations). In short, when just examining the economic structure alone, the resource
mining industry does have a significant impact on the dependent variable, regardless of how it is
measured. When, however, additional variables representing other explanations are added, the
effect of the mining industry is removed. This suggests the need for future research to determine
if certain control variables are impacted by resource mining which then impact illegal hunting
violations against terrestrial species. In the end, no support for hypothesis 3 was found.

Hunting Industry Variables
The second research question asked whether there is a relationship between measures of
the hunting industry and illegal hunting and fishing. The third research question asked whether
hunting industry variables are associated with IH&F when variables representing ToP theory are
included. Bivariate relationships have already found initial relationships between the number of
hunting establishments and the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold.
As noted, the location quotient of hunting establishments did not have any significant
bivariate relationship with any measures of illegal hunting and fishing. The following two
hypotheses address this relationship by exploring the condition in which (if any) significant
relationship between hunting industry variables and illegal hunting and fishing occurs. The test
of hypotheses proceeded in four steps. To determine the better measure to capture the presence
of the hunting industry, the first two steps analyzed two different measure of hunting
establishments separately. First, a cross sectional analysis was conducted assessing the
association of the LQ of hunting establishments and the number of hunting and fishing licenses
and permits sold regressed onto IH&F measures. Second, a cross sectional analysis was
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conducted assessing the association between the number of hunting establishments and the
number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold regressed onto IH&F measures. Third, a
cross sectional analysis was conducted exploring the association of either the LQ of hunting
establishments or the number of establishments, depending on the better explanatory measure,
and the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold regressed onto IH&F measures
with other economic variables in the model. Fourth, a cross sectional analysis was conducted
exploring the association of hunting industry variables regressed onto IH&F measures while
controlling for other economic, opportunity, and social variables. These steps are presented in
Model 2, 3, 7, and 8 across Tables 5.4 to Table 8. If the variable remains significant in model 8,
the variable would be included in reduced models for future analysis of effect strength.

H4: County measures of hunting establishments are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.

Only one measure of hunting establishments supported hypothesis 4, but overall, little
support was found for this hypothesis. Model 2 explored the effect of the LQ of hunting
establishment. Model 3 explored the effect of the number of hunting establishment. For the LQ
of hunting establishments, significance was only found in Table 7, while the alternative measure
(i.e., number of hunting establishments) was significant more often across models. Additionally,
even with a significant effect, across Tables 5.4 to 5.7, Model 2 had higher AIC compared to
model 3, suggesting a worse model fit. Therefore, it is safe to assume that the number of hunting
establishments is a better measure of the illegal hunting outcomes.
As illustrated in Table 5, the number of hunting establishments was significantly and
positively associated with the total number of IH&F violations. The significance remained in
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model 7 when controlling for other economic variables, but disappears in the full model (model
8). Thus, there is some partial support concerning the effect of the number of hunting
establishments on hunting violations. Table 8 displays a similar pattern between the number of
hunting establishments and the number of illegal fishing violations. When examining illegal
hunting against terrestrial species, no significance was found in any model. In contrast, the
number of hunting establishments had a significant, positive association with illegal hunting
violations against birds. The final result indicates that a unit change in the log of the in the
number of hunting establishments was positively associated with a .59 unit change in the log of
the number of illegal hunting violations against birds. Overall, however, support was only found
in one analysis i.e., birds), indicating only partial support for the hypothesis.

H5: County measures of licenses and permits are associated with illegal hunting and
fishing at the county level.

Hypothesis 5 had more support than any of the preceding hypotheses. The the number of
hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold was significant in three out of four analyses of
IH&F. Starting with Table 5, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold was
significant in model 2 and 3 with relatively the same coefficient. When controlling for other
economic variables in model 7, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold
remained significant. In model 8, while the coefficient decreased to .11, it remained significant.
After reducing the models to only significant variables, a one unit change in the log of the
number of hunting and fishing licenses sold was associated with a .15 unit change in the log of
the total number of IH&F violations. Table 6 (predicting hunting violations against terrestrial
species) displays a similar pattern. Here, a one unit change in the log of the number of hunting
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and fishing licenses and permits sold positively associated with a .23 unit change in the log of
number of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species. Table 7, the analysis of the
number of illegal hunting violations against bird animals, showed no support for hypothesis 5.
Though initially, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold were significant in
model 2 and 3, when controlling for other economic variables in model 7, the coefficient is
greatly reduced and the variable is no longer significant. The analysis of the number of illegal
fishing violations against aquatic species presented in Table 8 showed a different pattern
compared to Table 5 and 5.5. Compared to earlier analyses, the strength of the variable continued
to decrease across models. However, the variable remained significant, providing support for
hypothesis 5. Thus, a one unit change in the log of the number of hunting and fishing licenses
and permits sold was positively associated with a .14 unit change in the number of illegal fishing
violations against aquatic species. In sum, there is relative support for hypothesis 5, though this
hypothesis is not fully supported for each IH&F subtype.

Ecological Modification Variables
The fourth research question asked whether there “is there a relationship between
measures of ecological modifications and illegal hunting and fishing.” Bivariate relationships
indicated initial relationships between road development, agricultural development, and
structural development and multiple measures of illegal hunting and fishing; however, there is
less association with modifications and illegal hunting against terrestrial species. The follow set
of hypotheses answers the fourth research question by exploring the condition in which (if any)
significant relationship between variables of ecological modification and IH&F. The test of the
hypotheses proceeded in three steps across analyses of IH&F. First, a cross section analysis was
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conducted assigning the association of all ecological modification variables regressed onto IH&F
measures. Second, a cross sectional analysis was conducted exploring the association of all ToP
variables regressed onto IH&F measures while control for other economic variables. Third, a
cross sectional analysis was conducted assessing the association of ecological modifications
variables regressed onto IH&F measures while controlling for other economic, opportunity, and
social variables. These steps are presented in Model 4, 7, and 8 across Tables 5.4 to Table 8. If
the variable remains significant in model 8, the variable would be included in reduced models for
future analysis of effect strength.

H6: County measures of road development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting and fishing at county level.

Initially, in the bivariate analysis, road development had a significant positive
relationship with measures of IH&F, but in the regression models, no support was found for road
development across the regression analyses. Table 5 illustrates a negative relationship between
road development and the total number of IH&F violations. In Table 6, road development has a
positive relationship with illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species. In Table. 5.6, the
analysis of illegal hunting violations against birds, the relationship was positive. When analyzing
the total illegal fishing violations against aquatic species, road development was negatively
significant in model 4, but when controlling all other economic variables, the significance and
strength was lost Overall, no support was found for hypothesis 6.

H7: County measures of agricultural development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting at the county level.
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Some support was found for hypothesis 7. Bivariate relationships showed that
agricultural development did not associate with either illegal hunting violations against terrestrial
species or bird, but was significantly and negatively associated with the total number of IH&F
violations and illegal fishing violations against aquatic species. Looking at Table 5, partial
support for hypothesis 6 was found. Agricultural development was significantly and negatively
associated with the total number of IH&F violations in model 4, analyzing only ecological
modification variables. After including other economic variables (model 7), the significance
remained; however, when controlling for every variable (model 8), significance disappeared. In
Table 7, no support was found for hypothesis 6, however, Table 8 illustrates mix support for
hypothesis 7. Similar to Table 7, agricultural development was significantly and negatively
associated with the total illegal fishing violations against aquatic species (models 4, 7 and 8).
However, when models were reduced, agricultural development lost significance. This lost in
strength suggests a conditional effect, meaning, agricultural development does not associate with
illegal fishing against aquatic species by itself. Hypotheses 7 was supported when analyzing the
number of illegal hunting against terrestrial species (Table 6). Across models, agricultural
development was significantly and negatively associated with the number of illegal hunting
against terrestrial species. Over the models, the strength of coefficient decreased as variables
were added. However, in the last reduced model (model 10), mining industries were dropped and
the strength of agricultural development increased from a beta of -.37 to a beta of -.43, almost
back to its initiation beta in Model 4 (b = -.47, p < .01). Therefore, a one unit change in the log of
agricultural development was negatively associated with .43 unit change in the log of the number
of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species. Overall, there is mixed support for
hypothesis 7 when considering all analyses taken together.
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H8: County measures of structural development are associated with measures of illegal
hunting and fishing at the county level.

There was mixed support for hypothesis 8. Bivariate relationships showed positive
associations with structural development, the opposite of the hypothesis. Further regression
analyses showed a mix of associations between structural development and IH&F measures.
When analyzing the total number of IH&F violations, no support for hypothesis 8 was found -even though the variable was significant, the effect was in the opposite of the direction of the
theoretical prediction. In Table 5, structural development had an interesting pattern across the
models due to the significance in model 8, structural development was included in the reduced
models, and remained significant. As illustrated in Table 5, model 10, a one unit change in the
log of structural development in a county is positively associated with a .21 unit change in the
log of the total number of IH&F violations.
Table 6 also shows support for hypothesis 8. Apart from the decrease in coefficient due to
added variables, the variable was consistently significant and in the same direction throughout all
the models. A one unit change in the log of structural development is negatively associated with
a .28 unit change in the log of the number of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species.
Table 7 illustrates similarities with Table 5. 4. Here, the number of illegal hunting violations
against birds are positive, contradicting hypothesis 8. The variable increased in coefficient from
model 7 to model 8, suggesting some multicollinearity with control variables, because when the
control variables were dropped in the reduced model (model 9), the beta decreased back to .33,
the same value in model 7. Therefore, a one unit change in the log of structural development was
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positively associated a .33 unit change in the log of the number of illegal hunting violations
against bird animals.
The last analysis, focusing on the number of illegal fishing violations against aquatic
species, showed the same pattern of associations illustrated in Table 7. After reducing the
models, the effect strength does decrease but stabilized across each reduced model 9 and 10.
Therefore, a one percent increase in the concentration of structural development predicts a 38
percent change in the number of illegal fishing violations against aquatic species.

Beyond Significance
Looking at the regression outputs, the values for the statistically significant effect do not
reflect the effect size of the effect, or the relevance of the effect, of the independent variables. To
examine this issue further, the percent change associated with statistically significant variables
was examined further. The following formula is used to change the beta coeffects into percent
changes of the dependent variable to provide more clarity about the effects on the dependent
variable (Lorenzo-Seva, Ferrando and Chico, 2010).
% 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = (𝑒 𝑏 − 1)100
Using this formula, we can convert the beta coefficients into a percent change and see whether
dependent variables have a “reasonable” effect, meaning one that is possible given the measure
of the variable. Additionally, after applying the formula, the data is broken down in order to
examine raw differences to see how counts of IH&F violation differ across different
measurements of an intendent variable. Only variables of interest that showed significance are
discussed below.
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The GDP per capita was only associated with illegal hunting against terrestrial species.
After applying the formula, the effect of the variable was that a one percent change in the GDP
per capita was associated with a 32.3 percent decrease in the number of hunting violations
against terrestrial species. The counties with a GDP per capita above 100,000 dollars had a total
of 410 illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species. The remaining counties had a total of
5,193 violations. Using a different criteria, the criteria, the top 100 counties in GDP per capita
had a total of 1,484 violations compared to 4,119 in the remaining 134 counties. More
importantly, it is perfectly reasonable for GDP to change by 1% across counties in this data. The
standard deviation for GDP per capita was $591,260 across counties, and the mean was
$124,512. A one percent change in the mean of GDP per capita would amount to $1,245. &&&
The manufacturing industries variable was associated only with illegal hunting against
birds. The effect of the variable was that a one percent change in the location quotient of
manufacturing industries was associated with an 87.8 percent change increase in the number of
illegal hunting violations against birds. However, when looking at counties where the proportion
of industries for manufacturing exceed the proportion of industries for manufacturing nationwide
(i.e. a location quotient higher than 1), this association is brought to question. A total of 1,956
violation against birds were observed in counties with a location quotient above 1. Those
counties had an average of approximately 19 violations per county. A total of 2,479 violations
were observed in the remaining counties, with only around 16 violations per county. While the
averages are higher for counties with a higher quotient, the mean difference across high and low
LQ counties is about 20%. Given the mean and standard deviation for this variable, it is possible
for manufacturing LQ to change 1%, but this would be only in extreme cases given the ratio of
the standard deviation to the mean.
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Looking at hunting establishments, only 78 counties had the presence of one or more
hunting establishments. Those 78 counties contained 10,643 out of 22,141 total IH&F violation.
About 48 percent of the total IH&F violations are accounted by 30 percent of Texas counties.
Similarly, when looking at the significant relationship with illegal hunting violations against
birds, counties with hunting establishments had 2303 out of 4,435 illegal hunting violations
against birds. In other words, about 30 percent of counties account for 50 percent of illegal
hunting violations against birds. Here, hunting established are observed to be related to a higher
concentration of illegal hunting and fishing activity.
The number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold was one of the two variables
associating with multiple measures of illegal hunting. A one percent change in the number of
hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold was associated with a 16.2 percent change increase
in the total number of IH&F violations, a 25.9 percent increase for illegal hunting against
terrestrial species, and a 15 percent increase in illegal fishing. Counties with measures of hunting
and fishing licenses and permits sold between 0 and 1,000 had a total count of IH&F violations
of 793 across 49 counties with an average of 16 hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold.
The counties between 1,000 and 10,000 hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold had a total
count of 7,306 IH&F violations across 121 counties, with an average of 60 hunting and fishing
licenses and permits sold. Counties between 10,000 to 100,000 had a total count of IH&F
violations of 10,663 across 75 counties with an average of 142 hunting and fishing licenses and
permits sold. Contrarily, counties with over 100,000 hunting and fishing licenses and permits
sold had a lower total of IH&F violations (N = 3,379). Those violations, however, occurred in a
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very small number of counties, nine. Given the means and standard deviations for the number of
hunting and fishing licenses sold, it is entirely possible for this effect to occur quite easily across
counties.
Similar to GDP per capita, agricultural development was only associated with illegal
hunting against terrestrial species. After transforming the beta, a one percent change in
agricultural development was associated with a 53.7 percent decrease in illegal hunting against
terrestrial species. Upon further analysis, 151 counties had 80 percent or more land dedicated to
agriculture or crop harvesting. These counties also contained 2,550 observations of illegal
hunting against terrestrial species with an average of 16 offenses per county. The remaining
counties contained 3,053 illegal hunting offenses against terrestrial species, with an average of
30 illegal hunting violations per county.
Structural density (i.e. the number of houses per square mile) was the second variable
associated with multiple measures of illegal hunting. Using the above formula, a one percent
change in structural density was associated with a 23.4 percent increase in the total number of
IH&F, a 32.3 percent decrease in illegal hunting against terrestrial species, a 39 percent increase
in illegal hunting against birds, and a 30 percent increase in illegal fishing against aquatic
species. Looking at the distribution of structural density, 233 counties which had 100 houses per
square mile or below had a total of 16,207 IH&F violation. In contrast, counties which had over
100 houses per square mile had a total of 5,934 IH&F violations across 33. Though this first
appeared to be in opposition from the analyses, counties with 100 houses or below per square
mile, on average, had around 96 IH&F violations. For the remaining denser counties, there was
an average of about 282 IH&F violation for each county. While structural development is
concentrated across 21 counties, the average effect on the distribution from these counties had a
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much higher impact. Therefore, as the data shows, more houses built in closer proximity (i.e.
towns and cities) more IH&F violations would appear, only to decrease in regards to terrestrial
species victims.
For some variables, the percent change can be extreme, and whether or not the results
apply to any individual county would require further examination. For instance, if a county with
only one establish hunting industry obtains another establishment, the percent increase in the
hunting industry would be 100 percent. Using the appropriate equation, this would, following the
equation result, cause an increase of 8,039.9 percent in illegal hunting against bird animals,
which is highly unlikely. The limitations of applying these results to any specific county can also
be observed by focusing on the changes in the values of IH&F outcomes. For instance, there is a
mean of 17 illegal hunting violations against bird violations across Texas counties, and a total of
4,4,35 illegal hunting violations against birds in Texas. The largest number of these violations in
any county is 264. Thus, it is mathematically plausible that in some places, the effect size
estimated by the equation would be possible, while in other specific locales, the effect size would
be impossible. This occurs because the equations predict the mean rather than the outcome in a
specific county.

Summary of Results
Throughout the analysis, support of economic variables related to the ToP was at best
mixed. Speculating, there may be more to the relationship between economic structure and
measures of social behavior than has been explored here. Of the hypotheses examined,
hypothesis 5 had the most support. The number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold
had the most consistent association with the distribution of measures of IH&F violations. In
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contrast, while support was not found, some variable remained significantly associated through
the analyses, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural
development, and the number of species listed as rare, threatened, and endangered (a control
variable), were consistently associated, even though the direction of the association was opposite
of the hypotheses. Overall, there seems to be no association between the ToP and measures of
IH&F violations. The summary of the hypotheses testing is presented in Table 9.
When examining model 7 in Tables 5.4 through Table 8, which included all economic
measures, at least one measure of an economic structural concepts (Treadmill of Production,
hunting industry, ecological modifications) was related to the distribution of measures of IH&F
violations. With the inclusion of the control variables on geographical opportunity and social
factors (model 8 across these tables), the associations of economic measures disappeared. This
indicates two possibilities: (1) the association of economic structure measures is associated with
geographical opportunity measures, and then, these measures influence the geographical space of
social behaviors; or (2) the current economic structure measures are spurious and do not
determine the linear distribution of social behaviors. Given that measures of the economic
structure do initially significantly associate with the linear distribution of IH&F violations, the
former seems more likely of an explanation. Additionally, significant associations with measures
of ecological modification, a proposed outcome of the ToP, after considering control variables,
would suggest that the outcomes of the ToP, rather than the ToP itself, may be more relevant to
determining the distribution of social behavior. Therefore, there should be additional exploration
of how physical ecological changes due to the ToP affects these geographical opportunities
variables.
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Table 9. Hypothesis Testing Summary
Hypothesis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Table 5
(Total)




✓




Table 6
(Land)




✓

✓
✓

Table 7
(Bird)

✓

✓





Table 8
(Aquatic)




✓




In the next chapter, an analysis of the geographical clustering of IH&F violations is
undertaken. Conservation criminology (Moreto and Pires, 2018), along with historical analyses
(Jacoby, 2003), found theoretical and statistical reason to believe that any form of wildlife crime
is spatially distinct, and both argued that policy has ignored the fundamental differences of space
to properly address crime against wildlife. Using the found linearly associated variables, the
SatScan program tests whether counties with measures of IH&F violations that deviate from the
mean are clustered over space.
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CHAPTER 6:
SPATIAL ANALYSES CHAPTER

In the previous chapter, Poisson linear regression analyses were used to determine which
variables representing the Treadmill of Production (ToP) were linearly associated with the
geographic distribution of illegal hunting and fishing (IH&F) violations. Structural density had
the strongest association with IH&F violations across Texas counties. Other variables also had
significant associations with the dependent variables, such as the number of rare, threatened, and
endangered animals (RTE) and the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold;
however, linear analysis showed no support for hypotheses linking these variables to the
dependent outcomes.
In this chapter, I take up a geographic analysis of IH&F clusters, controlling for these
significant variables (i.e. covariates) from the linear analyses. Mapping clusters of IH&F
violations can reveal the existence of geographic relationships that linear analysis cannot depict.
Locating these hotspots can have policy implications, and can help direct limited resources to
controlling IH&F crimes where they are the most concentrated. Accordingly, the following
chapter examines the spatial concentration of IH&F violations using the program SatScan. The
following sections briefly discuss the SatScan program and how data were organized. After that,
the chapter covers spatial analyses of each measure of IH&F violations, each presented with
three tables and two geographical figures. The tables cover information on high-risk clusters
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(HRC) which include indicators of relative risk, observed outcomes, expected outcomes, cluster
size information, and averages of covariate measures across counties in a given HRC.

SatScan Program
SatScan is a program that uses a spatial discrete Poisson analysis to detect spatial clusters
of events, and to determine whether the relative risk within clusters is significant compared to the
total population surrounding the cluster. The relative risk of an event within an area (i.e., a
certain sized circular space) is calculated by dividing the observed number of events by the
expected number of events, and then using a moving cluster measure to compare the results to a
sample of all other results (e.g., to 999 to 999,999 other clusters). The software looks at clusters
in relation to a portion of population at risk of your choosing. The null hypothesis of the software
is that the observed events are comparatively proportional to the population. Therefore, the
alternative hypothesis argues that there is an unexpected count of observed events for certain
locations compared to the rest of the population.
SatScan uses a scan statistic to create an ellipse window (i.e. circles) across all locations,
comparing the observed and expected number of events inside the widow. The statistics
compared the mean of the number of cases in the window to λ, the counts outside of the window.
The radius of each circle (i.e. cluster of counties) is set to increase continuously to include up to
a specified percentage of the total population at risk. We did not allow windows to overlap. The
program is able to determine this ellipse window to a designated population at rick. While the
default for the program is 50% of a cluster’s population at risk to engage in illegal activity, for
more conservative measures, the population at risk is set to 5 percent to determine clusters. This
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would indicate that significant windows only appear if 5 percent of the population engages in
IH&F not by random chance.
To determine if the windows (i.e. clusters) found in the real data set are not by random
change, the software uses Monte Carlo replications to determine which clusters are by random
chance. Monte Carlo is a series of algorithms that rely on repeated random samples (see Kroese,
Brereton, Taimre, and Botev, 2014 for more information). The study set the count of replications
to 999. A test statistic is calculated for each random replication as well as the real data set. If the
real data set is statistically different among the distributions of replications, it would be ruled
significant signifying confidence that the real data outputs did not appear by random chance.
SatScan uses a threshold of 5% to determine if the real data set is statistically different.
This method has not been widely employed within criminology, and is more prevalent in
other disciplines. Within criminology, this method has been used for homicide (Zeoli et al.,
2014), general crime patterns (Leitner and Helbich, 2011), drug trafficking (Beato Filho et al.,
2001), and police officer deaths (Kaminski, Jefferis, and Chanhatasilpa, 2000).

Understanding SatScan Clusters
SatScan looks for counties where the expected count is lower or higher than the observed
count, using population means to weigh the expected count across locations. Thus, while certain
counties have a high raw score – for example, Harris county with a total count of 544 violations
– the purpose of SatScan is to find counties where activity is higher or lower than it should be,
warranting attention to the characteristics of a county to determine why observations do not
match an expected outcome. To determine these clusters, a two-step process was used which
includes hierarchical and Gini cluster models.
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SatScan gives three options to observe clusters. The first is a default option comparing
the spatial windows to the surrounding counties, not considering counties that are similar to each
other. The second option is the hierarchical cluster option, where the program finds clusters that
are distinct from other clusters, but the counties within clusters are similar. The third option is
the Gini cluster option, where the program implements the Gini coefficient to determine if there
are smaller clusters hidden within hierarchical clusters. This latter option allows SatScan to find
irregular shaped clusters that are not perfectly spherical and high-risk counties that are
significant but are not surrounded by similar counties. If a cluster does not have smaller clusters,
the Gini cluster should have the same centroid, radius, and observations as the hierarchical
cluster.
When conducting the geographic cluster analyses, the default option and the hierarchical
option both provide cluster results that have large radii, and do not provide enough information
on the distribution of relative risks across counties. One of the uses of cluster analysis with
respect to the location of high (and low) rate areas of IH&F violations is to inform hunting and
fishing policy and/or the distribution of resources that address hunting and fishing violations.
With respect to policy implications, the Gini cluster option has been argued to be more effective
due to the ability to capture more refined non-overlapping clusters (Han et al., 2016), and
according to Han et al. (2016), “it also fulfils a set of desirable theoretical properties, such as
being invariant under a uniform multiplication of the population numbers by the same constant.”
In order to use Gini clusters appropriately for policy related purposes, hierarchical
clusters are also reported to show whether these Gini clusters form larger clusters. Therefore, for
each measure of IH&F violations, two geographical cluster maps were complied. One cluster
map illustrates hierarchical clusters controlling for covariates showing hierarchical clusters,
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while the second map shows Gini clusters, controlling for covariates. These corresponding maps
for each measure of IH&F violations were demonstrate how cases are clustered, and whether
these clusters are comprised of multiple clustering of IH&F activities. Additionally, high
populated metropolitan cities and city headquarters for Texas Park and Wildlife law enforcement
districts were marked with stars to show visual representations of human development and law
enforcement. These cities were San Angelo, Houston, Fort Worth, Corpus Christi, Lubbock,
Temple, Lufkin, San Antonio, Dallas, and Austin.

Including and Reporting Covariates
In the previous chapter, significant variables are found for each analysis of illegal hunting
and fishing violations (see Tables 5.4 to 5.7). To include these variables in the SatScan analysis,
the variables must be transformed into categorical variables. Unfortunately, SatScan is limited to
analyzing categorical co-variates. There is a way to work around this for continuous co-variates,
but this requires generating the predicted results of each analysis when considering all significant
variables and treating the predicted values as the dependent variable in SatScan. To avoid
complications within the program and interpretations, transforming the variables into z-score for
the SatScan analysis is the more usual method.
Variables were transformed into z-scores to standardize the distribution and categories
variables in relation to the mean of the destitution. First, the z-score of each significant variable,
illustrated in the last models across Tables 5.4 to 5.7, was generated. Second, the z-scores were
coded into categories. For z-scores below the mean (e.g. negative values): (1) scores more than
three standard deviation of the mean was coded as 1; (2) scores coded more than two standard
deviation away were coded as 2; (3) scores coded more than one standard deviation away were
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coded as 3; (4) scores below one standard deviation of the mean was coded as 4. The mean zscore was considered 0, and any scores transformed be a z-score of 0 was coded as 5. For zscores that fell above the mean: (1) scores below one standard deviation of the mean was coded
as 6; (2) scores coded more than one standard deviation away were coded as 7; (3) scores coded
more than two standard deviations away were coded as 8; (4) scores coded more than more than
three standard deviations away were coded as 9.
Using this approaching affects interpreting the z-scores with respect to the mean. For
instance, the mean z-score is represented by the number 5. In this case, a county with a z-score
of 8 would be +2 z-scores above the mean, while a county with a score of 2 would be -2 z-scores
from the mean.

The Total Amount of Illegal Hunting and Fishing Violations High Risk Clusters
Examining the spatial analysis of total amount of IH&F violations, I found that high risk
clusters (HRC) had low measures of covariates across clusters which were positively associated
with IH&F violations, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural
development, and the amount of rare, threatened, and endangered species (RTE). I also found
that initial hierarchical clusters are influenced by the proximity of smaller clusters, suggesting a
spatial diffusion effect when clusters are close together, forming what seems to be large clusters;
however, the covariates that significantly associated with the overall distribution did not provide
an explanation to the clustering of counties with high risk of IH&F violations.
Figure 6.1 shows visual clusters of the total amount of illegal hunting and fishing
violations across Texas counties, controlling for covariates. Table 10 presented details on a total
of 11 hierarchical clusters. Here, only two clusters are contained within a county, while the radii

139

of clusters extend from the centroid county ranges from 48 to 147 kilometers. Additionally,
these clusters capture 13,915 observations, or roughly 65 percent of the total amount of
violations. Thus, 65 percent of IH&F occur in “problematic” counties, if problematic means
areas where there are high volumes of IH&F.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the Gini clusters while controlling for the covariates. Table 11
provides information on 22 Gini clusters, with clusters 9 and 10 being insignificant. The radii of
Gini clusters are smaller, ranging from 0 to 98.3 kilometers, with 6 clusters contained in a single
county. Noticeably, while there are more clusters, these clusters account for only 9,746 IH&F
violations, or about 70% of the number of cases identified by the hierarchical cluster model.
This may indicate a spatial diffusion effect from smaller clusters in close proximity to each other.
Thus, when initially analyzing clusters, the hierarchical calculations capture more cases due to
the proximity of these smaller clusters.
For further analysis, Table 12 present information on averages of covariate measures
across counties in a given HRC. In regards to these covariates, the averages of HRC for the
number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold ranged from 986.33 to 57,751 with an
average of 8,715 hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold across all HRC. The averages of
HRC for structural development ranged from .35 to 89.80 houses per square mile with an
average of 16.62 of houses per square mile across HRC. Lastly, the averages of HRC for RTE
ranged from 33.38 to 124 number of species with an average of 59.21 number of species across
HRC. Referencing back to Table 2, in Chapter 5, HRC averages had two covariates well below
the averages across counties while RTE cluster measures nearly matches the average across
counties. First, the mean of NLPS across counties was 18,367, 1or 0,000 more than the mean
across HRC. Second, the mean of structural development across counties was 55.12 houses per
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Figure 1. Relative Risk Hierarchical Clusters for the Total Amount of Hunting and Fishing Violations Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural development, and the number of species listed as rare,
threatened, and endangered.
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Table 10. Hierarchal Clusters of the Total Amount of Illegal Hunting and Fishing Violations Controlling for Significant
Variables
Ratio of
Centriod Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
County Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value
FIPS
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48401
147.44
29
4302
1069.38
4.02
4.75
1281783
2
<0.01
48409
177.58
26
3095
800.05
3.87
4.33
958957
3
<0.01
48083
175.33
42
2520
705.40
3.57
3.90
845504
4
<0.01
48245
108.24
9
1719
739.04
2.33
2.44
885825
5
<0.01
48339
49.21
5
615
499.69
1.23
1.24
598939
6
<0.01
48337
89.35
7
523
140.35
3.73
3.79
168226
7
<0.01
48463
87.08
9
477
159.15
3.00
3.04
190755
8
<0.01
48015
61.85
5
364
128.96
2.82
2.85
154575
9
<0.01
48505
0.00
1
137
11.94
11.48
11.54
14308
10
<0.01
48305
48.14
2
93
10.16
9.16
9.19
12174
11
<0.01
48119
0.00
1
70
4.36
16.06
16.11
5223
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Figure 2. Relative Risk Gini Clusters for the Total Amount of Hunting and Fishing Violations Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural development, and the number of species listed as rare,
threatened, and endangered.
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Table 11. Gini Clusters of the Total Amount of Illegal Hunting and Fishing Violations Controlling for Significant
Variables
Ratio of
Centriod Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
County Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value
FIPS
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48057
76.95
6
1396
277.95
5.02
5.29
194418
2
<0.01
48343
70.83
11
1371
619.87
2.21
2.29
420652
3
<0.01
48419
67.91
6
991
373.97
2.65
2.73
187748
4
<0.01
48307
92.09
11
846
221.11
3.83
3.94
109998
5
<0.01
48289
54.48
4
762
147.13
5.18
5.33
73192
6
<0.01
48503
80.75
9
500
185.80
2.69
2.73
92431
7
<0.01
48373
43.93
4
495
219.11
2.26
2.29
109003
8
<0.01
48261
56.72
4
464
160.10
2.90
2.94
61817
9
0.89
48213
48.18
3
442
381.26
1.16
1.16
189667
10
0.93
48491
38.97
2
424
365.67
1.16
1.16
1595237
11
<0.01
48071
98.30
13
399
160.34
2.49
2.52
79765
12
<0.01
48263
0.00
1
313
74.88
4.18
4.23
37251
13
<0.01
48105
87.23
13
195
34.88
5.59
5.63
17052
14
0.03
48097
47.55
2
167
117.07
1.43
1.43
58239
15
<0.01
48127
49.31
2
165
45.71
3.61
3.63
22742
16
<0.01
48035
38.12
2
163
53.43
3.05
3.07
26579
17
<0.01
48505
0.00
1
137
28.76
4.76
4.79
14308
18
<0.01
48379
0.00
1
124
22.19
5.59
5.61
11037
19
<0.01
48091
0.00
1
114
61.85
1.84
1.85
119632
20
<0.01
48089
0.00
1
110
41.72
2.64
2.64
20757
21
<0.01
48311
0.00
1
97
1.56
62.02
62.29
778
22
<0.01
48385
49.42
2
71
10.58
6.71
6.73
5262
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Table 12. Averages of County Variable Measurements in Total
Hunting and Fishing Violations Gini High Risk Clusters
Number of
Counties in
Structural
Cluster #
Cluster
NLPS
Development
RTE
1
6
57751.00
29.86
79.33
2
11
10708.36
38.37
48.00
3
6
8786.17
17.88
55.33
4
11
5342.73
6.18
51.00
5
4
4993.75
8.42
58.25
6
9
3449.33
5.66
38.89
7
4
7258.50
25.16
61.50
8
4
8796.25
7.55
92.00
9
(not significant)
10
(not significant)
11
13
1215.62
2.98
33.38
12
1
6722.00
23.68
61.00
13
13
986.33
0.92
53.50
14
2
9337.50
14.97
51.00
15
2
2193.00
3.30
41.00
16
2
3652.50
14.83
49.00
17
1
4608.00
6.24
70.00
18
1
4309.00
22.97
41.00
19
1
22156.00
89.80
124.00
20
1
9399.00
10.98
58.00
21
1
1141.00
0.35
50.00
22
2
1504.00
2.36
68.00
Means
8715.50
16.62
59.21
* = found to be significant in linear analyses
NLPS = Number of Hunting and Fishing Lisences and Permits Sold
RTE = Number of Species Listed as Rare, Threatened, and
Endangered

square mile, or 26.89 houses more per square mile than the mean of HRC. For the third variable,
the county mean of RTE was 55.12 species, which was roughly 4 species less than the HRC
mean of 59.21 species.
Measures of RTE, structural development, and NLPS all had significant positive linear
relationships with all IH&F violations (Table 5). When controlling for these covariates spatially,
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HRC had lower measures of these covariates with one covariate measuring near the mean of
counties. Linear analyses suggested that as NLPS and structural development increased, IH&F
violations increased. The clusters, however, show low measures of NLPS and structural
development in locations with higher-than-expected counts of IH&F violations. RTE had a
positive significant linear relationship with IH&F violations, and the mean of HRC averages was
near the mean of county measurements. According to linear analyses, counties with these
measures would not exhibit higher than expected counts of IH&F violations. These findings
suggest, that even though these covariates were associated with the overall distribution of the
total amount of IH&F violations, the covariates do not explain the grouping of high-risk
counties. In other words, while certain variables explain which counties had higher IH&F
violations, they do not necessarily explain how counties are clustered.
Below, this analysis is repeated for IH&F violation for terrestrial species hunting
violations only, and then for bird hunting violations only, and finally for fishing violations only.

Illegal Hunting Violations Against Terrestrial Species High Risk Clusters
When analyzing illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species with a spatial
component, I found that HRC had a mix of low, high, and average measures of controlled
covariates that had significant linearly associations; however, the measurements opposed the
direction of associations found in the linear analysis (Table 6.). These covariates were GDP per
capita, NLPS, agricultural development, structural development, and the number of bodies of
water. Additionally, I found that initial hierarchical clusters do not capture all Gini clusters that
are at high risk, suggesting that the majority of high-risk Gini clusters do not include
characteristics exhibited in the hierarchical cluster analysis. Only a few counties that are high

146

risk and close in proximity were similar to each other. Similar to the above analysis, the
covariates did not provide insight to the clustering of counties with a high-risk of illegal hunting
violations against terrestrial species.
Figure 3 shows six high-risk clusters while controlling for covariates with one cluster
contained in a county. Paralleling Figure 6.2, high-risk clusters tend to be located away from
metropolitan areas or cities (i.e., the border of the clusters are about one to two counties away
from metropolitan or city counties). Table 13 presents description of high-risk counties for illegal
hunting violations against terrestrial species. The radii of these hierarchical clusters ranged from
0 to 179.73 kilometers. The total amount of violations captured by the hierarchical clusters was
1,835 violations, roughly 33 percent of 5,603 total amount of illegal hunting violations against
terrestrial species. This result suggested that majority of counties have, on average, observed
violation numbers close to the expected amount of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial
species when considering covariates. Figure 4, however, illustrates a different distribution of
high-risk counties. Table 14 shows that, when examining for Gini clusters, 22 smaller high-risk
clusters are found, with only clusters 14 and 16 being insignificant. The radii of these clusters
similarly ranged from 0 to 179.73 kilometers, but 11 clusters were isolated within a county.
Unlike the cluster descriptions for the total amount of IH&F violations, the Gini clusters
captured more violations (n = 2,808), roughly 50 percent of the total cases. This reversal between
hierarchical and Gini clusters suggests that there are only a small group of counties that are
similar to each other in the hierarchical cluster analysis, while there are more clusters when using
the Gini cluster methods, and that these clusters contain more cases than those produces by the
hierarchical method.
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Figure 3. Relative Risk Hierarchical Clusters for Total Hunting Violations against Terrestrial Species Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are Gross Domestic Product per Capita, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, agricultural development,
structural development, and the number of bodies of water
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Table 13. Hierarchal Clusters of High Risk Illegal Hunting Violations Against Terrestrial Species Controlling for
Significant Variables
Ratio of
Centriod Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
County Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value
FIPS
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48435
179.73
28
802
183.29
4.38
4.94
389681
2
<0.01
48289
54.48
4
329
44.99
7.31
7.71
73192
3
<0.01
48193
84.39
9
315
139.87
2.25
2.33
227562
4
<0.01
48403
57.12
3
177
50.27
3.52
3.60
44860
5
<0.01
48433
99.95
15
141
51.99
2.71
2.76
84581
6
<0.01
48387
0.00
1
71
7.72
9.19
9.30
12567
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Figure 4. Relative Risk Gini Clusters for Total Hunting Violations against Terrestrial Species Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are Gross Domestic Product per Capita, the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, agricultural development,
structural development, and the number of bodies of water
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Table 14. Gini Clusters of High Risk Illegal Hunting Violations Against Terrestrial Species Controlling for Significant
Variables
Ratio of
Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
Centriod Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value County
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48435
179.73
28
802
183.29
4.38
4.94
389681
2
<0.01
48289
54.48
4
329
44.99
7.31
7.71
73192
3
<0.01
48193
84.39
9
315
139.87
2.25
2.33
227562
4
<0.01
48269
134.19
23
202
66.98
3.02
3.09
115486
5
<0.01
48403
57.12
3
177
50.27
3.52
3.60
44860
6
<0.01
48063
43.00
6
156
92.92
1.68
1.70
151176
7
<0.01
48311
77.67
6
135
87.61
1.54
1.55
96637
8
<0.01
48073
0.00
1
91
42.35
2.15
2.17
51167
9
<0.01
48077
48.07
3
77
23.81
3.23
3.27
38736
10
<0.01
48387
0.00
1
71
7.72
9.19
9.30
12567
11
<0.01
48457
0.00
1
70
32.50
2.15
2.17
21462
12
<0.01
48421
63.50
4
51
23.31
2.19
2.20
37920
13
<0.01
48071
0.00
1
49
22.90
2.14
2.15
37251
14
0.06
48285
47.08
2
48
24.77
1.94
1.95
40306
15
0.05
48321
0.00
1
45
22.50
2.00
2.01
36598
16
0.06
48315
0.00
1
44
15.52
2.84
2.85
10248
17
<0.01
48505
0.00
1
42
8.79
4.78
4.80
14308
18
<0.02
48127
49.31
2
32
13.98
2.29
2.30
22742
19
<0.03
48033
0.00
1
20
0.43
46.15
46.32
705
20
<0.04
48175
0.00
1
20
4.55
4.39
4.40
7410
21
<0.05
48237
0.00
1
18
5.50
3.27
3.28
8946
22
<0.06
48261
0.00
1
14
0.35
40.31
40.41
565
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For further analysis, Table 15 presents information on averages of covariate measures
across counties in a given HRC. A number of covariates were significantly associated linearly.
The HRC averages for GDP per capita ranged from $19,811.81 to $584,052.69 with a mean of
$12,081,100.09 across clusters. The HRC averages for NLPS ranged from 67 to 21,747 with a

Table 15. Averages of County Variable Measurements in Illegal Hunting
Violations Against Terrestrial Species Gini High Risk Clusters
Number of
Cluster Counties
GDP Per
#
in Cluster
Capita
155,257.95
1
28
55,766.49
2
4
42,341.40
3
9
71,624.74
4
23
39,771.89
5
3
38,786.31
6
6
584,052.69
7
6
27,945.92
8
1
33,582.39
9
3
19,850.48
10
1
19,811.81
11
1
113,057.64
12
4
59,507.40
13
1
14
(not significant)
15
1
58,020.36
16
(not significant)
49,001.33
17
1
165,627.03
18
2
331,547.52
19
1
42,787.31
20
1
64,862.28
21
1
438,504.42
22
1
Means
120,585.37
GDP = Gross Domestic Product

# of
Agricultural
Structural
Bodies
Development Development of Water
84.24
8.33
2.57
80.36
6.74
0.75
87.22
5.04
1.44
81.10
5.44
2.57
88.78
19.22
3.33
85.88
8.23
1.33
55.93
6.89
2.17
99.37
1.14
0.00
70.13
8.25
2.67
98.72
1.39
0.00
76.56
19.84
3.00
87.62
0.85
1.50
86.98
1.15
1.00
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15.32

11.47

2.00

86.38
86.39
94.50
55.05
88.13
83.44
79.60

1.22
6.51
6.47
32.45
6.24
3.31
8.01

0.00
7.00
2.00
4.00
0.00
1.00
1.92

mean of 4,889.38 NLPS across clusters. Agricultural development averages for HRC ranged
from 15.32 to 99.37 percent of agricultural land with a mean of 79.6 percent of agricultural land.
Structural development averages for HRC ranged from 0.85 to 32.45 houses per square mile with
a mean of 8.01 houses per square mile. Lastly, the averages for HRC for the number of BW
ranged from 0 to 7 BW with a mean of 1.92 across clusters. Comparing these results to the
means of covariates across counties (see Table 2), four covariates of HRC were less than the
means across counties, and one variable was near even with the mean of counties. The mean of
HRC for the GDP per capita was about four thousand less than the mean of the GDP per capita
across counties, $124,512.77. The mean of HRC for NLPS, was about 4 times less than the mean
of NLPS for counties, 18,367.76. The mean of HRC for structural development, houses per
square mile, was about 5.5 times less than the mean of structural development for counties,
43.51. Lastly, the mean of HRC for the number of BW was about 1.8 times less than the mean of
BW for counties. The mean of HRC of agricultural development, was about even with the mean
of agricultural development for counties (76.48 percent of agricultural land).
Measures of the GDP per capita, agricultural development, and structural development
had significant negative linear relationships with illegal hunting violations against terrestrial
species. When considering these covariates spatially, HRC has lower measures of structural
development, average measures of agricultural development, and higher measures of GDP per
Capita. Both the measures of the NLPS and the number of BW had a significant positive linear
relationship with illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species. When considering NLPS
and BW spatially, HRC had lower measures of both BW and NLPS. According to linear analyses
(Table 6), there should be an expected high observation of illegal hunting against terrestrial
species for counties with low measures of structural development, agricultural development, and
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GDP per capita; however, the spatial analysis shows that counties with these characteristics have
higher than expected counts. As well, the measures of NLPS and BW were opposite of the linear
relationships. These findings suggest, that even though these covariates have an association with
the overall distribution of illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species, the covariates do
not explain the grouping of high-risk counties.

Illegal Hunting Violations Against Birds High Risk Clusters
In the spatial analysis for illegal hunting violations against birds, I found that high-risk
clusters (HRC) had average measures of controlled covariates that positively and significantly
associated with illegal hunting violations against birds (see Table 7), the LQ of the
manufacturing industry, the number of hunting establishments, and structural development.
Examining hierarchical and Gini clusters, I found that smaller clusters that were
characteristically similar had a spatial diffusion effect. Just like the prior analyses, the covariates
that were linearly associated with IH&F violations did not provide an explanation for the
groupings of IH&F clusters.
Figure 5 illustrates the 21 hierarchical HRC of illegal hunting violations against birds,
controlling for the manufacturing industry, hunting establishments, and structural development.
Unlike the previous analyses, these clusters were not located near metropolitan areas. As seen in
Table 16, two of the hierarchical clusters were insignificant. The radii of clusters ranged from 0
to 204.27 kilometers; 8 clusters were contained within a county. The hierarchical HRC captured
2,204 cases, or about 49.6 percent of the total number of illegal hunting violations against birds
(n = 4,435).
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Figure 5. Relative Risk Hierarchical Clusters for Total Hunting Violations against Birds Controlling for Covariates
Covariates are the location quotient manufacturing industries, number of hunting establishments, and structural development.
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Table 16. Hierarchal Clusters of High Risk Illegal Hunting Violations Against Birds Control For Significant Variables
Ratio of
Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
Centriod Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value County
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48435
204.27
35
525
185.29
2.83
3.08
605105
2
<0.01
48273
109.24
11
398
109.36
3.64
3.90
574389
3
<0.01
48481
51.10
4
190
43.87
4.33
4.48
113105
4
<0.01
48337
64.28
5
147
50.79
2.89
2.96
138907
5
<0.01
48283
64.79
4
120
61.56
1.95
1.98
36819
6
1.00
48473
45.94
3
111
85.54
1.30
1.31
108969
7
<0.01
48029
0.00
1
100
48.28
2.07
2.10
1825502
8
<0.01
48449
45.65
5
74
33.03
2.24
2.26
80935
9
<0.01
48447
48.17
2
67
2.62
25.55
25.93
7398
10
<0.01
48281
45.67
2
66
28.13
2.35
2.37
64363
11
<0.01
48071
0.00
1
63
17.69
3.56
3.60
37251
12
0.12
48427
0.00
1
50
27.01
1.85
1.86
62648
13
<0.01
48445
48.29
4
46
17.72
2.60
2.61
49986
14
<0.01
48455
0.00
1
43
5.11
8.42
8.49
14405
15
<0.01
48161
0.00
1
43
6.94
6.19
6.24
19586
16
<0.01
48363
0.00
1
37
13.26
2.79
2.81
27921
17
<0.01
48379
0.00
1
35
5.24
6.68
6.72
11037
18
<0.01
48403
30.55
2
27
6.78
3.98
4.00
19135
19
0.02
48345
70.18
8
25
8.64
2.89
2.91
22187
20
<0.01
48229
82.41
2
19
1.99
9.53
9.56
5626
21
<0.01
48193
0.00
1
18
3.93
4.59
4.60
8266
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Figure 6. Relative Risk Gini Clusters for Total Hunting Violations against Birds Controlling for Covariates
Covariates are the location quotient manufacturing industries, number of hunting establishments, and structural development.
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Table 17. Gini Clusters of High Risk Illegal Hunting Violations Against Birds Controlling for Significant Variables
Ratio of
Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
Centriod Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value County
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48273
109.24
11
398
109.36
3.64
3.90
574389
2
<0.01
48307
92.09
11
219
39.16
5.59
5.83
109998
3
<0.01
48481
51.10
4
190
43.87
4.33
4.48
113105
4
<0.01
48507
54.61
3
160
17.61
9.08
9.39
49694
5
<0.01
48337
64.28
5
147
50.79
2.89
2.96
138907
6
<0.01
48207
96.79
11
142
19.98
7.11
7.31
54340
7
1
48473
45.94
3
111
85.54
1.30
1.31
108969
8
<0.01
48029
0.00
1
100
48.28
2.07
2.10
1825502
9
<0.01
48449
45.65
5
74
33.03
2.24
2.26
80935
10
<0.01
48281
45.67
2
66
28.13
2.35
2.37
64363
11
<0.01
48071
0.00
1
63
17.69
3.56
3.60
37251
12
0.12
48427
0.00
1
50
27.01
1.85
1.86
62648
13
<0.01
48445
48.29
4
46
17.72
2.60
2.61
49986
14
<0.01
48455
0.00
1
43
5.11
8.42
8.49
14405
15
<0.01
48161
0.00
1
43
6.94
6.19
6.24
19586
16
<0.01
48363
0.00
1
37
13.26
2.79
2.81
27921
17
<0.01
48379
0.00
1
35
5.24
6.68
6.72
11037
18
<0.01
48403
30.55
2
27
6.78
3.98
4.00
19135
19
<0.01
48105
87.23
6
26
6.67
3.90
3.91
17052
20
<0.01
48229
82.41
2
19
1.99
9.53
9.56
5626
21
<0.01
48193
0.00
1
18
3.93
4.59
4.60
8266
22
<0.01
48335
0.00
1
17
3.25
5.23
5.25
9169
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Figure 6 (see also Table 17) shows 22 Gini HRC of illegal hunting violations against
birds, with clusters 6 and 12 as insignificant. The range of radii in the Gini models was close to
the hierarchical clusters, 0 to 109.24 kilometers with 9 clusters contained within a county.
Similar to the hierarchical clusters, the Gini clusters capture 2,031 cases – only 173 fewer cases
than included within the hierarchical cluster results. These similarities between the two cluster
analyses suggest that clusters are robust, but figures show that the shape and size of the clusters
differ, meaning that there could be a spatial diffusion effect from these smaller clusters.
Additionally, 5 county centroids are different between analyses, suggesting that the centroids of
hierarchical clusters were not robust. Overall, the clusters for bird hunting violations seem more
robust or reliable than the previous two analyses.
Table 18 presents information on the averages of covariate measures across counties in a
given HRC for bird hunting violations. Three covariates were associated with illegal hunting and
violations against birds in a linear analysis -- the location quotient of manufacturing industries,
the number of hunting establishments, and structural development. The averages of HRC for the
location quotient of manufacturing industries ranged from 0.40 to 1.87 with a mean ratio of 0.99.
The averages of HRC for the number of hunting establishments ranged from 0 to 6 with a mean
number of 0.89. Lastly, the averages of HRC for structural development ranged from 0.31 to
544.52 houses per square mile with a mean of 38.70 houses per square mile. Cross examining
these means with the mean of county measures (Table 2), all covariates were similar to means of
county measures. The ratio mean of HRC for manufacturing industries was only 0.07 units more
than the ratio mean for all counties in the linear analysis, 0.92. The mean of the number of
hunting establishments was only 0.09 units more than the mean of counties, 0.80. Lastly, the
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Table 18. Averages of County Variable Measurements in Illegal
Hunting Violations Against Birds Gini High Risk Clusters
Cluster
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Means

Number of
LQ of
Counties Manufacturing # of Hunting
in Cluster
Industries
Establishments
11
0.60
1.18
11
1.03
0.18
4
1.03
6.00
3
0.73
1.67
5
1.31
0.00
11
0.53
0.18
(not significant)
1
0.72
4.00
5
1.28
0.20
2
1.52
0.00
1
1.67
3.00
(not significant)
4
0.62
0.00
1
0.78
0.00
1
0.99
0.00
1
1.87
0.00
1
1.56
0.00
2
0.72
0.00
6
0.40
0.33
2
0.59
0.00
1
1.45
1.00
1
0.43
0.00
0.99
0.89

Structural
Development
30.27
6.18
21.17
4.55
13.12
2.77
544.52
21.89
13.72
23.68
5.61
12.58
10.58
16.05
22.97
13.18
0.92
0.31
5.46
4.45
38.70

mean of HRC for structural development was only 4.81 houses per square mile less than the
mean of counties, 43.51 houses per square mile.
Measures of the LQ of manufacturing industries, number of hunting establishments, and
structural density had significant positive linear relationships with illegal hunting violations
against birds. When considering these covariates spatially, HRCs had average measures of these
covariates. According to linear analyses (Table 7), there should be an average count of
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observations of illegal hunting against birds for counties; however, the spatial analysis shows
that areas with these characteristics have higher than expected counts. These findings suggest,
that even though these covariates are associated with the overall distribution of illegal hunting
violations against birds, the covariates do not explain the grouping of high-risk counties.

Illegal Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species High Risk Clusters
Figure 7 illustrates seventeen significant hierarchical HRC for illegal fishing violations
controlling for NLPS, structural development, public hunting lands, number of BW, and RTE.
Presented in Table 19, all HRC were significant. The radii of clusters ranged from 0 to 95.74
kilometers, with 9 clusters contained within a county. The hierarchical HRC captured 4,482
cases, roughly 37 percent of the total amount of illegal fishing violations against aquatic species
(n = 12,103). Figure 8 illustrates nineteen significant Gini HRC for illegal fishing violations.
According to Table 20, the radii of clusters ranged from 0 to 85.54 kilometers, with 10 clusters
contained within a county. Similar to illegal hunting violations against terrestrial species, Gini
clusters captured more cases – in this case,4,856 case, or about 8.3% more cases than identified
by the hierarchical cluster analysis. This result suggests that there are smaller clusters that have
similarity with other clusters, and that those clusters were not captured by hierarchical clustering.
Table 21 presented the data for the averages of covariate measures across counties in a
given HRC. There was a total of five covariates: NLPS, structural development, public hunting
lands, number of BW, and RTE. The averages of HRC for NLPS ranged from 2,677 to 228,580
NLPS with a mean of 2,2029.89 NLPS. The averages of HRC for structural development ranged
from 5.83 to 51.81 houses per square mile with a mean of 24.30 houses per square mile. The
averages of HRC for public hunting lands ranged from 0 to 4.95 percent of land for public
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Figure 7. Relative Risk Hierarchical Clusters for Total Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural development, percent of county that is public hunting
land, percent of county that is private hunting land, number of bodies of water, and the number of species listed as rare, threatened, or
endangered.
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Table 19. Hierarchal Clusters of High Risk Illegal Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Control For Significant
Variables
Ratio of
Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
Centriod Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value County
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48315
95.74
13
1109
434.44
2.55
2.71
551859
2
<0.01
48057
78.30
7
1069
285.30
3.75
4.01
201828
3
<0.01
48261
56.72
4
311
68.83
4.52
4.61
61817
4
<0.01
48455
43.93
3
255
71.21
3.58
3.64
83467
5
<0.01
48161
0.00
1
248
16.71
14.84
15.13
19586
6
<0.01
48071
0.00
1
201
31.78
6.32
6.41
37251
7
<0.01
48379
34.28
2
198
103.60
1.91
1.93
63773
8
<0.01
48181
0.00
1
190
104.75
1.81
1.83
122780
9
<0.01
48039
0.00
1
176
106.24
1.66
1.67
331741
10
<0.01
48035
48.38
3
156
52.47
2.97
3.00
61502
11
<0.01
48077
48.07
3
118
32.30
3.65
3.68
38736
12
<0.01
48133
49.33
3
103
35.32
2.92
2.93
41403
13
<0.01
48299
0.00
1
88
16.49
5.34
5.37
19323
14
<0.01
48505
0.00
1
73
12.21
5.98
6.01
14308
15
<0.01
48149
0.00
1
68
21.20
3.21
3.22
24849
16
<0.01
48169
0.00
1
66
5.47
12.07
12.13
6410
17
<0.01
48311
0.00
1
53
0.66
79.85
80.19
778
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Figure 8. Relative Risk Gini Clusters for Total Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Controlling for
Covariates
Covariates are the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold, structural density, percent of county that is public hunting land,
percent of county that is private hunting land, number of bodies of water, and the number of species listed as rare, threatened, or
endangered
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Table 20. Gini Clusters of High Risk Illegal Fishing Violations Against Aquatic Species Controlling for Significant
Variables
Ratio of
Cluster Number of
Expected
Observed
Relative
Cluster
Centriod Radius Counties
Cluster
Observation
to
Risk
Cluster
#
P-value County
(KM)
in Cluster Observations
Count
Expected
Ratio
Population
1
<0.01
48057
78.30
7
1069
285.30
3.75
4.01
201828
2
<0.01
48315
85.54
11
867
331.80
2.61
2.74
498548
3
<0.01
48223
43.76
5
474
326.57
1.45
1.47
831844
4
<0.01
48261
56.72
4
311
68.83
4.52
4.61
61817
5
<0.01
48213
48.18
3
296
174.91
1.69
1.71
189667
6
<0.01
48455
43.93
3
255
71.21
3.58
3.64
83467
7
<0.01
48161
0.00
1
248
16.71
14.84
15.13
19586
8
<0.01
48071
0.00
1
201
31.78
6.32
6.41
37251
9
<0.01
48181
0.00
1
190
104.75
1.81
1.83
122780
10
<0.01
48039
0.00
1
176
106.24
1.66
1.67
331741
11
<0.01
48035
48.38
3
156
52.47
2.97
3.00
61502
12
<0.01
48077
48.07
3
118
32.30
3.65
3.68
38736
13
<0.01
48133
49.33
3
103
35.32
2.92
2.93
41403
14
<0.01
48299
0.00
1
88
16.49
5.34
5.37
19323
15
<0.01
48505
0.00
1
73
12.21
5.98
6.01
14308
16
<0.01
48177
0.00
1
44
17.21
2.56
2.56
20172
17
<0.01
48149
0.00
1
68
21.20
3.21
3.22
24849
18
<0.01
48169
0.00
1
66
5.47
12.07
12.13
6410
19
<0.01
48311
0.00
1
53
0.66
79.85
80.19
778
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hunting with a mean of 1.18 percent of land for public hunting. The averages of HRC for the
number of BW ranged from 0 to 6 BW with a mean of 3 BW. Lastly, the averages of HRC for
RTE ranged from 38 to 85 species with a mean of 59.81 species. Compared to Table 2 with the
means of counties, two cluster means differed from the county means while three cluster means
were relatively similar to county means. The mean of HRC for NLPS did not differ significantly
from the mean of counties, valuing only 3,662.13 more (22,029.89 versus 18,367.76). In
contrast, structural development differed from the mean of counties, and was two times greater.
The mean of HRC for public hunting lands, BW, and RTE were relatively close to the mean of
counties. The mean of HRC for public hunting land was only .22 percent more than the mean of
counties for public hunting land, .96 percent of land was dedicated to public hunting. The mean
of HRC for the number of BW was only .28 BW less than the mean of counties, 3.32 BW.
Lastly, the mean of HRC for RTE have 4.96 more species listed than the mean of counties which
listed 55.12 species.
Measures of NLPS, structural development, public hunting lands, number of BW, and
RTE all had positive linear associations with the overall distribution of illegal fishing violations
(Table 8). When considering these covariates spatially, HRC had lower than average measures of
structural development, higher than average measures of NLPS, and average measures of public
hunting lands, BW, and RTE. NLPS was the only variable that differed from the mean in the
expected positive direction found in linear analyses. Structural development was found to have a
positive association, but the measures of HRC are low. These findings suggest, that even though
these covariates were associated with the overall distribution of illegal fishing violations across
counties, the covariates do not explain the grouping of high-risk counties.
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Table 21. Averages of County Variable Measurements in Illegal Fishing
Violations Against Aquatic Species Gini High Risk Clusters
%
Number of
Public
# of
Cluster Counties
Structural
Hunting Bodies
#
in Cluster
NLPS
Development
Land
of Water
1
7
28350.71
33.43
0.78
4.14
2
11
11469.18
42.85
2.20
3.18
3
5
16496.80
51.81
0.47
3.80
4
4
13471.25
28.31
0.66
3.25
5
3
4562.33
5.83
0.00
2.67
6
3
8505.67
10.27
0.22
3.00
7
1
3104.00
6.01
1.67
4.00
8
1
21747.00
49.83
1.03
5.00
9
1
6395.00
10.89
0.00
4.00
10
1
2677.00
23.88
4.00
1.00
11
3
9205.00
19.61
4.95
3.00
12
3
3495.67
15.90
0.60
3.67
13
3
6343.33
15.93
1.92
3.00
14
1
6619.00
28.66
0.00
2.00
15
1
8674.00
27.16
3.77
2.00
16
1
228580.00
40.68
0.07
6.00
17
1
14131.00
12.02
0.10
0.00
18
1
20133.00
32.45
0.00
4.00
19
1
4608.00
6.24
0.00
0.00
Means
22029.89
24.30
1.18
3.04
* = found to be significant in linear analyses
NLPS = Number of Hunting and Fishing Lisences and Permits Sold
RTE = Number of Species Listed as Rare, Threatened, and Endangered

RTE
67.29
50.09
55.00
52.00
76.00
73.67
52.00
75.00
47.00
38.00
50.67
64.33
44.33
49.00
54.00
73.00
85.00
60.00
70.00
59.81

Summary of Results
Four spatial analyses were conducted for the four measures of IH&F violations (i.e., total
IH&F; animal hunting violations; bird hunting violations; and fishing violations). The spatial
analysis controlled for the results from the linear analysis to map the spatial locations of areas
with higher-than-expected areas of violations (i.e., violation hotspots). Multiple clusters were
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found to be significantly different than the county means, suggesting that counties with higherthan-average IH&F violations, when controlling for covariates, are not grouped by random
chance. Clusters were compared using hierarchical and Gini clustering methods. These results
indicated that the two methods did not produce the same outcomes. In most cases, the Gini
derived clusters were smaller and more refined but contained fewer cases. The hierarchical
methods, therefore, appears better suited for discovering a larger number of violations but does
so by including more geographic area within the cluster scope. Thus, with respect to
implementation of “rational” policies that are more target focused and potentially less resource
intensive, the Gini models would appear to provide a preferred outcome.
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CHAPTER 7:
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The goal of this disseration was to examine whether concepts and variables drawn from
Treadmill of Production (ToP) theory could help explain the distribution of illegal hunting and
fishing (IH&F) violations across Texas. The current chapter begins with a summary and
discussion of the findings. These are also explored in sections that focus attention on the two
primary analyses, the linear analysis and the spatial analysis. This chapter also addresses the
policy implications of these findings, and the limitations of the current study.

Discussion of Results
Findings in the analyses suggest that the economic structure does affect with IH&F in
Texas, supporting ToP arguments. It should be noted, however, that the results are not persistent
or consistent across all hypotheses tests, and vary depending on how the dependent variable was
measures (see Table 9). These inconsistencies make it difficult to provide a clear and convincing
conclusion concerning the utility of ToP theory with respect to attempts to use this theory to
explain IH&F crimes. Moreover, results from the linear analysis and the geographic analysis,
while related, provided unique insights into the use of ToP analysis in Texas. Accordingly,
results from the linear and geographic analysis are discussed separately below.
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Linear Analyses
First, in the linear analyses, the majority of the results supported only Hypothesis 5, and
showed that the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold (NLPS) was positively
associated with IH&F violations across counties in Texas. This finding supported the
observation in ToP theory which argued that the state can operate in ways that facilitates the
expansion of economic activity. In this case, the state may be contributing to the expansion of
the hunting and fishing portions of the economy by licensing hunters to engage in those
activities.
All other analyses found that NLPS significantly associated with other forms of IH&F.
Surprisingly, NLPS had a larger effect than traditional ToP measures. It would be reasonable to
suggest that the increase of consumerism in the hunting industry would lead to an increase in
IH&F; however, the issue of causality was not addressed. Instead, this finding could be
interpreted relative to the cultural setting of the economic structure surrounding a given hunting
and fishing location, as, perhaps, was evident in the geographic analysis. The problem of illegal
hunting and fishing persists in areas where the is more consumption of the commodities or
resources supplied by the hunting industry. This is consistent with Jacoby’s (2003) historical
analysis of illegal hunting in the United States of America (USA) reviewed in chapter 3. Recall
that Jacoby (2003) argued that illegal hunting occurred in areas where hunting and fishing was
prevalent before the growth of conservation efforts in response to the growing MI.
Second, the results also estimated the impact of the hunting industry on IH&F violations.
In a previous chapter, it was argued that the hunting industry could be interpreted as being a
dimension of economic activity in conflict with other industries of the ToP when analyzing
IH&F. With respect to the ToP-hunting establishment IH&F connection, the results indicated
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that the number of hunting establishments in a county were associated only to illegal hunting
violations against birds. While this finding provides some support for a modified ToP theory that
includes hunting establishment effects with respect to one form of IH&F, it does not rule out the
possibility that other economic measures of hunting or fishing consumerism may be useful for
describing the effect of the treadmill of hunting industries on IH&F.
Third, traditional measures of the ToP were not found to relate consistently to measures
of illegal hunting or fishing violations. Instead, measures of the resource mining industry (MI)
and measures of ecological modification had more persistent associations on the dependent
variables. This would follow historical accounts of MI and urbanization slowly encroaching on
undeveloped land used for hunting and fishing (Jacoby, 2003). Consistent with that argument,
the analysis found a negative relationship between MI and IH&F, so that as the volume of land
associated with mining increased, the number of IH&F violations decreased. Related to this
finding, Eliason (2020) and Jacoby (2003), however, have argued that the privatization of land
for businesses and industry hurt the ability of the general public to hunt freely, and that this
would be expected to increase illegal hunting and fishing. Interestingly, the association between
IH&F and the MI disappeared when other economic or geographical factors were included.
While this would suggest the association was spurious, other factors included in the model could
be mediating the association. It could be that the association of MI is conditional upon the
presence of other variables and vice versa. In other words, both the mediating factors and MI
may need to be present to express the association between the economic structure and IH&F.
Finally, since the analysis examined a specific timeframe, temporal order was not established.
The lack of temporal ordering is important to understand the analysis. Areas with a higher
concentration of MI establishments exhibit lower counts of illegal hunting and fishing, but this
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does not contradict Jacoby (2003). Jacoby (2003) and Eliason (2020) did not determine illegal
hunting directly occurred in areas where MI industries were established. No spatial analyses
were implemented.
In regards to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and manufacturing industries,
associations were significant only in regards to violations against land and bird animals.
Traditional ToP variables do not seem to have uniform associations. The GDP per capita only
associated with illegal hunting against land animals, and opposite of the hypothesized direction.
Manufacturing industries were only positively associated with illegal hunting against birds,
supporting Hypothesis 2. Though the GDP per capita did not support the intended direction, this
association does reflect some literature finding a negative relationship between the relative
economic size of areas on environmental health, particularly with respect to mammal and bird
species richness on a global level (Shandra et al., 2010; Shandra et al., 2009). It could be
assumed that overall economic growth is positively associated with IH&F in general, but when
focusing on the locations of IH&F, particularly against land animals, these forms of
environmental harm occur away from wealthier areas. Lynch et al. (2019) described this
relationship between urban and rural areas where resources are extracted from poorer areas to
supply the wealthier areas. Future research should determine who is hunting in different areas,
and should examine if those hunters reside in urban areas. This may explain other aspects of
illegal hunting against land animals.
Manufacturing industries seem to only be associated with illegal hunting against birds.
This finding parallels McKinney et al. (2009) research, which found support of the ToP relating
the bird species richness; however, McKinney et al. (2009) examined the GDP of countries
instead of manufacturing industries within counties. As discussed above, different measures of
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the ToP may associate differently on different levels of analyses. These findings would suggest
that smaller levels of analyses need more refined measures of the ToP, because the ToP is not
distributed evenly across space as discussed in Lynch et al. (2019) in their discussion of
metabolic rift, which argued that resources are unevenly extracted and processed across
ecosystems causing certain ecosystem to lose the ability to replenish themselves. Supporting this
concept of the metabolic rift, basic statistics (Table 2) showed that the manufacturing industries
and MI have a large variation and abnormal distribution. Therefore, using overarching measures
of the ToP at smaller levels are not necessarily appropriate when examining the location of
environmental harms, and better, more localized indicators of the ToP may need to be developed
for more disaggregated analyses.
The association between IH&F and ecological modifications, mainly the measure of
structural development, were resilient through the analyses, even though the direction of the
association occasionally changed directions. This change in directions would indicate that
ecological modifications have different contextual effects depending on the type of illegal
hunting or fishing violations examined. For instance, structural development and agricultural
development had a negative association with violations against land animals. It is reasonable to
conclude that modifying the environment for humans decreases the volume of habitat for
animals, perhaps decreasing the opportunity to hunt illegally. In contrast, in regards to violations
against bird and fish, structural development had a positive association. Though speculative, it
could be argued that unlike land animals, bird and fish can easily migrate through urban
counties, exposing these animals to illegal hunting in more locations.
Lastly, the more prevalent effects for control variables in the study were found for the
number of species listed as rare, threatened, or endangered (RTE), the number of bodies of water
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(BW), and the percentage of county land dedicated for public hunting. The only time these
variables did not explain the linear distribution of IH&F violations was the analyses of illegal
hunting against birds (Table 7). To further support the idea of a mediating effect of economic
variables, both RTE and BW were significant in the full model (model 8) for the total violations
and for violations against land animal analyses, but lost significance in the reduced models
(model 9). Thus, the significance of these variable appeared only when certain variables are
present in the analysis. The only exception is illegal fishing against aquatic species when all
three geographic-opportunity variables were significant in the reduce models. Thus, it appears
that geographic opportunities only mediate the association of the economic structure for certain
measures and approaches to IH&F.
The varying associations with geographical opportunity variables and different IH&F
violations, intuitively makes sense. If you compare the victims examined in each analysis, certain
geographical variables must be present in order for illegal activity to occur. With land animals,
this would not be the case, because land animals migrate through different ecosystems; however,
access to water ways and bodies are the only means to encounter aquatic species. The Texas Park
and Wildlife Department website has a list of public hunting land, all showing some access to a
body of water. Thus, it should be expected that public hunting land would associate with illegal
fishing. Still, more research is needed to determine the extent of these mediating variables.

Spatial Analyses
When considering the linear associations spatially, spatial analysis indicated that counties
with low-risk ratios focused around metropolitan and law enforcement headquarter cities, while
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high-risk counties were located away from cities (see Table 5). This may indicate a metabolic rift
Foster (1999) discussed as an outcome from the ToP. The metabolic rift assumes that nature is
geographically distributed in specific ways, and is extracted unevenly in distant areas (i.e., rural
locations) to support larger, populated areas (i.e., urban areas). The top nine counties in terms of
the number of hunting and fishing licenses and permits sold (NLPS) included Harris, Travis,
Galveston, Victoria, and Bexar, Tarrant, Nueces, Jefferson, and Cameron county. With the
expectation of Jefferson, most of these counties contain a metropolitan or micropolitan city. The
remaining 9 counties contain 45 percent of NLPS, with the remaining 55 percent of licenses
spread across the other 245 counties. Thus, it can be assumed, in conjunction with ecological
modifications limiting species richness in urban counties, these 9 counties are hunting and
fishing animals at a much higher rate, limiting the opportunity for residents in other counties to
legally hunt. This finding is consistent with following Fine’s (2000) discussion of the automobile
mobilizing urban dwellers access hunting opportunities. Unfortunately, travel data for this
activity is not available to confirm.
The most apparent concern with the spatial analyses was lack of explanation of high-risk
clusters (HRC) from variables found to be significantly associated with IH&F in the linear
analyses. Examining the characteristics of the high-risk clusters (Tables 12, 15., 18, and 21),
cluster co-variates had signs in the opposite direction of those found in the linear regression
analysis. While it could be argued that high-risk counties cluster around these variables in the
opposed direction, these measures do not explain why the observed count is higher than
expected. Insignificant variables were not reported, but further analyses should examine these
insignificant variables from the linear analyses and determine if these variables explain the
clustering of the high-risk clusters. Here, Jacoby’s (2003) historical account of MI industries
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may provide some insight. During the height of the lumber industry in the late 19th century,
conservation efforts were made to compensate the loss of natural resources by the industry,
particularly around mining areas. As conservation efforts increased, the opportunity to legally
hunt and fish decreased around these areas. Examining linear analyses again, MI industries were
significant, only to lose significance when other variables were added. It could be that the
variable initially related to the distribution of IH&F due to the clustering of these violations.
Further analyses are needed to determine the reason why high-risk counties are clusters together.
The last detail was the visual spatial distribution of different IH&F activity. Many highrisk clusters (HRC) and clusters for illegal hunting against land animals were heavily
concentrated in mid to west Texas with some areas throughout east Texas. HRCs and counties
for illegal hunting against birds at first seemed similar to the spatial distribution of illegal
hunting against land animals, but the clusters were not as large. Additionally, these clusters
expanded all the way to the western and southern tip of Texas. The HRC and counties for illegal
fishing aquatic species deviated from the others, with these clusters concentrated along the Texas
coastal bend and east Texas. This should not be unexpected, as the opportunity for illegal fishing
would be more prevalent in areas where there are high concentrations of water. Overall, these
results are similar to those found by Crow et al. (2013), who also found that levels of IH&F
activity are not uniform across geographical locations.

Theoretical Implications
The findings have two main implications for the economic structure, particularly around
the ToP theory and the environment. First, not all measures of the ToP explain harmful behaviors
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to environmental. Both the GDP per capita and manufacturing industries associated differently
with IH&F, and their effects varied depending on the measure of IH&F employed. This would
indicate that the different parts of the economic structure contribute differently to specific types
of IH&F. This differential effect may occur through the ways in which the ToP and geography
interact and relate to the formation of social space. Though geographical Marxist have discussed
how the ToP creates social space to support the ToP (see Peet, 1966), the economic structure is
not commonly discussed as affecting the social space for green crimes within criminology.
One could argue that MI industries should be considered a measure of ecological
withdrawals, as has been argued in PEG-C research (Lynch et al., 2019; 2017), and that, in that
view, MI should diminish the opportunity for IH&F through adverse ecological impacts such as
destruction of ecosystems or their destabilization and segmentation. MI was found to have initial
significant relationships with all measures of IH&F. Though the study found the initial
association of MI industries with IH&F to be spurious or perhaps mediated by other ecological
outcomes, manufacturing industries did not have consistent support as a measure of ecological
withdrawals. It is also important to understand that the environmental harm captured by this
study was not pollution or quality of an ecosystem, which are often the focus of green
criminological studies drawing on political economic and ToP theory, but rather focused on
crimes affecting animals. Calls for green criminological research mainly focuses around
environmental harms which threaten ecosystem health more generally (e.g., land, water, air
pollution). As noted earlier in this dissertation, green criminologists have not widely studied
crimes against wildlife, nor have they, in particular, applied ToP theory to efforts to neither
explain nor empirically model wildlife crime. As this dissertation’s results illustrate, the
associations of the ToP on IF&H violations were inconsistent. This suggests that ToP theory
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may not be the best way to explain IH&F violations, and that IH&F violations may be quite
different that the kinds of environmental crime that ToP theory has been used to explain.
With respect to the above, it is also important to consider that there is perhaps dimension
of the treadmill of production that are important to explaining IH&F violations that are not
normally incorporated into ToP explanations. One of the concepts that demonstrated a persistent
effect on IH&F was ecological modifications – which included measures such as miles of
roadways, physical building construction, and agricultural land. As argued in an earlier chapter,
these kinds of ecological modification can be seen as important to expanding the treadmill of
production, and supporting economic activity. Roadways, for example, provide the means to
move commodities and raw materials. Often, the building of roadways to support economic
activity outweighs the effect of that activity on ecosystems or wildlife, and those roadways can
segment ecosystems, diminish wildlife habitat, and affect the opportunity for hunting and
fishing, including illegal hunting and fishing.
Previous ToP relevant PEG-C theory and research has overlooked modifications to
ecosystem as an extension of the influence of the ToP, and as a central component of how the
ToP develops, and perhaps also developed differentially across geographic locations. Though
PEG-C research has discussed habitat destruction for development, (Lynch, Long, and Stretesky,
2015), the discussion has yet to connect development as a variable to be used in discussions of
ecological disorganization in PEG-C research. The present analyses found that illegal hunting
against terrestrial species occur away from ecological modifications, which one could argue tend
to replaces natural habitats with a human friendly ecosystem. Illegal hunting against birds and
illegal fishing aquatic species increased in areas with ecological modifications, perhaps by
increasing access to those areas. In addition, it is also likely that the ecosystems for birds,
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aquatic species, and humans overlap more so than does the space occupied by land species that
are hunted, meaning that there is more interaction among the human population with birds and
aquatic species, and more opportunities to illegally acquire fish and birds. The context of
ecological modifications, in other words, may help explain human-animal conflict in a spatial
dimension. That is an important consideration given that the spatial analyses indicated that IH&F
was distributed in specific ecological ways. Additional research is needed to determine the
proper measurements of ecological modifications, relevant to the environmental harm in
question.

Policy Implications
Since the current disseration is exploratory, policy implications are rudimentary,
especially since the study is cross-sectional and lacking temporal ordering. Though the economic
structure is argued to create social spaces, changing the economic structure with the goal of
changing individual behavior is often seen as involving an ecological fallacy, and one can argue,
that in such an approach, human agency would be ignored. Many social theorists, from Marx
through more contemporary analysts such as C. Wright Mills, address the effects of social
structure on human behavior. Mills is well recognized for arguing that history (i.e., social
structure) and biography (i.e., the life course of the acting individual) intersect. Other
contemporary theorists such as Anthony Giddens (e.g., in his theory of structuration, Giddens,
1984), and Pierre Bourdieu (e.g., in his theory, praxeology, Bourdieu, 1984), address the
interaction of social structure and agency. Thus, many social theorists would disagree that
adopting a structural view requires abandoning efforts to consider agency. How exactly one
would translate the implications of ToP theory into a perspective that considers agency is
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challenging, but has been addressed in various works (e.g. Bunker, 2005; Gould, 2004). Given
the complex nature of such arguments, it is beyond the scope of this brief analysis on policy
implications to extract a theory of ToP-agency interaction.
On the policy front, it can be argued that the most important implications of this
dissertation come from the spatial analyses (chapter 6). While the linear analyses suggest that
certain aspects of the economic structure should be the target of policies because they are the
best empirical predictors, controlling for those effects, the spatial analysis indicated the existence
of high-risk clusters. Cluster maps indicate places where IH&F is elevated geographically, and
the count of IH&F crimes in the extracted areas exceed the mean. Since the maps indicate places
where IH&F exceed the mean, one can argue that the maps can be used to inform the use of
targeted policies designed to control IH&F. That is to say, rather than create IH&F control
policies and then apply them statewide, the cluster maps suggest that IH&F crimes are
concentrated in certain locations, and that, therefore, targeting those locations with IH&F control
polices makes the greatest sense or might have the greatest impact. In addition, the clusters maps
can be used to address whether separate IH&F polices are needed for different species, because
IH&F violation maps vary for mammals, birds, and fish. This result is easily demonstrated in the
cluster maps, and may suggest that different IH&F polices would be more or less useful in
different locations depending on which particular IH&F violation is more prevalent in a cluster.
The cluster maps draw attention to locations where there is an excessive concentration of
IH&F crimes in Texas, and may, in this way, also be drawing attention to the fact that in some
locations there are “contextual” factors affecting effecting the distribution and concentration of
IH&F crimes. That finding is consistent with the approach taken within conservation
criminology, which attempts to identify how a content affects environmental crime (Moreto and
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Pires, 2018). Thus, PEG-C research should have follow-up case studies of “troubled areas” for
policy implications after geographically analyzing the distribution of the economic structure.
Two policies at enforcement and legislative levels can be pursued to address illegal
hunting and fishing across Texas. First, law enforcement should be concentrated around areas
with higher risk of illegal hunting or fishing; however, allocation should be based on the type of
illegal hunting enforcement wants to target. For example, if there is a concern of overhunting of
white-tail deer and other terrestrial species, law enforcement agencies should focus manpower
and resources for patrols or operations based on the means of illegal hunting such as tools used,
time illegal hunting occurs, and more, while other areas have average enforcement operations;
however, while increasing resources to high-risk areas can be done, the policies do not target the
problem contributing to the problem with illegal hunting. Second and therefore, the state
governor should work with county government to enact policies to either regulate to change the
economic structure around hunting. From discussions above, the economic structure can create
social space for illegal hunting when an economic hunting culture is present. As well, illegal
hunting seems to occur in areas where there is less species richness. Policies could focus on
allocating more land for hunting and encouraging conservation to push back against industries
restricting land and destroying habitats through development. Following Eliason (2020) and
Jacoby (2003), government buying land for the public trust helps alleviate the economic control
of industries in conflict with hunting and conservation. Unfortunately, conservation is expensive
for the government and could be privatized to independent land buyers when finances are low
(Jacoby, 2003). Thus, the state and county governments must consider the economic upkeep of
conservation and make it profitable for private land owners and government operations.
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Limitations
As with all studies, this study is not without its limitations. Those limitations could affect
the results of this study, which would affect the finding, conclusions and policy implications that
can be drawn from this research. As with all criminological research, care should be taken not to
generalize these results, since they are based on studying IH&F crimes across counties in Texas.
The first and major limitation of the dissertation is the cross-sectional nature of the
study. Cross sectional studies are useful for capturing snapshots of associations between
dependent and independent variables and easier to conduct than longitudinal studies (Menard,
2002). Some scholars argue that longitudinal studies may not be needed to study structure, since
structure does not drastically change over time (Brush, 2007; Butchart & Engrom, 2002). The
theoretical framework of the Treadmill of Production (ToP), however, does suggest the need for
a longitudinal study, since within criminology, this approach argues that economic change and
trends explains the rise of or distribution of environmental crimes and harms (Lynch et al.,
2017). For example, Long, Lynch and Stretesky (2018) employed time-series production and
pollution output data to assess the relationship between the expansion and contraction of the US
economy before, during and after the “Great Recession” on the emission of pollutants. The
results show that the recession, which slowed the treadmill of production, lead to reduced
pollution emission during the recession, follow by a return of rising levels of pollution following
the recession and a return to expanded ToP economic activity. Given the cross-sectional nature
of the data used in this dissertation, this time effect was not able to be assessed. It is possible
that the relationships examined here may not produce the same results if assessed over time.
Another limitation would be the measures of the ToP. Unlike traditional measures, such
as accounts of pollution or habitat destruction (e.g. Lynch, 2019; Barrett, 2017; and Stretesky
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and Lynch, 2011), the current study examines the presence of industries related to the ToP. In
general, the ToP is described theoretically, as a structure, and direct measures of the ToP have
not been offered in the literature. In those approaches, the ToP is described as a national and
international structure that emerged following WWII. In the current study, the focus was at the
county level. To date, there have been no empirical studies that attempt, to my knowledge, to
employ measures of the ToP at the county level. Thus, in the current study, county level
measures of the ToP were inferred from the theoretical work describing the components of the
ToP (see Chapter 3, section ecological withdrawals for details). To be sure, these measurements
can be seen as proxy measures of the behavior of the economic structure described in ToP
theory. It would therefore be improper to conclude that the behavior of the economic structure at
the county level is perfectly reflected by the measures employed in this study. Thus, the results
may reflect the nature of the measures used in this study to measure the various dimensions of
the ToP.
In addition, though it is assumed the method appropriately models the outcome, there is
no guarantee that the empirical results from the linear analyses reflect the behavior of the
economic structure, nor that they constitute the best empirical model for predicting the outcome,
IH&F. It is likely, for example, that there were omitted variables, and that their inclusion could
impact the results. Also, again because the ToP measure does not occur over time, the crosssectional method does not necessarily describe the behavior of the economic structure as it might
unfold if time were included in the analysis. Finally, it is also possible that within counties, the
ToP behaves differently overtime, and that this change in county-specific economic change has
not been captured in the current study.
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It should also be noted that the data and analysis is limited to Texas, and thus cannot be
generalized to other states. Additional research in other states or across states is needed before
any generalized implications of the current study could be made. Additionally, only linear
associations were examined in the current analyses. It is possible that there are curvilinear
relationships that should be explored. There are some theoretical indications that would support
the need for additional exploration of these data using other procedures. For instance, PEG-C
suggests that mass production creates an exponential use of natural resources (Lynch et al., 2019;
Lynch et al., 2017; Stretesky, Long, and Lynch, 2013). If this description is accurate, it may
suggest that the ToP models should be assessed using some kind of growth modeling.
With these limitations in mind, the discussion of the results presented above below
should be taken as constituting an initial contribution to assessing the applicability of PEG-C to
the potential explanation of IH&F, but not as the final word on this matter. As noted in this
research, prior studies in PEG-C criminology have not addressed IH&F crimes, nor have they
attempted to predict these crimes using either linear or spatial analysis. Thus, while these results
have limitation, they mark a unique step in the application of PEG-C theory and research.

Future Research
In addition to the limitations of the study, there are some other means that can be
proposed to explore these data for future research. First, political factors may also be involved
with the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing. For instance, factors such as the politics of
law enforcement, jurisdiction, or community political affiliation and beliefs may play into the
distribution of illegal hunting and fishing. For example, it is possible that county-level party
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affiliation might be associated with either the enforcement of IH&F violations, or the propensity
to engage in IH&F. Given that these data represent reports from the enforcement of Texas Parks
and Wildlife laws by state officers, variations in the counts of state police are not expected to be
associated with the outcome. It is possible, however, that these outcomes might be the result of
the distribution of State wildlife enforcement officers across counties. Second, longitudinal
studies should be pursued to further assess the potential casual relationships between variables.
It is possible that the results of the cross-county models would different from results obtained by
tracing those counties across time and space, or by tracking a particular county over time. In
addition, Treadmill of Production theory implies the existence of structural processes that
develop and change over time. Thus, a more approximate test of ToP theory would require a
longitudinal study of illegal hunting and fishing to determine whether the change in the economy
changes the distribution of illegal hunting and fishing over time. Third, the methodology of the
study should also be conducted in other states to determine whether the economy behaves
similarly for other forms and definitions of illegal hunting and fishing by the state. As discussed
in Lynch et al. (2018), states have jurisdiction over most wildlife conservation and law
enforcement. Therefore, applying studying other locations may produce different results.
Moreover, testing for differences in these results across states would also discover whether there
appear to be any situational characteristics or structures within states that affect IH&F. Such
results would be consistent with the results found in the conservation criminology literature.
Fourthly, future research should explore whether other structural correlates such as those
associated with street crime also explain the distribution of IH&F across locations. These studies
are needed to determine whether the factors affecting IH&F are different from those affecting
street crimes. In doing so, these studies should explore more traditional criminological theories
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that have been argued to explain crimes against the environment. Agnew (2012) argued that
strained pressure people into harming the environment, given certain situations. These studies are
needed to determine whether general theories of crime can explain any form of crime or
challenge our knowledge on the correlates of crime.

Conclusion
Building on political economic green criminology, treadmill of production theory, and
drawing also from conservation criminology, this dissertation argued that the economic structure
might be useful for understand IH&F violations. In chapter 2, previous literature discussed three
approaches that explain wildlife crimes, conservation criminology, PEG-C, and social factors.
The vast majority of research to date addressing wildlife crime has been derived from
conservation criminology, which focuses attention on examining the context surrounding those
crimes, and includes discussions of the structural opportunity for those crimes. In contrast to the
kind of situational approach taken in conservation criminology, PEG-C argues that any form of
environmental harm or criminal act can be explained by the organization and impact of the larger
economic structure. Unfortunately, studies focusing on illegal hunting in the USA mainly
employed social factors as an explanation. Here again, however, little quantitative analyses have
been applied to determine the extent of the effect of social factors as the correlates of IH&F. The
current disseration examines these approaches to analyses IH&F violation across space (i.e.
counties), focusing on an economic structural explanation (i.e. ToP theory) while controlling for
other explanations noted above.
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The study found that the economic structure is associated with some kinds of IH&F
violations, but that the associations vary depending on the victim (i.e., the kind of wildlife being
illegally taken) of IH&F violations. Additionally, geographical opportunity factors also were also
found to be relevant to the distribution of IH&F violations; however, these factors were argued to
mediate the association of the economic structure. More research is needed to address these
findings. Lastly, no significant associations were found for the association between social factors
and IH&F in this study.
Drawing on these findings, a few points were highlighted to further theory and policy.
First, ecological modifications (e.g., roadway volume and physical development of buildings)
should be included in ToP theoretical framework as a variable that affects local ecosystem.
These modifications may improve access to certain locations, increasing the ability to hunt or
fish illegally, or they may also reduce the opportunity for IH&F by segmenting or destroying
ecosystems through forms of ecological disorganization induced by the needs of the ToP to, for
example, ship products. Second, ToP research should explore other measure of the means of
production such as measures of the MI which may better capture ecological withdrawals. Third,
the spatial analysis indicated that policy needs to consider the varying associations of the
economic structure across geographic locations, and avoid the use of uniform policies to protect
wildlife from IH&F.
In sum, this research indicates that some IH&F violations have an association with
indicators measuring economic structure. This is an area of research that has largely been
overlooked within criminology generally, but within the illegal hunting literature in particular.
Thus, these results suggest that future illegal hunting research should focus on attention on
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economic explanations and the effect of economic variables on IH&F in order to develop a more
complete understanding of the covariates of illegal hunting and fishing.
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